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Abstract
Cyclic codes, like BCH or Reed-Solomon codes, are very widespread and important tools to enable
error-correction in many current communication systems. The standard algebraic decoding allows
to efficiently use codes whose length is not too large, while for larger lengths the computational
costs would be excessive, also in comparison with the iterative decoding algorithms for LDPC
codes, for example.
Aim of this dissertation is to show that further computational gains in the algebraic decoding of
cyclic codes are possible, so that it can become competitive also for very large lengths. A new
decoding method is therefore presented, which makes use of a novel polynomial evaluation algo-
rithms for finite fields instead of the classic Horner scheme, and of Cantor-Zassenhaus polynomial
factorization algorithm together with Shanks’ algorithm instead of the traditional Chien search.
Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm has been further deeply analysed, in order to obtain deterministic
estimates on the maximum number of attempts needed to split a polynomial of a fixed degree or
on the minimum degree such that a polynomial is split with one or two attempts.
The complexity of decoding a t-error correcting code of length n can thus be reduced from O(tn)
to O(t
√
n) for BCH codes or O(t
√
n log n) for Reed-Solomon codes.
We have also addressed in particular two applications where such computational improvements
would be desirable: a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem which requires multiple decoding
attempts to achieve a higher security level, and some code-based solutions for the secure storage
of biometric passwords which involve codes with very large length.
In Appendix we have also included some more detailed analysis and results on Gauss sums and
additive decompositions by multiplicative characters that have been exploited within the body of
the thesis.
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Zusammenfassung
Zyklische Codes, wie BCH oder Reed-Solomon-Codes, sind sehr weit verbreitet und wichtige In-
strumente, die die Fehlerkorrektur in vielen aktuellen Kommunikations-Systeme ermo¨glichen.
Die gewo¨hnliche algebraische Decodierung ermo¨glicht es, Codes effizient zu benutzen, deren
La¨nge nicht zu gross ist, wa¨hrend fu¨r gro¨ssere La¨ngen der Rechenaufwand u¨bertrieben wa¨re,
auch im Vergleich mit den iterativen Decodier-Algorithmen fu¨r z.B. LDPC Codes.
Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es zu zeigen, dass weitere rechnerische Gewinne in das algebraische
Decodierung von zyklischen Codes mo¨glich ist, so dass sie auch bei sehr grossen La¨ngen wettbe-
werbsfa¨hig werden. Ein neues Decodierverfahren wird deshalb vorgestellt, das einen neuartigen
Polynom Evaluierung-Algorithmus fu¨r endliche Ko¨rper anstelle des klassischen Horner-Schemas
und den Cantor-Zassenhaus Polynom-Faktorisierung-Algorithmus zusammen mit Shanks Algo-
rithmus anstelle der herko¨mmlichen Chien-Suche nutzt.
Desweiteren wurde der Cantor-Zassenhaus Algorithmus analysiert, um deterministische Scha¨tz-
ungen u¨ber die maximale Anzahl der Versuche zu erhalten die man beno¨tigt, um ein Polynom
festen Grades zu zerlegen, oder u¨ber den minimalen Grad eines Polynoms, so dass dieses mit
einem oder zwei Versuchen zerlegt wird.
Die Komplexita¨t der Decodierung eines t-Fehler-korregierenden Codes der La¨nge n kann somit
von O(tn) auf O(t
√
n) fu¨r BCH-Codes oder O(t
√
n log n) fu¨r Reed-Solomon-Codes reduziert wer-
den.
Wir betrachten zwei Anwendungen, bei denen solche rechnerische Verbesserungen wu¨nschens-
wert wa¨ren: eine Variante des McEliece Kryptosystem, das mehrere Entschlu¨sselung Versuche
erfordert, um eine ho¨here Sicherheitsstufe zu erreichen, und einige Code-basierte Lo¨sungen fu¨r
die sichere Speicherung von biometrischen Passwo¨rtern, die Codes mit sehr grosser La¨nge bein-
halten.
Des Anhang beinhaltet eine detailliertere Analyse und ein Paar Resultate zu Gaussschen Summen
und additiven Zerlegungen durch multiplikative Charaktere, die innerhalb des Haupteils dieser
Arbeit benutzt wurden.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyclic codes, like BCH and Reed-Solomon codes, are very widespread tools for error-correction
in many important applications in the current society, where information and communication are
playing a more and more relevant role. The traditional algebraic decoding algorithm for these
codes is on the other hand only efficient if their length is not too large, otherwise computational
complexity issues would arise. That is also one of the reason why in the last decades the focus has
shifted more on iteratively decodable codes, like LDPC codes, which can also outperform in terms
of gap to capacity.
Aim of this dissertation is to show that it is possible to make the classic algebraic decoding
scheme more efficient and competitive also for very large lengths. We will also deal with a few
current applications where such performance enhancements are in fact required.
1.1 Outline of the thesis
In Chapter 2 we present a new evaluation algorithm for polynomials in finite fields, whose com-
plexity is competitive as soon as the degree of the polynomial is large enough compared to the
field characteristic. Specifically, if n is the degree of the polynomial, the asymptotic complexity is
shown to be O(
√
n), versus O(n) of classical algorithms. While this is an important achievement
in itself, we will focus in the end on applications to the syndrome computation in the decoding of
cyclic codes.
Chapter 3 deals with an accurate analysis of the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm for factoring
polynomials, which will be used in the new decoding algorithm to find the roots of the error-
locator polynomial. After giving a description of the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm, we show that
restricting to linear polynomials as test polynomials is a convenient choice and that this instance of
the algorithm can be shown to be almost deterministic. In fact we can precisely compute in many
scenarios how many attempts are needed to split a polynomial of given degree or the minimum
degree such that a polynomial is split with one or two attempts.
Chapter 4 is devoted to the complete new decoding algorithm for cyclic codes, where the
syndrome computation is performedwith the new polynomial evaluation algorithm of Chapter 2,
while the Chien search for the root finding step is replaced by a combination of Cantor-Zassenhaus
algorithm and Shanks’ algorithm. A practical numerical example of a BCH code is given for an
overall picture.
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In Chapter 5 we deal with a first application in cryptography, that is a new variant of the
McEliece cryptosystem, where we managed to obtain a higher public key security or equivalently
a smaller key size, by using MDS codes like Reed-Solomon codes. The cost to pay, although not
the most relevant issue in this context, is an increased decoding complexity with respect to the
traditional scheme, whereby having an efficient decoding algorithm at our disposal is extremely
important. The new variant is presented in full details from the point of view of the systemdesign,
possible attacks and comparison with other variants.
Chapter 6 is concerned with a second cryptographic application, that is the authentication
of users by means of biometric features, like fingerprints or irises. Because of the error-tolerance
intrinsicly required by the application, error-correcting codes play a fundamental role in most of
the systems which have been proposed to this end. In particular, codes of rather large lengths are
required because of the typical characteristics of the biometrics in use. This makes the choice and
design of the codes a crucial issue for the performance of these types of systems. In our analysis
we consider two of these constructions, that are essentially error-tolerant hash functions: the fuzzy
commitment scheme and a syndrome based fuzzy hash construction. We propose either the use
of classic algebraic codes or that of iteratively soft-decoded LDPC codes, for which a thorough
design and simulation analysis is presented.
The Appendix contains results on the computation of Gauss sums of cubic characters and
additive decompositions induced by quadratic or cubic characters in finite fields. Some of these
results have been used for the analysis of the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm in Chapter 3. Many of
them are also independently relevant either by their novelty or for the methods used.
10
Chapter 2
On polynomial evaluation in finite fields
This chapter reports the description given in [40] of a new evaluation method for polynomials
in finite fields. Its complexity is shown to be lower than that of standard techniques, when the
degree of the polynomial is large enough compared to the field characteristic. Specifically, if n
is the degree of the polynomial, the asymptotic complexity is shown to be O(
√
n), versus O(n) of
classical algorithms. Applications to the syndrome computation in the decoding of Reed-Solomon
codes are highlighted.
2.1 Introduction
The direct evaluation of a polynomial P (x) = anx
n + an−1xn−1 · · · + a0 of degree n over a ring or
a field in a point α may be performed computing the n powers αi recursively as ηi+1 = αηi, for
i = 1, . . . , n− 1, starting with η1 = α, obtaining P (α) as
P (α) = a0 + a1η1 + a2η2 + · · ·+ anηn .
This method requires 2n − 1 multiplications and n additions. However, Horner’s rule (e.g. [67]),
which has become a standard, is more efficient and computes the value P (α) iteratively as
P (α) = (· · · ((anα+ an−1)α+ an−2)α+ · · · )α+ a1)α+ a0 .
This method requires nmultiplications and n additions. In particular scenarios, for example when
the number of possible values of the coefficients is finite, more advantageous procedures can be
used, as it will be shown in this chapter.
We point out that what is usually considered in the literature to establish upper and lower
bounds to the minimum number of both ”scalar” and ”nonscalar” multiplications refers, some-
times implicitly, to polynomials with coefficients taken from an infinite set, e.g. fields of char-
acteristic zero, or algebraically closed fields. In fact, in [20, 89, 125], Horner’s rule is proved to
be optimal assuming that the field of coefficients is infinite; instead, we show that this is not the
case if the coefficients belong to a finite field. Furthermore, in [90], restricting the field of coeffi-
cients to the rational field, and converting multiplications by integers into iterated sums (therefore
scalar multiplications are not counted in that model), it is shown that the number of required mul-
tiplications is less than that required by Horner’s rule, although the number of sums can grow
unboundedly.
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In the following we describe a method to evaluate polynomials with coefficients over a finite
field Fps , and estimate its complexity in terms of field multiplications and sums. However, as is
customary, we only focus on the number of multiplications, that are more expensive operations
than additions: in F2m , for example, the cost of an addition is O(m) in space and 1 clock in time,
while the cost of a multiplication is O(m2) in space and O(log2m) in time ([39]). Clearly, field
multiplication by look-up tables may be faster, but this approach is only possible for small values
ofm. We also keep track of the number of additions, so as to verify that a reduction in the number
of multiplications does not bring with it an exorbitant increase in the number of additions.
Our approach exploits the Frobenius automorphism and its group properties, therefore we call it
”polynomial automorphic evaluation”.
The next Section describes the principle of the algorithm, with two different methods, refer-
ring to the evaluation in a point of Fpm of a polynomial with coefficients in the prime field Fp.
The complexity is carefully estimated in order to make the comparisons self-evident. Section 2.3
concerns the evaluation in Fpm of polynomials with coefficients in Fps , for any s > 1 dividing m:
different approaches will be described and their complexity compared. Section 2.4 includes ex-
amples concerning the syndrome computation in the algebraic decoding of error-correcting codes
(cf. also [106] and Chapter 4), and some final remarks.
2.2 Polynomial automorphic evaluation: basic principle
Consider a polynomial P (x) of degree n > p over a prime field Fp, and let α be an element of Fpm .
We write P (x) as a sum of p polynomials
P (x) = P1,0(x
p) + xP1,1(x
p) · · ·+ xp−1P1,p−1(xp) , (2.1)
where P1,0(x
p) collects the powers of x with exponent a multiple of p and in general xiP1,i(x
p)
collects the powers of the form xap+i, with a ∈ N and 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1.
First method. If σ is the Frobenius automorphism of Fpm mapping γ to γ
p, which leaves invariant
the elements of Fp, we write the expression above as
P1,0(σ(x)) + xP1,1(σ(x)) + · · ·+ xp−1P1,p−1(σ(x)) ,
where P1,i(y), i = 0, . . . , p−1, are polynomials of degree bnp c at most. Then we may evaluate these
p polynomials in the same point σ(α), and obtain P (α) as the linear combination
P1,0(σ(α)) + αP1,1(σ(α)) · · · + αp−1P1,p−1(σ(α)) .
A possible strategy is now to evaluate recursively the powers αj for j from 2 up to p, and σ(α)j
for j from 2 up to bnp c, compute the p numbers P1,i(σ(α)), i = 0, . . . , p − 1, using n sums and at
most bnp c(p− 2) products (the powers of σ(α) times their possible coefficients; the multiplications
by 0 and 1 are not counted), and obtain P (α) with p − 1 products and p − 1 additions. The total
numberMp(n) of multiplications is
Mp(n) = p− 1 + bn
p
c − 1 + (p− 1) + bn
p
c(p− 2) = 2p − 3 + bn
p
c(p − 1) .
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Then this procedure is more efficient compared to Horner’s rule as far asMp(n) < n. For example,
if p = 3 and n = 10we haveM3(10) = 9 < 10, and for every n > 10 the outlined method is always
more efficient. More in general the condition is certainly satisfied whenever n > 2p2− 3p, as it can
be verified by considering nwritten in base p.
Let us see an example in detail, for the sake of clarity, in the case p = 3 and n = 10. Suppose we
want to evaluate the polynomial f(x) = 1 + 2x+ x2 + 2x4 + x5 + x6 + 2x8 + x10 in some element
α ∈ F3m . Writing f(x) as in equation (2.1)
f(x) = 1 + x6 + x(2 + 2x3 + x9) + x2(1 + x3 + 2x6),
we see that it is sufficient to compute α2, α3, α6, α9, then 2α3, 2α6, 2α9 (all possible coefficients
needed to evaluate the three sub-polymonials), and lastly the two products by α and α2 in front of
the brackets, for a total of 9multiplications. Note that actually 2α9 is not needed for this particular
example, but in general we always suppose to have a worst case situation. Clearly α should
belong to F3m for some m such that 3
m > n, so that the powers of α up to the exponent n are all
different. Note, in particular, that if both the coefficients and the evaluation point are in Fp, then
the polynomial has degree at most p− 1, and our methods cannot be applied.
Now, the above mechanism can be iterated, and the point is to find the number of steps or
iterations yielding the maximum gain. In fact we can prove the following:
Theorem 2.1. Let Lopt be the number of steps of this method yielding the minimum number of products,
G1(p, n, Lopt), required to evaluate a polynomial of degree n with coefficients in Fp. Then Lopt is either the
integer which is nearest to logp
√
n(p− 1), or this integer minus 1, and asymptotically we have:
G1(p, n, Lopt) ≈ 2
√
n(p− 1) .
PROOF.
At step i, the number of polynomials at step i − 1 is multiplied by p since each polynomial
Pi−1,h(x) is partitioned into p sub-polynomials Pi,j+ph(x) , j varies between 0 and p− 1, of degree
roughly equal to the degree of Pi−1,h(x) divided by p, that is of degree b npi c; the number of these
polynomials is pi.
After L steps we need to evaluate pL polynomials of degree nearly n
pL
, then P (α) is reconstructed
performing back the linear combinations with the polynomials Pi,h(x) substituted by the corre-
sponding values Pi,h(α). The total cost of the procedure, in terms of multiplications and additions,
is composed of the following partial costs
• Evaluation of p powers of α, this step also produces σ(α) = αp, and requires p− 1 products.
• Evaluation of (σi(α))j , i = 1, . . . , L − 1, j = 2, . . . , p; this step also produces σL(α), and
requires (p − 1)(L− 1) products.
• Evaluation of b n
pL
c powers of σL(α), this step requires b n
pL
c − 1 products.
• Evaluation of pL polynomials PL,j(x), of degree at most b npL c, at the same point σL(α), this
step requires n additions and b n
pL
c(p − 2) products at most.
• Computation of p − 1 + (p2 − p) + · · · + pL − pL−1 = pL − 1 multiplications by powers of
σi(α), (i = 0, . . . , L− 1).
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• Computation of p− 1 + (p2 − p) + · · · + pL − pL−1 = pL − 1 additions.
The total number of products as a function of n, p and L is then
G1(p, n, L) = b n
pL
c(p − 1) + L(p− 1) + pL − 2 ,
which should be minimized with respect to L. The values of L that correspond to local minima
are specified by the conditions
G1(p, n, L) ≤ G1(p, n, L− 1) and G1(p, n, L) ≤ G1(p, n, L+ 1) , (2.2)
which can be explicitly written in the forms
b n
pL
c+ pL−1 ≤ b n
pL−1
c − 1 and b n
pL
c − pL ≤ b n
pL+1
c+ 1 .
Let {x} denote the fractional part of x, then bxc = x−{x}, thus the last inequalities can be written
as
1 + { n
pL−1
} − { n
pL
} ≤ n
pL−1
− n
pL
− pL−1 and n
pL
− n
pL+1
− pL ≤ 1 + { n
pL
} − { n
pL+1
} .
Since {x} is a number less than 1, these inequalities can be relaxed to
0 <
n
pL−1
− n
pL
− pL−1 and n
pL
− n
pL+1
− pL < 2 ,
which imply
p2L < n(p− 1)p and n(p− 1) + p < p2L+1 + 2pL+1 + p = p(pL + 1)2 .
Thus, we have the chain of inequalities
1√
p
√
n(p− 1) + p− 1 < pL < √p
√
n(p− 1) ,
and taking the logarithm to base p we have
− logp
(√
1 +
p
n(p− 1) +
√
p
n(p− 1)
)
− 1
2
+ logp
√
n(p− 1) < L < logp
√
n(p− 1) + 1
2
, (2.3)
which shows that at most two values of L satisfy the conditions for a minimum, because L is
constrained to be in an interval of amplitude 1 + , with  = logp
(√
1 + pn(p−1) +
√
p
n(p−1)
)
< 1,
around the point of coordinate logp
√
n(p− 1). Therefore, the optimal value Lopt is either the in-
teger which is nearest to logp
√
n(p− 1), or this integer minus 1. Hence, we have the very good
asymptotic estimation Lopt ≈ logp
√
n(p− 1), and correspondingly a very good asymptotic esti-
mation for G1(p, n, Lopt), that is
G1(p, n, Lopt) ≈ 2
√
n(p− 1) .
2
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Second method. We describe here another approach exploiting the Frobenius automorphism in
a different way; although it will appear to be asymptotically less efficient than the above method,
it may be useful in particular situations, as shown in Section 4.
Since the coefficients are in Fp,
P (x) = P1,0(x
p) + xP1,1(x
p) · · · + xp−1P1,p−1(xp)
can be written as
P1,0(x)
p + xP1,1(x)
p · · ·+ xp−1P1,p−1(x)p ,
where P1,i(x), i = 0, . . . , p−1, are polynomials of degree bnp c at most. Then we may evaluate these
p polynomial in the same point α, and obtain P (α) as the linear combination
P1,0(α)
p + αP1,1(α)
p · · ·+ αp−1P1,p−1(α)p .
A possible strategy is to evaluate recursively the powers αj for j = 2, . . . , bnp c, compute the p
numbers P1,i(α), i = 0, . . . , p − 1, using sums and at most bnp c(p − 2) products (the powers of α
times their possible coefficients), and obtain P (α) with p p-th powers, p − 1 products and p − 1
additions. The total number of multiplications is bnp c − 1 + (p − 1) + pcp + bnp c(p − 2), where cp
denotes the number of products required by a p-th power (so c2 = 1 and cp ≤ 2blog2 pc). The
mechanism may be iterated: after L steps we need to evaluate pL polynomials of degree nearly
n
pL
, then P (α) is reconstructed performing back the linear combinations with the p-powers of the
polynomials Pi,h(x) substituted by the corresponding values Pi,h(α).
Theorem 2.2. Let Lopt be the number of steps of this method yielding the minimum number of products,
G2(p, n, Lopt), required to evaluate a polynomial of degree n with coefficients in Fp. Then Lopt lies in an
interval around logp
√
n(p−1)2
pcp+p−1 of length at most 2, and asymptotically we have:
G2(p, n, Lopt) ≈ 2
√
n(pcp + p− 1) .
PROOF.
The total cost of the procedure, in terms of multiplications and additions, is composed of the
following partial costs
• Evaluation of b n
pL
c powers of α.
• Evaluation of pL polynomials PL,j(x), of degree at most b npL c, at the same point α, this step
requires n additions and b n
pL
c(p − 2) products.
• Computation of p+ p2 + · · · + pL = pL+1−pp−1 p-th powers.
• Computation of p− 1 + (p2 − p) + · · · + pL − pL−1 = pL − 1multiplications by powers of α.
• Computation of p− 1 + (p2 − p) + · · · + pL − pL−1 = pL − 1 additions.
Then the total number of products as a function of n, p and L is
G2(p, n, L) = b n
pL
c − 1 + p
L+1 − p
p− 1 cp + (p
L − 1) + b n
pL
c(p− 2) ,
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which should be minimized with respect to L. The optimal value of L is obtained by conditions
analogous to (2.2) and arguing as above we find that this optimal value must be included in a very
small interval.
Setting y = 4n(pcp+ p− 1)1p , the optimal value for L turns out to be included into an interval
around L1 = logp
√
n(p−1)2
pcp+p−1 of extremes
L1 − 1
2
− logp
(√
1 +
1
y
+
√
1
y
)
and L1 +
1
2
+ logp
(√
1 +
1
y
+
√
1
y
)
,
which restricts the choice of Lopt to at most two values. Hence, we have the very good asymptotic
estimation Lopt ≈ logp
√
n(p−1)2
pcp+p−1 , and correspondingly a very good asymptotic estimation for
G2(p, n, Lopt), that is
G2(p, n, Lopt) ≈ 2
√
n(pcp + p− 1) . (2.4)
2
2.2.1 p = 2
The prime 2 is particularly interesting because of its occurrence in many practical applications,
for example in error correction coding. In this setting an important issue is the computation of
syndromes for a binary code ([69]), where it is usually needed to evaluate a polynomial in several
powers of a particular value, so that an additional advantage of the proposed method may be the
possibility of precomputing the powers of α.
A polynomial P (x) over the binary field is simply decomposed into a sum of two polynomials by
collecting odd and even powers of x as
P (x) = P1,0(x
2) + xP1,1(x
2) = P1,0(x)
2 + xP1,1(x)
2 .
The mechanism is then the same as for odd p with a few simplifications. The main point is that
we do not need to multiply with the coefficients, which are either 0 or 1, so only sums are finally
involved when evaluating the polynomials.
And to evaluate 2L polynomials at the same point α we would need to evaluate the powers
αj for j = 2, . . . , b n
2L
c, and then obtain each PLj(α) by adding those powers corresponding to non-
zero coefficients; the number of additions for each polynomial is nearly n
2L
, then the total number
of additions is not more than n. But the actual number of additions is much smaller if sums of
equal terms can be reused, and it is upper bounded by O( nln(n)). This bound is a consequence of
the fact that in order to evaluate 2L polynomials of degree h = b n
2L
c at the same point α, we have
to compute 2L sums of the form
αi1 + · · · + αim , m ≤ h
having at disposal the h powers αi. We can then think of a 2L×b n
2L
c binary matrix to be multiplied
by a vector of powers of α, and assuming 2L ≈ n
2L
(as follows from the estimation of the minimum
discussed above), we may consider the matrix to be square and apply [59, Theorem 2].
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2.3 Automorphic evaluation of polynomials over extended fields
This section considers the evaluation in α, an element of Fpm, of polynomials P (x) of degree n
over Fps , a subfield of Fpm larger than Fp, thus s > 1 and s|m. There are two ways to face the
problem, one way is more direct, the second way exploits the Frobenius automorphism.
First method. Let β be a generator of a polynomial basis of Fps , i.e. β is a root of an irreducible
s-degree polynomial over Fp, expressed as an element of Fpm, then P (x) can be written as
P (x) = P0(x) + βP1(x) + β
2P2(x) + · · ·+ βs−1Ps−1(x) , (2.5)
where Pi(x), i = 0, . . . , s − 1, are polynomials over Fp (cf. also [101]). Then P (α) can be obtained
as a linear combination of the s numbers Pi(α). Thus the problem of evaluating P (α) is reduced to
the problem of evaluating s polynomials Pi(x)with p-ary coefficients followed by the computation
of s− 1 products and s− 1 sums in Fpm .
We can state then the following:
Theorem 2.3. The minimum number of products required to evaluate a polynomial of degree n with coef-
ficients in Fps is upper bounded by 2s(
√
n(p− 1) + 12 ).
PROOF. The upper bound is a consequence of Theorem 1 and the comments following equation
(2.5).
2
The total complexity grows asymptotically with n as 2s
√
n(p− 1), so that a general upper bound
(possibly tight) for the number of multiplications that are sufficient to compute P (α), when P (x)
has coefficients in any subfield of Fpm , is then 2m
√
n(p− 1).
Second method. This consists in generalizing the basic principle directly. We will show the
following:
Theorem 2.4. G1(p
s, n, Lopt) ≈ 2
√
n(ps − 1) andG2(ps, n, Lopt) ≈ 2
√
n(ps − 1)
√
1 + cps−1 + cp
p
p−1 .
PROOF.
As for the first description, the point now is that there are ps − 1 possible coefficients to be
multiplied, so that we get an asymptotic complexity of G1(p
s, n, Lopt) ≈ 2
√
n(ps − 1).
Considering the second variant, P (x) = P1,0(x
p) + xP1,1(x
p) · · · + xp−1P1,p−1(xp) is now not
directly decomposable into a sum of powers of the polynomials Pi(x) since the Frobenius auto-
morphism σ alters their coefficients. However, we can write (2.1) as
P−11,0 (x)
p + xP−11,1 (x)
p · · ·+ xp−1P−11,p−1(x)p ,
where P−11,i (x) stands for the polynomial obtained from P1,i(x) by substituting its coefficients with
their transforms through σ−1 (and if we iterate this for k times we would consider σ−k). Notice
that the polynomials P−11,i (x) have degree at most ni =
n−i
p , and are obtained by computing a total
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of n automorphisms σ−1. However, in order to compute the p numbers P−11,i (α), i = 0, . . . , p− 1, it
is not necessary to compute the total number of n inverse automorphisms observing that
P−11,i (α) =
ni∑
j=0
σ−1(aj)αj = σ−1(
ni∑
j=0
ajσ(α
j)),
where aj , j = 1, . . . , ni, are the coefficients of P1,i(x). It is then sufficient to first evaluate σ(α),
compute then P1,i(σ(α)) and finally apply σ
−1. This procedure requires the application of only p
automorphisms σ−1 instead of n.
If we perform L steps, we need to apply σ−L a number of times not greater than pL. Notice
also that what interests us in σL is Lmodulo s because σs is the identity automorphism in Fps , the
field of the coefficients. The number of multiplications to be minimized becomes:
G2(p
s, n, L) = cp
pL+1 − p
p− 1 + p
L − 1 + cps−1pL + b
n
pL
c(ps − 1) ,
where the automorphism σL counts like a power with exponent pK , with K = L mod s ≤ s − 1.
The optimal value of L is obtained by analogues of conditions (2.2) and arguing as above we find
that this optimal value must be included in a very small interval.
Setting y =
4n(p−1)(pcp+p−1+cps−1(p−1))
p(ps−1) , the optimal value for L is included into an interval
around L2 = logp
√
n(p−1)(ps−1)
pcp+p−1+cps−1(p−1) of extremes
L2 − 1
2
− logp
(√
1 +
1
y
+
√
1
y
)
and L2 +
1
2
+ logp
(√
1 +
1
y
+
√
1
y
)
, (2.6)
which restricts the choice of Lopt to at most two values. Hence, we have the very good asymptotic
estimation Lopt ≈ logp
√
n(p−1)(ps−1)
pcp+p−1+cps−1(p−1) , and correspondingly
G2(p
s, n, Lopt) ≈ 2
√
n(ps − 1)
√
1 + cps−1 + cp
p
p− 1 .
2
2.4 Examples and conclusions
In some circumstances, for example when s ≈ m ≈ logp n, the optimal L and the consequent
estimated computational cost may obscure the advantages of the new approach, suggesting the
practical use of standard techniques. However, this might not be always a good strategy, as shown
by the following example borrowed from the error correcting codes.
Let us consider the Reed-Solomon codes that are used in any CD-ROM, or the famous Reed-
Solomon code [255, 223, 33] over F28 used by NASA ([123]): in such applications an efficient eval-
uation of polynomials over F2m in points of the same field is of the greatest interest (see also [106]).
What we now intend to show is that in particular scenarios the proposed methods allow
additional cost reductions that can be obtained by a clever choice of the parameters, for example
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choosing L as a factor of m that is close to the optimal value previously found and employing
some other strategies as explained below.
The idea will be illustrated considering the computation of the syndromes needed in the
decoding of the above mentioned Reed-Solomon code. We will only show how to obtain the
32 syndromes; from that point onwards decoding may employ the standard Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm, the Chien search to locate errors, and the Forney algorithm to compute the error mag-
nitudes ([18]).
Let r(x) =
∑254
i=0 rix
i, ri ∈ F28 , be a received codeword of the Reed-Solomon code [255, 223, 33]
generated by the polynomial g(x) =
∏32
i=1(x− αi), with α a primitive element of F28 , i.e. a root of
x8 + x5 + x3 + x+ 1. The aim is to evaluate the syndromes Sj = r(α
j), j = 1, . . . , 32.
A possible approach is as follows. The power β = α17 is a primitive element of the subfield
F24 , it is a root of the polynomial x
4+x3+1, and has trace 1 in F24 . Therefore, a root γ of z
2+z+β
is not in F24 (see [68, Corollary 3.79, p.118]), but it is an element of F28 , and every element of F28
can be written as a+ bγ with a, b ∈ F24 . Consequently, we can write r(x) = r1(x)+γr2(x) as a sum
of two polynomials over F24 , evaluate each ri(x) in the roots α
j of g(x), and obtain each syndrome
Sj = r(α
j) = r1(α
j) + γr2(α
j)with 1multiplication and 1 sum.
Now, we choose to adopt our second variant which turns out to be very well-suited since
we will actually avoid to compute any automorphism. If p(x) is either r1(x) or r2(x), in order to
evaluate p(αj)we must consider the decomposition
p(x) = (σ−1(p0)+σ−1(p2)x+ · · ·+σ−1(p254)x127)2+x(σ−1(p1)+σ−1(p3)x+ · · ·+σ−1(p253)x126)2 .
Now, each of the two parts can be decomposed again into the sum of two polynomials of degree
at most 63, for instance
σ−1(p0) + σ−1(p2)x+ · · · + σ−1(p254)x127 = (σ−2(p0) + σ−2(p4)x+ · · ·+ σ−2(p252)x63)2+
x(σ−2(p2) + σ−2(p6)x+ · · ·+ σ−2(p254)x63)2
and at this stage we have four polynomials to be evaluated. The next two steps double the number
of polynomials and halve their degree; one polynomial per each stage is given here as an example
σ−2(p0) + σ−2(p4)x+ · · ·+ σ−2(p252)x63 = (σ−3(p0) + σ−3(p8)x+ · · ·+ σ−3(p248)x31)2+
x(σ−3(p4) + σ−3(p12)x+ · · · + σ−3(p252)x31)2
σ−3(p0) + σ−3(p8)x+ · · · + σ−3(p248)x31 = (σ−4(p0) + σ−4(p16)x+ · · ·+ σ−4(p240)x15)2+
x(σ−4(p8) + σ−4(p24)x+ · · · + σ−4(p248)x15)2
Since we choose to halt the decomposition at this stage (notice thatL = 4 is a putative optimal
value given by (2.6)), we must evaluate 16 polynomials of degree at most 15 with coefficients in
F24 . We do not need to compute σ
−4 on the coefficients, as σ−4(pi) = pi, since the coefficients are
in F24 and any element β in this field satisfies the condition β
24 = β.
We remark that up to knowwe have only indicated how to partition the original polynomial.
This task does not require any computation, it just defines in which order to read the coefficients
of the original polynomial.
Now, letK be the number of code words to be decoded. We compute only once the following
field elements:
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• αi, i = 2, . . . , 254 and this requires 253 multiplications;
• αi · βj for i = 0, . . . , 254 and j = 1, . . . , 14, which requires 255 · 14 = 3570 multiplications.
Then only sums (that can be performed in parallel) are required to evaluate 16 polynomials of
degree 15 for each αj , j = 1 . . . , 32. Once we have the values of these polynomials, in order to
reconstruct each of r1(α
j) and r2(α
j), we need
• 16 + 8 + 4 + 2 squares
• 8 + 4 + 2 + 1multiplications (and the same number of sums).
Summing up, every r(αj) = r1(α
j)+γr2(α
j) is obtained with 2 ·45+1 = 91multiplications. Then
the total cost of the computation of 32 syndromes drops down from 31 + 32 · 254 = 8159 with
Horner’s rule to 32 ·91+3570+253 = 6735. Since we haveK code words the total cost drops from
31 + 8128 ·K to 3823 + 2912 ·K , with two further advantages:
- many operations can be parallelized, further increasing the speed;
- the multiplications can be performed in F24 instead of F28 , if we write α
j = aj + γbj ; this
might increase the number of multiplications, but they would be much faster.
As said, this example was meant to show that there are important applications of polynomial
evaluation which can take advantage of a complexity reduction and that there are certainly many
other possibilities to further reduce the costs, depending on the particular problem at hand, the
model in consideration and the available technology (e.g. availability of storage, of pre-computed
tables for finite field mutiplications, etc.). In particular, this paper has been mainly devoted to the
single-point evaluation of polynomials, showing that it is possible to achieve significant complex-
ity reductionwith respect toHorner’s rule evenwithout any precomputation or storage, especially
when the degree of the polynomial is large. In other models, it may be possible to have the powers
of α as already given data and to store relatively large binary matrices in order to reduce the num-
ber of multiplications in a multi-point evaluation scenario or it may be possible to reduce them
at the cost of a significant increase of the number of additions. For all these different models, we
refer to the vast literature on multi-point evaluation, e.g. [18, 29, 101].
In conclusion, we have proposed some methods to evaluate polynomials in extensions of
finite fields that have a multiplicative asymptotical complexity O(
√
n), much better than O(n),
the complexity of standard methods; the constant involved is a function of the field character-
istic. We have proposed different variants and shown that the choice of an evaluation scheme
that uses possibly the smallest number of multiplications follows from a careful analysis of the
particular situation and might involve the adoption of special tricks dependent on the combina-
tion of parameters. It remains to ascertain whether there exists some evaluation algorithm doing
asymptotically better, i.e. having a complexity O(nt)with t < 12 .
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Chapter 3
On the Cantor-Zassenhaus polynomial
factorization algorithm
Following [41] we revisit here the Cantor-Zassenhaus polynomial factorization algorithm, describ-
ing a new simplified version of it, which entails a lower computational cost. Moreover, we show
that it can be used to find a factor of a fully splitting polynomial of degree t over F2m with O(
2m
3t )
attempts and over Fpm for odd p with O(
pm
2t ) attempts.
We will use, among others, results on Gauss sums and additive decompositions by multi-
plicative characters, to which we have devoted a full-fledged analysis in Appendix.
3.1 Introduction
The Cantor-Zassenhaus polynomial factorization algorithm ([26]) is an efficient (polynomial-time)
probabilistic algorithm for factoring polynomials over a finite field Fpm , that are the product of
irreducible polynomials with a common degree s and multiplicity one. When the multiplicity
is above 1, the factors can be separated by computing the greatest common divisor of the given
polynomial and its formal derivative. If the irreducible polynomials have different degrees, the
factors are separated by computing the greatest common divisors with polynomials of the form
xp
mr−1 − 1, starting from r = 1, so as to obtain the product of all irreducible factors of degree
r = 1, 2, . . . (see e.g. [49]). Thus standard methods can be used to reduce the problem to the above
case.
We will now introduce the Cantor-Zassenhaus factorization algorithm, providing a non-
standard explanation which will be the basis for the rest of the chapter: in the Sections below
we will show how it can be improved, giving a new description with a more favorable estimate
of its complexity and success rate. In fact this description leads us to consider a deterministic ver-
sion of the algorithm, so that we will be concerned with the problem of establishing how many
attempts are needed in the worst case to obtain a factor (with probability 1) and what is the least
degree of the polynomial such that a factor is found with at most a fixed number of attempts.
Let σ(z) be a polynomial of degree t over Fpm which is a product of irreducible polynomials
of degree s, i.e. t = s · d.
Let us assume that s = 1 as a first instance and suppose that the trivial factor z does not
divide σ(z).
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We first deal with the case p = 2, and following [26] we assume that m is even, otherwise
we would consider a quadratic extension solely for the computations. If α is a known primitive
element of F2m , we define `m =
2m−1
3 and ρ = α
`m , which is thus a primitive cubic root of unity in
the field F2m .
Let c(z) be a non-constant polynomial over F2m of degree less than t, and let
a(z) = c(z)`m mod σ(z)
which is again a polynomial of degree at most t− 1. Furthermore, we have
(c(z)`m + 1)(c(z)`m + ρ)(c(z)`m + ρ2) = c(z)2
m−1 − 1 .
Now, either gcd(c(z), σ(z)) is non-trivial (and thus we already have a factor of σ(z)) or else
c(z)2
m−1 − 1 = 0 mod σ(z). In this latter case, if we write c(z)2m−1 − 1 = Q(z)σ(z) + R(z) and
specialize it in the roots {zi} of σ(z), we see that R(z), which is a polynomial of degree t− 1, takes
the value 0 for all t roots, as β2
m−1 − 1 = 0 for any β ∈ F∗2m . This implies that R(z) is identically 0.
Thus we can write
(c(z)`m + 1)(c(z)`m + ρ)(c(z)`m + ρ2) = (a(z) + 1)(a(z) + ρ)(a(z) + ρ2) = 0 mod σ(z) .
Since every factor of the product (a(z) + 1)(a(z) + ρ)(a(z) + ρ2) has degree less than t, at least
two of them must have a common non-trivial factor with σ(z), unless a(z) = 1, ρ, ρ2. In this latter
case, the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm considers another random polynomial instead of c(z), and
reiterates the procedure until all factors have been found.
Notice that a(z) ≡ 0 never occurs, since c(z) has degree less than σ(z), so that at least one
root of σ(z), say β, is not a root of c(z); then substituting β in the identity c(z)`m = q(z)σ(z)+a(z),
we get a(β) 6= 0, therefore a(z) is not identically zero (this holds even if the roots of σ were not in
the field of the coefficients, as in the original description of the algorithm).
For the case p > 2, the procedure is similar: wewould consider `m =
pm−1
2 and ρ = α
`m = −1,
where α is a primitive element of Fpm . Here we would compute a(z) = c(z)
`m mod σ(z) and then
factor as soon as a(z) 6= ±1.
Let us consider now the case s > 1. One option is to look at Fpsm , where the polynomial fully
splits into linear factors: once a factor z−β is found, it can be multiplied with the factors z−βpmi ,
with 1 ≤ i ≤ s − 1, to obtain an irreducible factor of degree s. A second option is the application
of the algorithms over Fpm ([12], [26]), to directly find the irreducible factors of degree s over Fpm .
If p = 2, the argument follows as above: either gcd(c(z), σ(z)) is non-trivial, or gcd(c(z), σ(z)) = 1,
in which case
(c(z)`sm + 1)(c(z)`sm + ρ)(c(z)`sm + ρ2) = (a(z) + 1)(a(z) + ρ)(a(z) + ρ2) = 0 mod σ(z) .
Since every factor of the product (a(z) + 1)(a(z) + ρ)(a(z) + ρ2) has degree less than t, at least
two of them must have a common non-trivial factor with σ(z) in F2m , unless a(z) = 1, ρ, ρ
2. In
this latter case, the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm considers another random polynomial c(z), and
reiterates the procedure until all factors have been found.
For the case p > 2, the procedure is similar: we would consider `sm =
psm−1
2 and compute
a(z) = c(z)`sm mod σ(z) and then factor as soon as a(z) 6= ±1.
In the next Section we will present a variant of the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm, according
to the description given above, and then deal with probabilistic as well as deterministic consider-
ations about its success rate.
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3.2 An improved algorithm
We focus first on the case s = 1 and show that it is enough, and indeed convenient, to choose
c(z) = z as initial test polynomial and to choose c(z) = z + β, for some random β 6= 0, as further
test polynomial, and continuing by choosing random βs different from the previous ones until a
factor is found. A similar approach was already present in [96] for the case of odd characteristic
(cf. also [5]).
We then consider the case s > 1, where polynomials of degree 1 or s will be involved as test
polynomials in order to obtain bounds on the number of attempts to find a factor.
3.2.1 Case s = 1
Suppose σ(z) is over F2m and z
`m = ρi mod σ(z), i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Now, any element in F∗2m can
be written as αk+3n, with k ∈ {0, 1, 2}: we define A0 = {α3i : i = 0, . . . , `m − 1}, that is the
subgroup of the elements of F∗2m that are cubic powers, and let A1 = αA0 and A2 = α2A0 be
the two cosets that complete the coset partition of F∗2m . If we substitute α
k+3n for any root zi of
σ(z) in z`m − ρi = Q(z)σ(z), we obtain ρk − ρi = 0, which implies k = i. This means that if
z`m = ρi mod σ(z), then all the roots of σ(z) are of the form αi+3n, that is they belong to the same
coset. When this situation occurs, we consider another test polynomial c(z) = z + β, which is
equivalent to testing c(z) = z for the polynomial ς(z) whose set of roots is {zi + β}. The test
succeeds as soon as we find a β such that the roots zi + β do not all belong to the same coset.
The next step is to determine an upper bound to the number of attempts needed in the worst
case scenario, or on average, until a factor is found.
Let us first consider the simple case t = 2: suppose that z1 and z2 belong to the same coset;
then we look for a β such that z1+β and z2+β are in different cosets. For the worst case scenario,
we need to know how many pairs (z1 + β, z2 + β) have both elements in the same coset. This is
equivalent to knowing the number of ways in which z1−z2 = z1+β−(z2+β) can be written as the
sum of two elements in the same coset. This number is actually 2
m−1
3 − 1, as can be deduced from
[126, Theorem 1] specialized with i = 0 and χ the cubic character. So at most with 2
m−1
3 attempts
we can factor a polynomial of degree 2. Clearly at each test we can factor with a probability of 23 ,
so that the expected number of attempts is 1.5.
If σ(z) is a polynomial over Fpm , p > 2, then the maximum number of attempts is
pm−1
2 , by
similar reasoning: we again use some additive properties of residues ([80, 81, 98, 126]). At each
test we can factor with a probability of 12 , so that the expected number of attempts is 2.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to establishing both probabilistic estimates and
deterministic bounds on the number of attempts needed to successfully factor, for a generic t. A
first deterministic, though very loose, bound is the following:
Proposition 3.1. The maximum number of attempts needed to find a factor is upper bounded by `m (that
is 2
m−1
3 or
pm−1
2 for p = 2 or p odd, respectively). In particular, in the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm it is
sufficient to consider only linear polynomials as test polynomials c(z).
PROOF. In characteristic 2, if a root zi belongs to a given known coset, we can test all the `m
elements of that coset, until we obtain zi itself: zi + zi adds to 0, which does not belong to any
coset. Thus we will succeed with at most `m attempts. In characteristic p greater than 2, it is
sufficient to add all the elements of the coset multiplied by p− 1.
23
That it is enough to consider all the pm monic linear polynomials is anyway clear since com-
puting gcd{z − β, σ(z)} for all β in Fpm would be enough to find all the factors.
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Remark 3.2. The above argument implies that, if the first attempt fails, we know which coset the roots
belong to, and can restrict our choice of β to that coset.
Remark 3.3. Alternatively, the upper bounds of the proposition follow from the above remarks about t = 2:
clearly, if t is bigger than 2, then a degree-2 polynomial is anyway a factor of the t-degree polynomial, so
that the maximum number of attempts cannot exceed the number needed to factor this degree-2 polynomial.
Remark 3.4. In the original version of the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm, gcd(a(z), σ(z)) is computed
when searching for a factor of σ(z), corresponding to the case when gcd(c(z), σ(z)) is non-trivial. Our
version of the algorithm avoids this computation, since it is sufficient to evaluate σ(z) in β with any efficient
polynomial evaluation algorithm; this can be done before exponentiating to the power `m.
Remark 3.5. If q is a prime factor of pm − 1, then we may consider the exponent `m = p
m−1
q : in this case
the probability of success is q−1q and the corresponding expected number of attempts is
q
q−1 , which is close
to 1 already for small primes like 5 or 7; the drawback is that, if q is large, in the worst case we must check
q greatest common divisors, namely gcd(a(z) + ζjq , σ(z)), for 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1, where ζq is a q-th primitive
complex root of unity.
3.2.2 Case s > 1
If s > 1, either we look for linear factors in Fpms , and the analysis is the same as in the case s = 1,
or we choose the direct method, as explained in the previous section. In this case, by a similar
argument as above, the algorithm succeeds as soon as c(zi), zi being the roots of σ(z), are not all
in the same coset. This is equivalent to ask that non conjugate roots are not all in the same coset,
as
c(zp
m
i )
`sm = ((c(zi))
pm)`sm = ((c(zi))
`sm)p
m
= (c(zi))
`sm
by the properties of the Frobenius automorphism.
Let us see this more precisely, describing in detail the case p = 2, while a similar argument
applies in the case of odd primes. Let σ(z) be, as above, a polynomial of degree t over F2m ,
which is a product of d irreducible polynomials σi(z) of degree s over the same field F2m , where
it is not restrictive to assume even m. According to Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm, a polynomial
c(z) over F2m , relatively prime with σ(z), separates σ(z) into two polynomials of smaller degree
if a(z) = c(z)`sm mod σ(z) is different from 1, ρ, ρ2: at least two factors σi(z) are in two distinct
greatest common divisors between σ(z) and a(z) + 1, a(z) + ρ, and a(z) + ρ2, respectively.
Lemma 3.6. With the above hypotheses and definitions, a polynomial c(z) over F2m separates σ(z) into
two polynomials one containing the factor σ1(z), and a second one containing the factor σ2(z) if and only if
c(z)`sm mod σ1(z) 6= c(z)`sm mod σ2(z). Equivalently, σ1(z) and σ2(z) are separated if and only if c(z1)
and c(z2) belong to different cosets A′h of F∗2sm , where z1 and z2 are roots of σ1(z) and σ2(z), respectively.
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PROOF. The polynomial σ(z) can be written as a product of three polynomials, i.e. σ1(z), σ2(z),
and σr(z) which collects the remaining factors, thus a(z) can be decomposed, using the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT), as
a(z) = a1(z)ψ1(z) + a2(z)ψ2(z) + ar(z)ψr(z) mod σ(z) , ψ1(z) + ψ2(z) + ψr(z) = 1 ,
where a1(z) = c(z)
`sm mod σ1(z), a2(z) = c(z)
`sm mod σ2(z), and ar(z) = c(z)
`sm mod σr(z).
If a(z) = 1, ρ, ρ2, the uniqueness of the CRT decompositions implies that a1(z) = a2(z) =
ar(z).
If a(z) 6= 1, ρ, ρ2, then c(z) separates σ(z) into two polynomials of smaller degree, and we
distinguish two cases:
1) a1(z) 6= a2(z): the polynomials σ1(z) and σ2(z) are in different factors because, if both of
them were in the same factor, they would both divide the same polynomial a(z) + ρh, thus
ai(z) = a(z) = ρ
h modulo σi(z), i = 1, 2, contrary to the assumption.
2) a1(z) = a2(z): σ1(z) and σ2(z) are in the same factor; in fact, suppose they are not, then
a1(z) = a(z) = ρ
h1 mod σ1(z) 6= a2(z) = a(z) = ρh2 mod σ2(z), yielding a contradiction.
Also, since a(z) = c(z)`sm mod σ(z) and a(z) = ai(z) = ρ
hi mod σi(z), we have that c(zi)
`sm = ρhi ,
i = 1, 2, which means that c(zi) ∈ A′hi , hence it follows from the first part of the lemma that c(z)
separates σ1(z) and σ2(z) if and only if c(z1) 6= c(z2).
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Now, as in the case s = 1, we are interested in upper bounds for the number of attempts and
we can limit the choice of c(z), according to our convenience. For example, if we know at least
one primitive polynomial m(z) of degree s, we can choose the polynomials c(z) within the set of
monic irreducible polynomials of degree s, so that we get directly p
ms
s as an upper bound. If we
do not have any primitive polynomial of degree s, that is no means to get and draw from the pool
of irreducible polynomials of degree s, then we can choose the polynomials c(z) within the larger
set of monic polynomials of degree s, and we have the looser bound pms. Somehow surprisingly,
we show next that usually it is actually sufficient to consider again linear polynomials.
Let χ′3(x) be a non-trivial cubic character over F2sm , namely χ
′
3 is a mapping from F
∗
2sm into
the complex numbers defined as
χ′3(α
hθ) = ζh3 , θ ∈ A′0, h = 0, 1, 2 ,
α being a primitive element of F∗2sm , ζ3 a primitive complex cubic root of unity, and A′0 the coset
of cubes in F∗2sm . Moreover, we set χ
′
3(0) = 0 by definition.
If z1 and z2 are roots of two distinct irreducible polynomials of degree s, we denote with
N
(m)
2 (z1, z2) the number of monic polynomials c(z) = z + β with β ∈ F2m such that χ′3(c(z1)) =
χ′3(c(z2)).
Proposition 3.7. The maximum number NA of attempts needed to find an irreducible factor of degree s,
using monic linear polynomials as test polynomials, is upper bounded by 2
m
3 (1 +
4s−2√
2m
+ 12m ) if p = 2, or
by p
m
2 (1 +
2s−1√
pm
) if p is odd. In particular linear polynomials are sufficient to find a factor if 4s−2√
2m
< 2 or
2s−1√
pm
< 1, respectively.
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PROOF. In the case of characteristic 2, NA is upper bounded by the maximum of N
(m)
2 (z1, z2) + 1
taken over all distinct pairs of roots z1 and z2 of distinct irreducible polynomials of degree s. Thus
an upper bound for N
(m)
2 (z1, z2) independent of z1 and z2 is also an upper bound for NA − 1.
Consider the indicator function
IA′h(c(zi)) =
1 + ζ¯h3χ
′
3(c(zi)) + ζ
h
3 χ¯
′
3(c(zi))
3
i = 1, 2 ,
which is 1 if the cubic character of c(zi) is ζ
h
3 , and is 0 otherwise, if we suppose c(z) relatively
prime with σ(z).
Therefore, for a given c(z)we have a coincidence whenever the product IA′h(c(z1))IA′h(c(z2))
is 1. Thus,
2∑
h=0
IA′h(c(z1))IA′h(c(z2)) =
1
3
(
1 + χ′3(c(z1))χ¯
′
3(c(z2)) + χ¯
′
3(c(z1))χ
′
3(c(z2))
)
is the coincidence indicator for a fixed polynomial c(z). Summing over all monic linear polynomi-
als z + β over F2m , we get the total number N
(m)
2 (z1, z2) of coincidences
N
(m)
2 (z1, z2) =
1
3
∑
β∈F2m
(
1 + χ′3(z1 + β)χ¯
′
3(z2 + β) + χ¯
′
3(z1 + β)χ
′
3(z2 + β)
)− 2
3
,
where −23 comes from excluding those polynomials z + β having z1 or z2 as root. We split the
summation in three summations, the first summation is simply 2m, and the second and third
summations are complex conjugated, thus it is enough to evaluate only the summation
C =
∑
β∈F2m
χ′3(z1 + β)χ¯
′
3(z2 + β) .
This summation is hard to evaluate in closed form, thus we content ourselves with a bound.
Namely, as χ′3 can be considered as the lifted character of a nontrivial character χ3 over F2m [63],
we can write
C =
∑
β∈F2m
χ3(NF2ms/F2m (z1 + β))χ¯3(NF2ms/F2m (z2 + β)),
where NF2ms/F2m (x) = x · x2
m · · · x2m(s−1) is the relative norm of x.
Since NF2ms/F2m (zi + β), i = 1, 2, are polynomials of degree s in β, and χ¯3 = χ
2
3, we can then
use the Weil bound ([108, Theorem 2C’]; cf. also [120],[127, Lemma 2.2]) to obtain
C < (2s− 1)2m/2.
In conclusion we obtain NA bounded asNA <
2m
3 (1+
4s−2√
2m
+ 12m ). The same argument works
similarly for p odd, and making the appropriate changes the conclusion is
NA <
pm
2
(1 +
2s − 1√
pm
) .
2
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In the following we analyse the algorithm more in detail both from a probabilistic and a
deterministic point of view; in particular we will show that the maximum number of attempts to
get a factor is usually very small, so that the algorithm, which is probabilistic in nature, can often
be considered deterministic. In order to simplify the subsequent analysis, we will suppose that
s = 1 from now on.
Remark 3.8. Note that similar equalities of characters as those we use in the present paper to assess de-
terministic bounds have been already considered in [4, 12, 111], but the analysis was aimed at obtaining
probabilistic estimates, and also other approaches are possible, such as algebraic geometric machinery [3].
Remark 3.9. The analysis concerns the scheme of Cantor-Zassenhaus where the test polynomials are chosen
randomly. Therefore when considering linear polynomials z + β we are always choosing different, but
random βs. However this does not exclude that there are systematic choices for the βs that lead to a smaller
maximum number of attempts, in particular, for prime fields we get a better estimate from [111, Lemma
3.3], but this might, on the other hand, affect negatively the average complexity [111].
3.3 Probability of factoring
The Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm is very efficient in factoring polynomials, but is not determin-
istic. We can show, however, that the maximum number of attempts, following the modified
version above, decreases exponentially with the degree of the polynomial, so that the probability
of factoring with one test is close to 1when the degree is large enough.
Making the reasonably assumption that the set of {zi+β} for some β is made up of elements
which belong to each coset Ai with probability 1/3 (or 1/2 in the case p > 2), independently of
one another, then 3 · 13t is the probability that they all belong to a common coset of the three cosets
(and 2 · 12t in case of the two cosets in F∗pm , p > 2). Therefore the number of attempts to obtain a
factor, in the worst case scenario, is roughly 2
m
3t−1 and
pm
2t−1 respectively. And the expected number
is 1
1− 1
3t−1
= 1 + 13t−1−1 or 1 +
1
2t−1−1 .
Furthermore, supposewe fail at the first attempt, then we can choose β within a certain coset,
and the probability of failing at the next n attempts is only 13tn .
Clearly, once a factor is found, the polynomial splits into two parts to which we will re-apply
the previous computation if we are interested in a complete factorization, untill all linear factors
are obtained.
3.4 Deterministic splitting I: fixed t
If we use the proposed variant of the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm, the tightest upper bound to
the number of attempts necessary to split a polynomial σ(z) of degree t over F2m is equal to
1 + max
z1 6=z2 6=···6=zt
N2(t),
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where N2(t) is the number of solutions β of a system of t equations in F2m of the form
αjz31 + β = α
ky31
αjz32 + β = α
ky32
...
αjz3t + β = α
ky3t
(3.1)
where αjz31 , α
jz32 , · · · , αjz3t are given and distinct (i.e. they are the roots of σ(z)), whereas the yis
must be chosen in the field to satisfy the system, and the three values {0, 1, 2} for k and j are all
considered. However, we may assume j = 0, since dividing each equation by αj , and setting
β′ = βα−j and k′ = k− j mod 3, we see that the number of solutions of the system is independent
of j. If the system is unsolvable, then the number of attempts is 1.
To evaluate N2(t), we define an indicator function of the sets Au using the cubic character,
namely for every x 6= 0
IAu(x) =
1 + ζ2u3 χ3(x) + ζ
u
3 χ¯3(x)
3
=
{
1 if x ∈ Au
0 otherwise
u = 0, 1, 2 ,
(where the bar denotes complex conjugation). Then, given a zi we can partition the elements
β 6= z3i in F2m into subsets depending on the k ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that χ3(β + z3i ) = ζk3 . Therefore, a
solution of (3.1) for a fixed k and j = 0 is singled out by the product
t∏
i=1
IAk(β + z
3
i ) =
1
3t
[1 +
t∑
i=1
σ
(k)
i ] ,
where each σ
(k)
i is a homogeneous sum of monomials which are products of i characters of the
form χ3(β + z
3
h) or χ¯3(β + z
3
h). ThusN2(t) is
N2(t) =
∑
β∈F2m
β 6∈{z3i }
[
t∏
i=1
IA0(β + z
3
i ) +
t∏
i=1
IA1(β + z
3
i ) +
t∏
i=1
IA2(β + z
3
i )
]
. (3.2)
The roots zi in the sum need not be considered, since in any case they are not solutions (z
3
i +z
3
i = 0
cannot be in the same coset as z3i + z
3
j if i 6= j).
Similarly, in characteristic greater than 2, the tightest upper bound to the number of attempts
necessary to split a polynomial σ(z) of degree t is equal to
1 + max
z1 6=z2 6=···6=zt
Np(t),
where Np(t) is the number of solutions β of a system of t equations in Fpm of the form
αjz21 + β = α
ky21
αjz22 + β = α
ky22
...
αjz2t + β = α
ky2t
(3.3)
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where αjz21 , α
jz22 , · · · , αjz2t are given and distinct and the two values {0, 1} for k and j are consid-
ered. Again, we may assume j = 0 and we can define an indicator function of the setsBu using the
quadratic character, where B0 is the set of squares and B1 the complementary set in F∗pm : namely,
let χ2 be a mapping from F
∗
pm into the complex numbers defined as
χ2(α
hθ) = (−1)h , θ ∈ B0, h = 0, 1 .
Again, we set χ2(0) = 0.
The corresponding indicator function is thus
IBu(x) =
1 + (−1)uχ2(x)
2
=
{
1 if x ∈ Bu
0 otherwise
u = 0, 1 .
Given a zi we partition Fpm \{z2i } into subsets depending on the value of k, such that χ2(β+ z2i ) =
(−1)k . Therefore, a solution of (3.3) for a fixed k is given by the product
t∏
i=1
IBk(β + z
2
i ) =
1
2t
[1 +
t∑
i=1
σ
(k)
i ] ,
where each σ
(k)
i is a homogeneous sum of monomials which are product of i characters of the form
χ2(β + z
2
h). Thus Np(t) is
Np(t) =
∑
β∈Fpm
β 6∈{−z2i }
[
t∏
i=1
IB0(β + z
2
i ) +
t∏
i=1
IB1(β + z
2
i )
]
. (3.4)
The following subsections deal with computations of Np(t) for small values of t, then with
general bounds on Np(t).
3.4.1 Computations for small t
In the following computations, wewill use some properties of nontrivial characters that we briefly
mention:
∑
x∈Fq χ(x) = 0; if β 6= 0, then
∑
x∈Fq χ(x)χ¯(x+ β) = −1 ([102, 126]). Moreover,∑
x∈F2m
χ3(x)χ3(x+ 1) = Gm(1, χ) = −(−2)m/2,
with Gm(1, χ) being the Gauss sum ([102]).
We will start with the case p = 2. First we computeN2(2), already found above with another
technique, then analogously N2(3).
t = 2. Setting xi = β + z
3
i , we have
2∏
i=1
IAh(xi) =
1
9
(
1 + σ
(h)
1 + σ
(h)
2
)
h = 0, 1, 2 ,
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where
σ
(h)
1 = ζ
2h
3 χ3(x1) + ζ
h
3 χ¯3(x1) + ζ
2h
3 χ3(x2) + ζ
h
3 χ¯3(x2)
σ
(h)
2 = ζ
h
3χ3(x1)χ3(x2) + χ3(x1)χ¯3(x2) + χ¯3(x1)χ3(x2) + ζ
2h
3 χ¯3(x1)χ¯3(x2)
Since σ
(0)
1 + σ
(1)
1 + σ
(2)
1 = 0 and σ
(0)
2 + σ
(1)
2 + σ
(2)
2 = 3(χ3(x1)χ¯3(x2) + χ¯3(x1)χ3(x2)), the sum of
the three products
∏2
i=1 IAk(xi) is
1
3 (1 + χ3(x1)χ¯3(x2) + χ¯3(x1)χ3(x2)), and thus the sum over β
in the whole field F2m , with the exclusion of β = z
3
1 and β = z
3
2 , is
N2(2) =
1
3
2m − 2 + ∑
β 6=z31 ,z32
(
χ3(β + z
3
1)χ¯3(β + z
3
2) + χ¯3(β + z
3
1)χ3(β + z
3
2)
) .
Let S denote the above summation, then S can be evaluated in closed form: by the substitution
β = z31 + η, since χ3 is a nontrivial cubic character, we have
S =
∑
η 6=0,z31+z32
(
χ3(η)χ¯3(η + z
3
1 + z
3
2) + χ¯3(η)χ3(η + z
3
1 + z
3
2)
)
= −2 ,
as the summation of each of the two parts gives −1 (z31 + z32 6= 0 by hypothesis). In conclusion, we
have
N2(2) =
1
3
(2m − 4) ,
so that
1 + max
z1 6=z2
N2(2) =
1
3
(2m − 1) .
t = 3. In this case
3∏
i=1
IAh(β + z
3
i ) =
1
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(
1 + σ
(h)
1 + σ
(h)
2 + σ
(h)
3
)
h = 0, 1, 2 ,
where
σ
(h)
1 = ζ
2h
3 χ3(x1) + ζ
h
3 χ¯3(x1) + ζ
2h
3 χ3(x2) + ζ
h
3 χ¯3(x2) + ζ
2h
3 χ3(x3) + ζ
h
3 χ¯3(x3)
σ
(h)
2 = ζ
h
3χ3(x1)χ3(x2) + χ3(x1)χ¯3(x2) + χ¯3(x1)χ3(x2) + ζ
2h
3 χ¯3(x1)χ¯3(x2)+
ζh3χ3(x2)χ3(x3) + χ3(x2)χ¯3(x3) + χ¯3(x2)χ3(x3) + ζ
2h
3 χ¯3(x2)χ¯3(x3)+
ζh3χ3(x3)χ3(x1) + χ3(x3)χ¯3(x1) + χ¯3(x3)χ3(x1) + ζ
2h
3 χ¯3(x3)χ¯3(x1)+
σ
(h)
3 = χ3(x1)χ3(x2)χ3(x3) + χ¯3(x1)χ¯3(x2)χ¯3(x3) + ζ
2h
3 χ¯3(x1)χ3(x2)χ3(x3)+
ζ2h3 χ3(x1)χ¯3(x2)χ3(x3) + ζ
2h
3 χ3(x1)χ3(x2)χ¯3(x3) + ζ
h
3 χ¯3(x1)χ¯3(x2)χ3(x3)+
ζh3χ3(x1)χ¯3(x2)χ¯3(x3) + ζ
h
3 χ¯3(x1)χ3(x2)χ¯3(x3)
We thus have
σ01 + σ
1
1 + σ
2
1 = 0
σ02 + σ
1
2 + σ
2
2 = 3(χ3(x1)χ¯3(x2) + χ¯3(x1)χ3(x2) + χ3(x2)χ¯3(x3) + χ¯3(x2)χ3(x3)+
χ3(x3)χ¯3(x1) + χ¯3(x3)χ3(x1))
σ03 + σ
1
3 + σ
2
3 = 3(χ3(x1)χ3(x2)χ3(x3) + χ¯3(x1)χ¯3(x2)χ¯3(x3))
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In the summation over β of the sum of the three products, the values of β = z31 , z
3
2 , z
3
3 should be
excluded. Thus we must compute
N2(3) =
1
9
2m − 3 + 1
3
∑
β 6=z31 ,z32 ,z33
[
(σ02 + σ
1
2 + σ
2
2) + (σ
0
3 + σ
1
3 + σ
2
3)
] .
Therefore, two types of summations must be evaluated, namely
S2 =
∑
β 6=z31 ,z32 ,z33
χ3(β + z
3
1)χ¯3(β + z
3
2) and S3 =
∑
β 6=z31 ,z32 ,z33
χ3(β + z
3
1)χ3(β + z
3
2)χ3(β + z
3
2) ,
the remaining ones being obtained by symmetry or complex conjugation. Considering S2, and
defining for short y1 = z
3
2 + z
3
3 , y2 = z
3
1 + z
3
3 , and y3 = z
3
2 + z
3
1 , we have
S2 = −χ3(y2)χ¯3(y1) +
∑
β 6=z31 ,z32
χ3(β + z
3
1)χ¯3(β + z
3
2) = −χ3(y2)χ¯3(y1) +
∑
x 6=0,y3
χ3(x)χ¯3(x+ y3) ,
thus S2 = −χ3(y2)χ¯3(y1)− 1. Considering S3 we have
S3 =
∑
β 6=z31 ,z32 ,z33
χ3(β + z
3
1)χ3(β + z
3
2)χ3(β + z
3
3) =
∑
x 6=0,y2,y3
χ3(x)χ3(x+ y3)χ3(x+ y2)
thus, with the change of variable x = 1/z, since the character is cubic we obtain
S3 =
∑
z 6=0,1/y2,1/y3
χ3(1 + zy3)χ3(1 + zy2) =
∑
X 6=1,0,1+y3/y2
χ3(X)χ3(X
y2
y3
+ 1 +
y2
y3
)
S3 = χ3(y2)χ¯3(y3)
∑
X 6=1,0,1+y3/y2
χ3(X)χ3(X + 1 +
y3
y2
)
= −1 + χ3(y2)χ¯3(y3)
∑
X 6=0,1+y3/y2
χ3(X)χ3(X + 1 +
y3
y2
)
= −1 + χ¯3(y2)χ¯3(y3)χ¯3(y1)
∑
x∈F2m
χ3(x)χ3(x+ 1) .
In conclusion, we obtain
N2(3) =
1
9
[
2m − 11 − (−2)m2 [χ3(y1y2y3) + χ¯3(y1y2y3)]−
(
χ3(y1y
2
2) + χ3(y
2
1y2)+
χ3(y2y
2
3) + χ3(y
2
2y3) + χ3(y3y
2
1) + χ3(y
2
3y1)
)] .
Note that, if z1 = 0 (which corresponds to choosing β in one particular coset), then y2 and y3 are
cubes, and the number of solutions is
N2(3) =
1
9
(
2m − 13− [(−2)m2 + 2][χ3(y1) + χ¯3(y1)]
)
.
Finally we focus our interest on the maximum over the zi and obtain
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1 + max
z1 6=z2 6=z3
N2(3) =
{
1
9(2
m + 2m/2 − 2) for m/2 even
1
9(2
m + 2m/2+1 + 1) for m/2 odd
.
Let us deal now with the case p > 2:
t = 2. In this case, we have
2∏
i=1
IBh(β + z
2
i ) =
1
4
(
1 + σ
(h)
1 + σ
(h)
2
)
h = 0, 1 ,
where σ
(h)
1 = (−1)hχ2(x1) + (−1)hχ2(x2), and σ(h)2 = χ2(x1)χ2(x2).
Since σ
(0)
1 + σ
(1)
1 = 0 and σ
(0)
2 + σ
(1)
2 = 2(χ2(x1)χ2(x2)), the sum over β in the whole field Fpm
with the exclusion of β = −z21 and β = −z22 is
Np(2) =
1
2
pm − 2 + ∑
β 6=−z21 ,−z22
(
χ2(β + z
2
1)χ2(β + z
2
2)
) .
Let S denote the above summation: we evaluate it in closed form by substituting β = η− z21 ; since
χ2 is a nontrivial quadratic character, we have
S =
∑
η 6=0,z21−z22
(
χ2(η)χ2(η + z
2
2 − z21)
)
= −1 ,
the summation being independent of the term z22 − z21 , which is non-zero by hypothesis. In con-
clusion we have
Np(2) =
1
2
(pm − 3) ,
so that
1 + max
z1 6=z2
Np(2) =
1
2
(pm − 1) .
t = 3. In this case
3∏
i=1
IBh(β + z
2
i ) =
1
8
(
1 + σ
(h)
1 + σ
(h)
2 + σ
(h)
3
)
h = 0, 1 ,
where σ
(h)
1 = (−1)hχ2(x1) + (−1)hχ2(x2) + (−1)hχ2(x3), σ(h)2 = χ2(x1)χ2(x2) + χ2(x1)χ2(x3) +
χ2(x2)χ2(x3), and σ
(h)
3 = (−1)hχ2(x1)χ2(x2)χ2(x3).
Since σ01 +σ
1
1 = 0, σ
0
2 +σ
1
2 = 2(χ2(x1)χ2(x2)+χ2(x1)χ2(x3)+χ2(x2)χ2(x3)), and σ
0
3 +σ
1
3 = 0,
the summation over β of the sum of the two products, where the values of β equal to −z21 ,−z22 ,
and −z23 are excluded, becomes
Np(3) =
1
4
pm − 3 + ∑
β 6=−z21 ,−z22 ,−z23
[χ2(x1)χ2(x2) + χ2(x1)χ2(x3) + χ2(x2)χ2(x3)]
 .
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We thus need to evaluate only one type of summation, namely
S2 =
∑
β 6=−z21 ,−z22 ,−z23
χ2(β+z
2
1)χ2(β+z
2
2) =
∑
η 6=0
z21−z22 ,z21−z23
χ2(η)χ2(η+z
2
2−z21) = −1−χ2(z21−z23)χ2(z22−z23) ,
the remainder being obtained by symmetry. In conclusion, we obtain
Np(3) =
1
4
[
pm − 6− (χ2(z21 − z23)χ2(z22 − z23) + χ2(z21 − z22)χ2(z23 − z22) + χ2(z23 − z21)χ2(z22 − z21))
]
.
And , if we consider the maximum, we have
1 + max
z1 6=z2 6=z3
Np(3) ==

1
4(p
m − 1) p = 4k + 1
1
4(p
m + 1) p = 4k + 3, m odd
1
4(p
m − 1) p = 4k + 3, m even
3.4.2 Bounds
As the number of equations in system 3.1 or 3.3 becomes larger, exact computations become less
meaningful for our purpose, as it would then be necessary to think about estimates and bounds
on rather cumbersome expressions. We will thus shift our interest to a general upper bound for
the function Np(r); we will first deal with the case p = 2, then the case p > 2.
Consider equation (3.2) written as
N2(r) =
1
3r
∑
β∈F2m
β 6∈{z3i }
[P0 +P1 +P2] , (3.5)
where
Pk = 3
r
r∏
i=1
IAk(xi) = 1 + σ
(k)
1 + σ
(k)
2 + · · ·+ σ(k)r k = 0, 1, 2 ,
xi being β + z
3
i , and each σ
(k)
j is a sum of monomials which are products of the same number j of
distinct variables (characters) χ3(xi) or χ¯3(xi), possibly times ζ3 or ζ
2
3 . In particular the number of
addends in σ
(k)
j is 2
j
(
r
j
)
.
Define σj = σ
(0)
j + σ
(1)
j + σ
(2)
j for every j = 1, . . . , r; then σj contains fewer addends than any
σ
(k)
j , since all monomials multiplied by either ζ3 or ζ
2
3 are canceled out with monomials multiplied
by 1, and the surviving monomials are multiplied by 3 (see also the examples above). In particular,
σ1 is zero; σ2 is a sum of monomials of the form χ3(xi)χ¯3(xl) (i, l distinct), whose total number is
2
(
r
2
)
; σ3 is a sum of monomials of the form χ3(xi)χ3(xl)χ3(xm) (i, l,m all distinct), whose total
number is 2
(
r
3
)
; and σ4 is a sum of monomials of the form χ3(xi)χ3(xl)χ¯3(xm)χ¯3(xs) (i, l,m, s
all distinct), whose total number is 6
(
r
4
)
. In general, the number of surviving monomials of
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degree j can be computed by considering that each monomial is a product of n1 characters and n2
complex conjugate characters; thus n1 + n2 = j. Supposing that χ3(xi) are multiplied by ζ3 and
χ¯3(xh) are multiplied by ζ
2
3 , the surviving monomial satisfies the condition n1 + 2n2 = 0 mod 3.
Therefore, the admissible values of 0 ≤ n2 ≤ j satisfy the condition n2 = 2j mod 3: if e = 2j mod 3
and e ∈ {0, 1, 2}, the number of surviving monomials is
(
r
j
)
aj ,where aj =
∑b j−e
3
c
h=0
(
j
e+ 3h
)
,
with {aj}Z>1 = 2, 2, 6, 10, 22, 42, 86, 170, 342 . . . matching the sequence A078008 in [113] with the
first two terms disregarded. We observe now that the product of j characters, whose arguments
are distinct linear functions of β, can be interpreted as a single character whose argument is a
polynomial f(β) with j distinct roots: by [108, Theorem 2C’], each sum of these characters is
upper bounded by (j − 1)√2m, so that
N2(r) ≤ 1
3r−1
2m − r + r∑
j=2
aj(j − 1)
(
r
j
)√
2m
 .
The summation above is evaluated as follows, using the expression aj =
1
3
∑2
h=0 ζ
−he
3 (1 + ζ
h
3 )
j for
the sequence aj as can be found in [10, 11, 52]:
r∑
j=2
aj(j− 1)
(
r
j
)
=
r∑
j=2
1
3
2∑
h=0
ζ−he3 (1+ ζ
h
3 )
j(j− 1)
(
r
j
)
=
1
3
2∑
h=0
r∑
j=2
ζ−he3 (1+ ζ
h
3 )
j(j− 1)
(
r
j
)
.
Now, observing that e = −j mod 3 and ζ3 is a cubic root of the unity, we may substitute ζhj3 for
ζ−he3 and write (ζ
h
3 + ζ
2h
3 )
j for ζhj3 (1 + ζ
h
3 )
j in the last expression, which we then write as
1
3
2∑
h=0
r∑
j=0
(ζh3+ζ
2h
3 )
j(j−1)
(
r
j
)
+1 = 1+
1
3
2∑
h=0
 r∑
j=0
j(ζh3 + ζ
2h
3 )
j
(
r
j
)
−
r∑
j=0
(ζh3 + ζ
2h
3 )
j
(
r
j
) .
Using the binomial sum and its derivative, we finally obtain
r∑
j=2
aj(j − 1)
(
r
j
)
= 1 +
1
3
2∑
h=0
(
r(ζh3 + ζ
2h
3 )(1 + ζ
h
3 + ζ
2h
3 )
r−1 − (1 + ζh3 + ζ2h3 )r
)
,
that is
r∑
j=2
aj(j − 1)
(
r
j
)
= 1 +
1
3
[2r3r−1 − 3r] ,
because (1 + ζh3 + ζ
2h
3 ) is 3when h = 0 and is 0 otherwise. In conclusion
N2(r) ≤ 1
3r−1
[
2m +
√
2m − r + 3r−2(2r − 3)
√
2m
]
,
where we see that, when 3r−2(2r−3)√2m−r+√2m << 2m, roughly r << m/2, thenN2(r) ' 2m3r−1 ,
so that this deterministic bound supports the probabilistic estimate discussed above.
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In the case p > 2, consider equation (3.4) written as
Np(r) =
1
2r
∑
β∈Fpm
β 6∈{−z2i }
[Q0 +Q1] , (3.6)
where
Qk = 2
r
r∏
i=1
IBk(xi) = 1 + σ
(k)
1 + σ
(k)
2 + · · ·+ σ(k)r k = 0, 1 ,
xi being β + z
2
i , and each σ
(k)
j is a sum of monomials which are products of the same number j
of distinct variables (characters) χ2(xi). In particular, only σ
(k)
j s with even subscripts occur, and
clearly they are the elementary symmetric functions of r variables; thus the number of addends in
σ
(k)
j is
(
r
j
)
. The same argument used to upper bound N2(r) also applies here, in this case the
sum of products of j characters is bounded as (j − 1)√pm by [108, Theorem 2C’], so that
Np(r) ≤ 1
2r−1
pm − r + r∑
j=2
(j − 1)
(
r
j
)√
pm
 .
which, after some manipulation, can be written as
Np(r) ≤ 1
2r−1
[
pm − r + [2r−1(r − 2) + 1]√pm] ,
and we see that, when [2r−1(r− 2) + 1]√pm − r << pm, roughly r << m2 log2 p, then Np(r) ' p
m
2r−1
as in our probabilistic estimate.
3.5 Deterministic splitting II: fixed N
This section examines the smallest t such that the algorithm succeeds, in at most 1 or 2 attempts:
we will call these t0(1) and t0(2), respectively.
Clearly, t0(1) = `m+1, since there are exactly `m elements belonging to a given coset; then, if
t > `m, the algorithm succeeds at the first attempt.
To evaluate t0(2), we must examine the number of representations of a β 6= 0 in the field
being the sum of an element in a given coset and an element in another (possibly the same) given
coset (see also [81, 80, 98]). We then consider the maximumM , over β 6= 0 in the field and over all
possible pairs of cosets, so that t0(2) is 1 +M .
For the case of the cubic character,M can be calculated as follows:
M = max
i,j,β
∑
z 6=0,β
1 + ζ2j3 χ3(z) + ζ
j
3χ¯3(z)
3
1 + ζ2i3 χ3(β + z) + ζ
i
3χ¯3(β + z)
3
which is the maximum over i, j, β of the following expression:
1
9
[
2m − 2− χ3(β)(ζ2i3 + ζ2j3 )− χ¯3(β)(ζ i3 + ζj3)− ζ2i+j3 − ζ i+2j3 − (−2)m/2(ζ2i+2j3 χ¯3(β) + ζ i+j3 χ3(β))
]
,
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where we have again exploited the relations
∑
x∈F2m χ3(x) = 0,
∑
x∈F2m χ3(x)χ¯3(x+ β) = −1 and∑
x∈F2m χ3(x)χ3(x+ 1) = Gm(1, χ3) = −(−2)m/2 ([16, 102, 126]). Then we have
M =
{
1
9 (2
m + 2m/2 − 2) for m/2 even
1
9 (2
m + 2m/2+1 + 1) for m/2 odd
.
For the case of the quadratic character, we consider similarly
M = max
i,j,β
∑
z 6=0,β
1 + (−1)jχ2(z)
2
1 + (−1)iχ2(β − z)
2
= max
i,j,β
{
1
4
(
pm − 2− χ2(β)(−1)i − χ2(β)(−1)j − (−1)i+jχ2(−1)
)}
,
therefore
M =

1
4 (p
m − 1) p = 4k + 1
1
4 (p
m + 1) p = 4k + 3, m odd
1
4 (p
m − 1) p = 4k + 3, m even
Remark 3.10. It is interesting to notice that M , which is the maximum t such that it is still possible to
fail splitting a polynomial of degree t with two attempts, is equal to the maximum number of attempts to
split a polynomial of degree 3. Similarly, `m is at the same time the maximum t such that it is possible to
fail splitting a polynomial of degree t at the first attempt and the maximum number of attempts to split a
polynomial of degree 2.
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Chapter 4
On the decoding complexity of cyclic
codes
The standard algebraic decoding algorithm of cyclic codes [n, k, d] up to the BCH bound δ = 2t+1
is very efficient and practical for relatively small n while it becomes unpractical for large n as its
computational complexity is O(nt).
Using the results of the previous chapters, we show here, following [106], how to make this
algebraic decoding computationally more efficient: in the case of binary codes, for example, the
complexity of the syndrome computation drops from O(nt) to O(t
√
n), while the average com-
plexity of the error location drops from O(nt) tomax{O(t√n), O(t log2(t) log log(t) log(n))}.
4.1 Introduction
The algebraic decoding of cyclic codes up to the BCH bound, as obtained early in the sixties
with the contribution of many people, was considered very efficient for the needs of that time
([14, 19, 69, 72, 94, 95]). However, today we can and need to manage error correcting codes of
sizes that require more efficient algorithms, possibly at the limit of their theoretical minimum
complexity. We are proposing here an algorithm that goes in this direction.
Although we will focus as our main point of reference and comparison on the classical alge-
braic decoding, there are other decoding algorithms that have been recently proposed and that we
limit ourselves to cite here as a reference, e.g. [43, 53, 82, 84].
Let us summarize now the standard algebraic decoding of cyclic codes: let C be an [n, k, d]
cyclic code over a finite field Fq, q = p
s for a prime p, with generator polynomial of minimal degree
r = n− k
g(x) = xr + g1x
r−1 + . . .+ gr−1x+ gr ,
g(x) dividing xn − 1, and let α be a primitive n-th root of unity lying in a finite field Fpm , where
the extension degree is the minimum integerm such that n is a divisor of pm− 1. Assuming that C
has BCH bound δ = 2t+ 1 (if δ is even, we would just consider δ − 1), then g(x) has 2t roots with
consecutive power exponents, so that the whole set of roots is
R = {α`+1, α`+2, . . . , α`+2t, αs2t+1 , . . . , αsr} ,
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where it is not restrictive to take ` = 0 as it is usually done.
Let R(x) = g(x)I(x) + e(x) be a received code word such that the error pattern e(x) has no more
than t nonzero coefficients. The Gorenstein-Peterson-Zierler decoding procedure ([69, 94]), which
is a standard decoding procedure for every cyclic code up to the BCH bound, is made up of four
steps:
• Computation of 2t syndromes: Sj = R(α
j), j = 1, . . . , 2t.
• Computation of the error-locator polynomial σ(z) = σtz
t + σt−1zt−1 + · · · + σ1z + 1 (we are
assuming the case that exactly t errors occurred; if there are te < t errors, this step would
output a polynomial of degree te).
• Computation of the roots of σ(z) in the form α−jh , h = 1, . . . , t, yielding the error positions
jh.
• Computation of the error magnitudes.
Efficient implementations of this decoding algorithm combine the computation of 2t syndromes
using Horner’s rule, the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to obtain the error-locator polynomial, the
Chien search to locate the errors, and the evaluation of Forney’s polynomial to estimate the error
magnitudes.
The computation of the 2t syndromes using Horner’s rule requires 2tnmultiplications in Fpm ,
which may be prohibitive when n is large. The Berlekamp-Massey algorithm has multiplicative
complexity O(t2) ([19, 57]), is very efficient and will not be discussed further later on. The Chien
search requires again O(tn) multiplications in Fpm and Forney’s algorithm O(t
2) ([57]). Notice
that this fourth step is not required if we deal with binary codes and that both the first and the
fourth steps consist primarily in polynomial evaluations, so they can benefit from any efficient
polynomial evaluation algorithm, as we will show.
The standard decoding procedure is satisfactory when the code length n is not too large
(say < 103) and efficient implementations are set up taking advantage of the particular structure
of the code. The situation changes dramatically when n is of the order of 106 or larger. In this
case a complexity O(tn), required by the syndrome evaluations and by the Chien search, is not
acceptable anymore.
Here we describe some methods using the results of the previous chapters to make these
steps more efficient and practical even for large n. We will follow the usual approach of focusing
as above in computing the number of multiplications, as they are more expensive than sums (see
also [39]).
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 concerns the computation of syndromes.
Section 4.3 deals with the computation of the roots of the error-locator polynomial as well as the
corresponding error positions; the error locator polynomial is supposed to be given (being com-
puted by Berlekamp-Massey algorithm). Finally, Section 4.4 gives a numerical example illustrating
the whole procedure.
4.2 Syndrome Evaluation
Let β be any element of R, the standard Horner’s rule ([63],[67]) allows us to compute R(β) in at
most n products, thus for the computation of 2t syndromes we have the estimateO(tn). However,
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in Chapter 2 or in [40, 105] we showed that polynomials over a finite field of characteristic p
can be evaluated more efficiently by exploiting the Frobenius automorphism with a significant
computational cost reduction.
Briefly, to evaluate a polynomial r(x) of degree n over Fps , in β, an element of Fpm , one
can achieve an overall complexity of approximately 2s
√
n(p− 1). In the particular case of binary
codes, the complexity is 2
√
n.
It was also shown that in particular situations, like the example of the Reed-Solomon code
[255, 223, 33], a better cost reduction can be obtained by means of a different use of the Frobenius
automorphism and a careful choice of the number of iterations.
We again point out that in hardware implementations, the proposed algorithm allows a
strong parallelism, while Horner’s rule is inherently serial. Moreover an additional gain may
be given by the pre-computation of the powers of β, especially when the number of syndromes to
be computed is big. Furthermore, like in Horner’s rule, multiplication by β or its powers can be
performed using Linear Feedback Shift Registers ([51, 69, 75]) with a further speed up at a very
small cost, while the p-power operations would benefit from the use of a normal basis ([63, 68]).
4.3 Roots of the error-locator polynomial
Once the error locator polynomial σ(z) is computed from the syndromes using the Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm, its roots, represented in the form α−`i , correspond to the error positions `i,
i = 1, . . . , t, which are generally found by testing σ(α−i) for all n possible powers α−i with an
algorithm usually referred to as the Chien search. In this approach, if σ(α−j) = 0 an error in po-
sition j is recognized, otherwise the position is correct. However, this simple mechanism can be
unacceptably slow when n is large since its complexity is O(tn): aim of this Section is to describe
a less costly procedure.
The Cantor-Zassenhaus probabilistic factorization algorithm is very efficient in factoring a polyno-
mial and consequently in computing the roots of a polynomial ([12, 49]). Since σ(z) is the product
of t linear factors z + ρi over Fpm (i.e. ρi is a p-ary polynomial in α of degreem− 1), this factoring
algorithm can be directly applied to separate these t factors. The error positions `i are then ob-
tained by computing the discrete logarithm of (ρi)
−1 = α`i to base α. This task can be performed
by Shanks’ algorithm ([109]), which we revisit below. The overall expected complexity of find-
ing the error positions with this algorithm is O(mt log2 t log log t) ([12]), plus O(t
√
n), where the
second addend comes from Shanks’ algorithm. Moreover, better computational estimates may be
obtained taking into account the considerations and improvements highlighted in the previous
chapter or in [41].
4.3.1 Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm
The algorithm of Cantor-Zassenhaus is reported here again for easy reference as in [26] and only
in the case of characteristic 2, which is by far the most common in practice. Assume that p(z) is
a polynomial over F2m that is a product of t polynomials of degree 1 over the same field F2m , m
even (when m is odd it is enough to consider a quadratic extension and proceed as in the case of
even m). Suppose that α is a known primitive element in F2m , and set `m =
2m−1
3 , then ρ = α
`m
is a primitive cubic root in F2m , so that ρ is a root of z
2 + z + 1. The algorithm consists of the
following steps:
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1. Generate a random polynomial b(z) of degree not greater than t− 1 over F2m .
2. Compute a(z) = b(z)`m mod p(z).
3. IF a(z) 6= 0, 1, ρ, ρ2, THEN at least a polynomial among
gcd{p(z), a(z)}, gcd{p(z), a(z) + 1}, gcd{p(z), a(z) + ρ}, gcd{p(z), a(z) + ρ2}
will be a non trivial factor of p(z), ELSE repeat from point 1.
4. Iterate until all linear factors of p(z) are found.
Remark 4.1. As shown in the previous chapter, the polynomial b(z) can be conveniently chosen of the form
z + β, using b(z) = z as initial choice.
Success has been shown to happen probabilistically, and often deterministically, very soon, expecially
when the degree of σ(z) is high.
4.3.2 Shanks’ algorithm
Shanks’ algorithm can be applied to compute the discrete logarithm in a group of order n gener-
ated by the primitive element α. The exponent ` in the equality
α` = b0 + b1α+ · · · + bs−1αs−1 .
is written in the form ` = `0 + `1d
√
ne. A table T is constructed with d√ne entries α`1d
√
ne which
are sorted in some well defined order, then a cycle of length d√ne is started computing
Aj = (b0 + b1α+ · · ·+ bs−1αs−1)α−j j = 0, . . . , d
√
ne − 1 ,
and looking for Aj in the Table; when a match is found with the κ-th entry, we set `0 = j and
`1 = κ, and the discrete logarithm ` is obtained as j + κd
√
ne.
This algorithm can be performed with complexity O(
√
n) both in time and space (memory). In
our scenario, since we need to compute t roots, the complexity is O(t
√
n).
Remark 4.2. The Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm finds the roots Xj = α
`j of the reciprocal of the error
locator polynomial, then the baby-step giant-step algorithm of Shanks’ finds the error positions `js. As said
in the introduction, this is the end of the decoding process for binary codes. For non-binary codes, Forney’s
polynomial Γ(x) = σ(x)(S(x) + 1) mod x2t+1, where S(x) =
∑2t
i=1 Six
i ([122]), yields the error values
Yj = −Xj
Γ(X−1j )
σ′(X−1j )
.
Again we remark that this last step can benefit from an efficient polynomial evaluation algorithm, such as
the one discussed in Chapter 2.
Remark 4.3. We observe that the above procedure can be used to decode beyond the BCH bound, up to the
minimum distance, whenever the error locator polynomial can be computed from a full set of syndromes
([38, 42, 99, 122]).
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4.4 A numerical example
In the previous sections we presented methods to compute syndromes and error locations in the
GPZ decoding scheme of cyclic codes up to their BCH bound, which are asymptotically better
than the classical algorithms. The following example illustrates the complete new procedure.
Consider a binary BCH code [63, 45, 7] with generator polynomial
g(x) = x18 + x17 + x14 + x13 + x9 + x7 + x5 + x3 + 1
whose roots are
α,α2, α4, α8, α16, α32, α3, α6, α12, α24, α48, α33, α5, α10, α20, α40, α17, α34,
thus the BCH bound is 7. Let c(x) = g(x)I(x) be a transmitted code word, and the received word
be
r(x) = x57+x56+x53+x52+x50+x48+x46+x44+x42+x39+x31+x18+x17+x14+x13+x7+x5+x3+1
where 3 errors occurred. The 6 syndromes are
S1 = α
5 + α2 + α
S2 = S
2
1
S3 = α
5 + α4 + α3 + α2 + α
S4 = S
4
1
S5 = α
5 + α2 + 1
S6 = S
2
3
.
For example, S1 has been computed considering r(x) as
[r3,0 + zr3,1 + y(r3,2 + zr3,3)] + x[r3,4 + zr3,5 + y(r3,6 + zr3,7)],
with y = x2, z = x4, w = x8 and 
r3,0 = w
7 + w6 + 1
r3,1 = w
6 + w5
r3,2 = w
6 + w5 + w2
r3,3 = w
5 + w
r3,4 = w
7 + w2
r3,5 = w
6 + w + 1
r3,6 = 1
r3,7 = w
4 + w3 + 1
with only 16 products, namely 3 to compute α2, α4 and α8, 6 for the powers of w up to w7
and 7multiplications by x, y and z.
The coefficients of the error locator polynomial turn out to be
σ1 = α
5 + α2 + α
σ2 = α
3 + α4 + α
σ3 = α
4 + α5 + α2
.
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The roots of σ∗(z) = z3σ(z−1) =
∏3
i=1(z − α`i) are computed as follows using the Cantor-
Zassenhaus algorithm.
Let ρ = α21 be a cube root of the unity; consider a random polynomial, for instance z + ρ, of
degree less than 3 and compute a(z) = (z + ρ)21 modulo σ∗(z) (the exponent of z + ρ is 2
m−1
3 =
63
3 = 21):
(α5 + α4 + α2 + α+ 1)z2 + (α3 + α+ 1)z + α5 + α4 + x3 + 1 .
In this case a(z) has no root in common with σ∗(z), while
gcd(a(z) + 1, σ∗(z)) = z + (α4 + α3 + 1) (`1 = 31),
gcd(a(z) + ρ, σ∗(z)) = z + (α5 + α4 + α2 + 1) (`2 = 9),
gcd(a(z) + ρ2, σ∗(z)) = z + (α3 + α) (`3 = 50).
The error positions have been obtained using Shanks’ algorithm with a table of 8 entries, and
a loop of length 8 for each root, for a total of 24 searches versus 63 searches of Chien’s search.
4.5 Concluding remarks
A new decoding algorithm for cyclic codes has been presented having a very competitive com-
plexity and targeting in particular those applications using error correcting codes with very large
length.
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Chapter 5
Enhanced public key security for the
McEliece cryptosystem
This chapter presents a first application where an efficient decoding of cyclic codes would be
highly desirable. We descrive a variant [7] of the McEliece cryptosystem able to ensure that the
code used as the public key is no longer permutation-equivalent to the secret code. This increases
the security level of the public key, thus opening theway for reconsidering the adoption of classical
families of codes, like Reed-Solomon codes, that have been longly excluded from the McEliece
cryptosystem for security reasons. It is well known that codes of these classes are able to yield
a reduction in the key size or, equivalently, an increased level of security against information set
decoding; so, these are the main advantages of the proposed solution. A drawback is on the
other hand the increased decoding complexity, which, although not being the major concern in
this context, has to be taken into account, possibly by means of more efficient algorithms like
that of the previous chapter. We also describe possible vulnerabilities and attacks related to the
considered system, and show which design choices are best suited to avoid them.
5.1 Introduction
The McEliece cryptosystem [74] is one of the most promising public-key cryptosystems able to
resist attacks based on quantum computers. In fact, differently from cryptosystems exploiting
integer factorization or discrete logarithms, it relies on the hardness of decoding a linear block
code without any visible structure [15].
The original McEliece cryptosystem adopts the generator matrix of a binary Goppa code as
the private key, and exploits a dense transformation matrix and a permutation matrix to disguise
the secret key into the public one. It has resisted cryptanalysis for more than thirty years, since
no polynomial-time attack to the system has been devised up to now; however, the increased
computing power and the availability of optimized attack procedures have required to update its
original parameters [17].
The main advantage of the McEliece cryptosystem consists in its fast encryption and de-
cryption procedures, which require a significantly lower number of operations with respect to
alternative solutions (like RSA). However, the original McEliece cryptosystem has two main dis-
advantages: low encryption rate and large key size, both due to the binary Goppa codes it is based
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on. When adopting Goppa codes, a first improvement is obtained through the variant proposed
by Niederreiter [83], which uses parity-check matrices instead of generator matrices.
A significant improvement in both the encryption rate and the key size would be obtained
if other families of codes could be included in the system, allowing a more efficient code design
and a more compact representation of their matrices. In particular, the use of Reed-Solomon (RS)
codes could yield significant advantages. In fact, RS codes are maximum distance separable codes,
which ensures they achieve maximum error correction capability under bounded-distance decod-
ing. In theMcEliece system, this translates into shorter keys for the same security level, or a higher
security level for the same key size, with respect to binary Goppa codes (having the same code
rate). In fact, Goppa codes are subfield subcodes of generalized RS codes and the subcoding pro-
cedure makes them less efficient than RS codes. However, this also makes them secure against
key recovering attacks, while the algebraic structure of RS codes, when exposed in the public key
(also in permuted form), makes them insecure against attacks aimed at recovering the secret code
[112].
Many attempts of replacing Goppa codes with other families of codes have exposed the sys-
tem to security threats [87], [124], and some recent proposals based on Quasi-Cyclic and Quasi-
Dyadic codes have also been broken [119]. Low-Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes, in principle,
could offer high design flexibility and compact keys. However, also the use of LDPC codes may
expose the system to severe flaws [79], [85]. Nevertheless, it is still possible to exploit Quasi-Cyclic
LDPC codes to design a variant of the system that is immune to any known attack [6].
The idea in [6] is to replace the permutation matrix used in the original McEliece cryptosys-
tem with a dense transformation matrix. The transformation matrix used in [6] is a sparse matrix
and its density must be chosen as a trade-off between two opposite effects: i) increasing the den-
sity of the public code parity-check matrix so that it is too difficult to search for low weight code-
words in its dual code and ii) limiting the propagation of the intentional errors so that they are still
correctable by the legitimate receiver. The advantage of replacing the permutation with a more
general transformation is that the code used as the public key is no longer permutation equivalent
to the secret code. This increases the security of the public key, as it prevents an attacker from
exploiting the permutation equivalence when trying to recover the secret code structure.
We elaborate on this approach by introducing a more effective class of transformation matri-
ces and by generalizing their form also to the non-binary case. The new proposal is based on the
fact that there exist some classes of dense transformation matrices that have a limited propagation
effect on the intentional error vectors. The use of these matrices allows to better disguise the pri-
vate key into the public one, with a controlled error propagation effect. So, we propose a modified
cryptosystem that can restore the use of advantageous families of codes, as RS codes, by ensuring
increased public key security.
5.2 Description of the cryptosystem
The proposed cryptosystem takes as its basis the classical McEliece cryptosystem, whose block
scheme is reported in Figure 5.1, where u denotes a cleartext message and x its associated cipher-
text. The main components of this system are:
• A private linear block code generator matrixG
• A public linear block code generator matrixG′
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Figure 5.1: The McEliece cryptosystem.
• A secret scrambling matrix S
• A secret permutation matrix P
• A secret intentional error vector e
As for the original system, the proposed cryptosystem can be implemented in the classical
McEliece form or, alternatively, in the Niederreiter form. In both cases, the main element that
differentiates the proposed solution from the original cryptosystem is the replacement of the per-
mutation matrix Pwith a dense transformation matrixQ, whose design is described next.
5.2.1 MatrixQ
The matrixQ is a non-singular n× nmatrix having the form
Q = R+T, (5.1)
where R is a dense n × n matrix and T is a sparse n × n matrix. The matrices R, T and Q have
elements in Fq, with q ≥ 2.
The matrixR is obtained starting from two sets,A and B, each containing w matrices having
size z × n, z ≤ n, defined over Fq: A = {a1,a2, . . . ,aw}, B = {b1,b2, . . . ,bw}. We also define
a =
∑w
i=1 ai. The matrices in A and B are secret and randomly chosen; then,R is obtained as:
R =

a1
a2
...
aw

T
·

b1
b2
...
bw
 , (5.2)
where T denotes transposition. Starting from (5.2), wemake some simplifying assumptions, aimed
at reducing the amount of secret data that is needed to be stored. In fact, for the instances of the
proposed cryptosystem we consider, we will focus on two cases: i) w = 1, a1 = a, any b1 and ii)
w = 2, b2 = 1 + b1, any a1, a2 (we denote with 0 and 1, respectively, the all-zero and the all-one
z×nmatrix). In both these cases, there is no need to store nor choose thematrix b2. For this reason,
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in order to simplify the notation, we will replace b1 with b in the following. This obviously does
not limit the applicability of the general form (5.2) of the matrix R.
Concerning the choice of the matrix T, we denote by Πi a generalized permutation matrix,
that is, a matrix having only one non-zero element in each row and in each column, whose value
is selected among the q − 1 non-zero elements of Fq. The matrix T is then obtained as the sum of
m ≥ 1 generalized permutation matrices, chosen at random:
T = Π1 +Π2 + . . .+Πm. (5.3)
In the system we propose, the matrix Q, having the form (5.1), replaces the permutation ma-
trix P that is used in the original McEliece cryptosystem and in its Niederreiter version. As we
will see in the following, both these versions exploit an intentional error vector e = [e1, e2, . . . , en],
randomly generated, having a predetermined weight t, like in the classical cryptosystem. Each
error vector might then be subject or not to additional constraints, depending on the implementa-
tion we use, as shown later. Let us suppose now that a constraint is imposed to the vector e in the
form:
a · eT = 0. (5.4)
If we suppose that thematrix a is full rank, the number of constraints we impose on the intentional
error vectors is equal to z. Obviously, in order to be implemented, this would require a to be
disclosed as part of the public key, but, as wewill see in the following, this, togetherwith condition
(5.4), may introduce a weakness in the system. This issue will be discussed next, togetherwith the
ways to avoid such a weakness.
For the moment, let us suppose that a is disclosed and that condition (5.4) is verified. As we
will see in the following, for both versions of the cryptosystem it turns out that, during decryp-
tion, the matrix Q has a multiplicative effect on the intentional error vector e. As a result, e is
transformed into e ·Q = e · (R+T). If (5.4) holds, the contribution due toR becomes, for the two
cases we focus on:
e ·R =
{
0, if a = a1,a2 = 0,
e · aT2 · 1, if b2 = 1+ b.
(5.5)
So, in the former case, e·Q reduces to e·T. In the latter case, instead, the legitimate receiver should
know the value of e · aT2 to remove the contribution due to e ·R. We will see in the following how
this can be done.
When the result of e ·Q can be reduced to e ·T, the use of the matrix Q as in (5.1) allows to
amplify the number of intentional errors (at most) by a factor m. For m = 1, the required error
correction capability is exactly the same as in the originalMcEliece andNiederreiter cryptosystems
while, for m > 1, the limited error propagation effect can be compensated by using codes with a
high error correction capability, as it occurs when adopting LDPC codes [6].
But the advantage of using the matrix Q is that it allows to disguise the private matrix of a
code over Fq in a way that can be much stronger than what can be done by using a permutation
matrix (as in the original McEliece system).
So, the proposed solution can help revitalizing previous attempts of using alternative families
of codes in the McEliece system. A first idea is to reconsider the usage of RS codes over Fq. In
the following sections we will show that the attacks that have prevented their usage in the past
cannot be directly applied to the new variant, so that it shall be considered secure against them.
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5.2.2 McEliece version
In the McEliece version of the proposed system, Bob chooses his secret key as the k × n system-
atic generator matrix G of a linear block code over Fq, able to correct t errors. He also chooses
other two secret matrices: a k × k non-singular scrambling matrix S and the n × n non-singular
transformation matrix Q, defined as in (5.1). The public key is:
G′ = S−1 ·G ·Q−1. (5.6)
So, in general, differently from the originalMcEliece cryptosystem, the public code is not permutation-
equivalent to the private code.
Alice, after obtaining Bob’s public key, applies the following encryption map:
x = u ·G′ + e. (5.7)
After receiving x, Bob inverts the transformation as follows:
x′ = x ·Q = u · S−1 ·G+ e ·Q, (5.8)
thus obtaining a codeword of the secret code affected by the error vector e ·Q.
The special form we adopt for the matrix Q allows Bob to reduce e · Q to e · T. Obviously,
this is immediately verified when e ·R = 0, while it will be shown in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 how
it can be achieved when e ·R 6= 0.
So, because of the limited error propagation effect that is due to T, Bob is able to correct all
the errors and get u · S−1, thanks to the systematic form of G. He can then obtain u through
multiplication by S.
5.2.3 Niederreiter version
The Niederreiter version of the proposed cryptosystem works as follows. Bob chooses the secret
linear block code over Fq, able to correct t errors, by fixing its r × n parity-check matrix (H), and
obtains his public key as
H′ = S−1 ·H ·QT , (5.9)
where the scrambling matrix S is a non-singular r × r matrix and the transformation matrix Q is
defined as in (5.1).
Alice gets Bob’s public key, she maps the cleartext vector into a weight t error vector e and
calculates the ciphertext as the syndrome x of e throughH′, according to
x = H′ · eT . (5.10)
In order to decrypt x, Bob first calculates x′ = S · x = H ·QT · eT = H · (e ·Q)T . The special
form ofQ allows Bob to reduce e·Q to e·T. Obviously, this is immediately verifiedwhen e·R = 0,
while it will be shown in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 how it can be achieved when e ·R 6= 0.
So, he gets H ·TT · eT and, due to the limited error propagation effect of T, he is able to
obtain TT · eT by performing syndrome decoding through the private linear block code. Then, he
multiplies the result by (TT )−1 and finally demaps e into its associated cleartext vector u.
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In order to reduce the public key size, the matrixH′, defined by (5.9), can be put in systematic
form. Let us divideH′ into a left r × r matrixH′l and a right r × k matrixH′r, i.e. H′ = [H′l|H′r].
We can suppose, without loss of generality, thatH′l is full rank and obtain the systematic form of
H′ as:
H′′ =
(
H′l
)−1 ·H′. (5.11)
IfH′′ is used as the public key, only its rightmost k columns are needed to be stored. When Alice
uses H′′ for encryption, she obtains a public message x′′ = H′′ · eT . Then, Bob must compute
x = H′l · x′′ in order to get x as expressed by (5.10).
5.3 System design
In this section, we describe some critical aspects and possible weaknesses that must be carefully
considered in the design of the proposed system.
5.3.1 Subcode vulnerability
When a = a1 and a2 = 0, a possible vulnerability results from condition (5.4), since, in such a case,
a subcode of the public code is exposed, that is permutation-equivalent to a subcode of the private
code. In fact, if we refer to the Niederreiter version of the system, an attacker could consider the
subcode generated by the following parity-check matrix:
HS =
[
H′
a
]
=
[
S−1 ·H ·QT
a
]
=
[
S−1 ·H ·RT + S−1 ·H ·TT
a
]
. (5.12)
Each codeword c in the code defined by HS must verify a · cT = 0. Due to the form of
R, this also implies RT · cT = 0, so HS defines a subcode of H′ in which all codewords satisfy
S−1 ·H ·TT · cT = 0. Hence, the effect of the denseR is removed and, when T is a permutation
matrix (that is, when m = 1), the subcode defined by HS is permutation-equivalent to a subcode
of the secret code.
The same vulnerability can also occur when b2 = 1+ b. In fact, in this case,
R =
[
a1
a2
]T
·
[
b
1+ b
]
= aT · b+ aT2 · 1 (5.13)
and
H ·RT = H · bT · a+H · 1T · a2. (5.14)
So, when the private code includes the all-one codeword, that is, H · 1T = 0, it results H ·RT =
H · bT · a and a vulnerable subcode is still defined by HS as in (5.12). For this reason, when R
is defined as in (5.13), codes including the all-one codeword cannot be used as secret codes. For
example, when an RS code defined over Fq having length n = q−1 is used, the all-one codeword is
always present. Shorter lengths should be considered in order to avoid the presence of the all-one
codeword.
When an RS code is used and one of its subcodes is exposed (except for a permutation), an
opponent could implement an attack of the type described in [124]. It is possible to verify that, for
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practical choices of the system parameters, the subcode defined by HS given by (5.12) is always
weak against such an attack.
A similar situation occurs if LDPC codes are used as private codes, since low weight code-
words could be searched in the dual of the subcode defined byHS , so revealing some rows of H
(though permuted). Moreover, the existence of low weight codewords in the dual of a subcode
of the public code could be dangerous for the system security even when HS is not available to
an attacker, since such codewords could still be searched in the dual of the public code. So, when
dealing with LDPC codes, it is always recommended to defineT as a sum of permutationmatrices
(that is, to fix m > 1) in order to avoid the existence of codewords with low weight in the dual of
the public code [6].
In the following subsectionswe propose two implementations of the cryptosystem that avoid
the subcode vulnerability. We describe them by making reference to the Niederreiter version of
the cryptosystem, but they can also be applied to its McEliece version.
5.3.2 First implementation
A first solution to overcome the subcode vulnerability consists in maintaining a1 = a and a2 = 0,
but hiding the constraint vector a. This obviously would also eliminate the need of selecting the
intentional error vectors according to condition (5.4).
We refer to the Niederreiter version of the cryptosystem and we fix, for simplicity, z = 1, but
the same arguments can easily be extended to the general case 1 ≤ z < n. Let us suppose that a
is private and that the error vector e generated by Alice is such that a · eT = γ, with γ ∈ Fq. It
follows that
RT · eT = γbT (5.15)
and
x′ = S · x = γH · bT +H ·TT · eT . (5.16)
In this case, Bob can guess that the value of γ is γB and compute
x′′ = x′ − γBH · bT
= (γ − γB)H · bT +H ·TT · eT . (5.17)
So, if γB = γ, Bob obtains x
′′ = H ·TT ·eT . In such a case, he can recover e through syndrome
decoding, check its weight and verify that a ·eT = γB . Otherwise, it is γB 6= γ and, supposing that
b is not a valid codeword, syndrome decoding fails or returns an error vector e′ 6= e. This latter
case is extremely rare, as shown below, and can also be identified by Bob by checking the weight
of e′ and the value of a · e′T . So, by iterating the procedure, that is, changing the value of γB , Bob
is able to find the right γ.
The probability of finding a correctable syndrome e′, for γB 6= γ, is very low. In fact, since
b is randomly chosen, when γB 6= γ we can suppose that the vector (γ − γB)H · bT is a random
r × 1 vector over Fq. The total number of correctable syndromes is
∑t
i=1
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i, while the
total number of random r×1 vectors is qr. So, the probability of obtaining a correctable syndrome
is:
Pe =
∑t
i=1
(n
i
)
(q − 1)i
qr
. (5.18)
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The value of Pe, for practical choices of the system parameters, is very low. For example, by
considering the set of parameters used in the original McEliece cryptosystem, that is, q = 2, n =
1024, k = 524, t = 50, it results Pe ≈ 10−65.
In concluding this subsection, we notice that, by using such an implementation, the com-
plexity of the decryption stage is increased, on average, by a factor ≤ (q + 1)/2 with respect to
the classical Niederreiter implementation. In fact, the average number of decryption attempts
needed by Bob becomes (q + 1)/2. However, some steps of the decryption procedure do not need
to be repeated; so, an increase in the decryption complexity by a factor (q + 1)/2 corresponds to a
pessimistic estimate.
5.3.3 Second implementation
A second solution to the subcode vulnerability is to adopt the choice a = a1 + a2, b2 = 1 + b
and to preserve condition (5.4), that implies, for Alice, the need to perform a selection of the error
vectors. In this case, according to (5.5):
RT · eT = 1T · a2 · eT . (5.19)
If we fix, for simplicity, z = 1 (but the same arguments can easily be extended to the general
case 1 ≤ z < n) and suppose to work over Fq, the possible values of α = a2 · eT are, obviously, q.
So, Bob needs to make up to q guesses on the value of α.
First, Bob computes x′ = S · x = H · (R+T)T · eT . By using (5.19), we have:
x′ = H · 1T · α+H ·TT · eT . (5.20)
We observe that, if the secret code included the all-one codeword, then H · 1T = 0 and Bob
would not need to guess the value of α. However, in this version of the cryptosystem, the use
of codes including the all-one codeword is prevented by the subcode vulnerability, as shown in
Section 5.3.1, so this facilitation cannot be exploited. Instead, Bob needs to make a first guess by
supposing α = αB and to calculate
x′′αB = x
′ −H · 1T · αB = H · 1T · (α− αB) +H ·TT · eT . (5.21)
If αB = α, then x
′′
αB = H ·TT · eT ; therefore, Bob can recover e through syndrome decoding,
check its weight and verify that a2 · eT = αB . Otherwise, the application of syndrome decoding
on x′′αB results in a decoding failure or in obtaining e
′ 6= e, for αB 6= α. As for the first implemen-
tation, in this case the probability of obtaining a correctable syndrome e′ is very small; so, when
αB 6= α, the decoder will end up reporting failure in most cases.
Also in this case, the average number of decryption attempts needed by Bob is (q+1)/2, and
the decryption complexity increases by a factor ≤ (q + 1)/2.
Concerning the subcode vulnerability, by using a1 6= a and a2 6= a, the matrixHS as in (5.12)
no longer defines a subcode permutation-equivalent to a subcode of the secret code. So, provided
that the private code does not include the all-one codeword (for the reasons explained in Section
5.3.1), the subcode vulnerability is eliminated.
Note that an attacker could try to sum two rows ofH′, hoping that one of them corresponds
to a copy of the vector a1 in R and the other to a copy of the vector a2, so that the sum of the
two rows might still contain the vector a. If he were able to select only those sums of this type,
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then he might be able to find a weak subcode. This appears to be a hard task for the following
reasons. If he adds one rowwith all the other rows, he would get, on average, only r/2 = (n−k)/2
rows containing the vector a, while the other sums would contain 2a1 or 2a2; even if he were able
to select the rows corresponding to a, the dimension of the subcode would not be large enough
for a feasible attack [77], [124]. Furthermore, effectively obtaining a in the sum of two rows also
depends on howH is built, i.e. it may occur only if some special relations between elements ofH
are satisfied. Lastly, to sum pairs of rows would also imply to sum pairs of rows of TT ; so, their
(very low) weight would be doubled with a very high probability, making decoding harder.
For these reasons, it seems not easy to devise a further vulnerability for the subcode that may
allow to mount an attack against this implementation.
5.3.4 Choice of Q
Also the choice of the matrix Q can show some critical aspects. Let us focus on the binary case
(q = 2) and consider a particular instance of the first implementation, in which the matrix Q is
obtained as
Q1 = R+P1, (5.22)
with P1 being a permutation matrix and
R = aT · b = [ a1 a2 · · · an ]T · [ b1 b2 · · · bn ] , (5.23)
where a and b are two random vectors over F2.
In the choice ofQ1 it is important to avoid some special cases which could allow an attacker
to derive a code that is permutation-equivalent to the secret one, thus bringing security back to
that of the classical McEliece system.
Let us suppose that the j-th element of b is zero and that P1 has a symbol 1 at position (i, j).
In this case, the j-th column of Q1 is null, except for its element at row i. Since Q
−1
1 = Q̂/ |Q|,
where Q̂ is the adjoint matrix and |Q| is the determinant ofQ1, it follows from the definition of Q̂
that the i-th column ofQ−11 is null, except for its element at row j. So, the i-th column ofQ
−1
1 has
the effect of a column permutation, like in the original McEliece cryptosystem.
In order to avoid such a possible flaw, we impose that all the elements of b are non-zero.
If we limit to the binary case, this imposes that b is the all-one vector. However, in such a case,
further issues exist in the design of Q. For example, let us consider a as an all-one vector too, so
thatR = 1. A valid parity-check matrix for the public code is:
H′ = H ·QT , (5.24)
where H is the parity-check matrix of the private code. In the special case of Q1 = 1 + P1, we
haveH′ = H · 1+H ·PT1 . By assuming a regularH (i.e. with constant row and column weights),
two cases are possible:
• If the rows ofH have even weight,H · 1 = 0 andH′ = H ·PT1 .
• If the rows ofH have odd weight,H · 1 = 1 andH′ = 1+H ·PT1 .
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In both cases, the public code has a parity-check matrix that is simply a permuted version of
that of the secret code (or its complementary). This reduces the security to that of the original
McEliece cryptosystem, that discloses a permuted version of the secret code. Such a security level
is not sufficient when adopting, for example, LDPC codes, since the permuted version of the secret
matrixH can be attacked by searching for low weight codewords in the dual of the secret code.
A more general formulation of the flaw follows from the consideration thatQ1 = 1+P1 has
a very special inverse. First of all, let us consider that Q1 is invertible only when it has even size.
This is obvious since, for odd size, Q1 has even row/column weight; so, the sum of all its rows
is the zero vector. If we restrict ourselves to even size Q1 matrices, it is easy to show that their
inverse has the form Q−11 = 1 + P
T
1 , due to the property of permutation matrices (as orthogonal
matrices) to have their inverse coincident with the transpose.
So, Q−11 has the same form of Q1 and, as in the case of H, disclosing G
′ = S−1GQ−11 might
imply disclosing a generator matrix of a permuted version of the secret code or its complementary
(depending on the parity of its row weight). Therefore, the form Q1 = 1 + P1 might reduce the
security to that of the permutation used in the original McEliece cryptosystem.
Based on these considerations, one could think that adopting a vector a different from the
all-one vector could avoid the flaw. However, by considering again that Q−11 = Q̂/ |Q|, it is easy
to verify that a weight-1 row in Q1 produces a weight-1 row in Q
−1
1 and a weight-(n − 1) row in
Q1 produces a weight-(n−1) row inQ−11 . It follows thatQ−11 contains couples of columns having
Hamming distance 2. Since their sum is a weight-2 vector, the sum of the corresponding columns
of the public matrix results in the sum of two columns of S−1G. Starting from this fact, an attacker
could try to solve a system of linear equations with the aim of obtaining a permutation-equivalent
representation of the secret code, at least for the existing distance-2 column pairs.
So, our conclusion concerning the binary case is that the choice of Q as in (5.22) and (5.23)
should be avoided. A safer Q is obtained by considering z > 1 and more than one permutation
matrix (i.e. m > 1). This obviously has the drawback of requiring codes with increased error
correction capability.
5.4 Comparison with other variants of the McEliece cryptosystem
The main difference between the proposed cryptosystem and many other variants of the McEliece
cryptosystem consists in the way the secret generator matrix is disguised into the public one, that
is, by using a more general transformation matrix in the place of the permutation matrix.
Other proposals for increasing key security have been made in the past, such as using a
distortion matrix together with rank codes in the GPT cryptosystem [46] and exploiting the prop-
erties of subcodes in variants of the McEliece and the GPT cryptosystems [13]. Unfortunately,
cryptanalysis has shown that such approaches exhibit security flaws [87], [124].
The idea of using a rank-1 matrix with the structure (5.23) can be found in [45]. However,
such a matrix was added to the secret matrix (rather than multiplied by it) and no selection of the
error vectors was performed, so that a completely different solution was implemented.
Instead, the idea of replacing the permutation in the McEliece cryptosystem with a more
general transformation matrix is already present in the variant of the GPT cryptosystem adopting
a column scrambler [86], [97] and in cryptosystems based on full decoding [64, sec. 8.3]. These
proposals are shortly examined next.
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5.4.1 Comparison with the modified GPT cryptosystem
The original GPT cryptosystemhas been the object of Gibson’s attack. To counter such an attack, in
[86] a variant including a column scrambler in place of the permutationmatrix has been proposed.
Apart from the code extension and the inclusion of an additive distortion matrix, in the mod-
ified GPT cryptosystem the public generator matrix is obtained through right-multiplication by a
non-singular matrix that is not necessarily a permutation matrix. So, in principle, it is the same
idea of using a more general transformation matrix as in the proposed cryptosystem. However, in
order to preserve the ability to correct the intentional error vectors, the GPT cryptosystem works
in the rank metric domain and adopts rank distance codes, as Gabidulin codes.
Unfortunately, the properties of Gabidulin codes make it possible to exploit the effect of the
Frobenius automorphism on the public generator matrix in order to mount a polynomial-time
attack [87]. Recently, it has been shown that this attack can be avoided [97], but the cryptosystem
still needs to workwith rank distance codes. Differently from the GPT cryptosystem, the proposed
solution is able to exploit Hamming distance codes, that are more widespread than rank distance
codes, can be chosen to have convenient properties or structure, like RS codes, and may take
advantage of many efficient codec implementations that are already available.
5.4.2 Comparison with full-decoding cryptosystems
The main idea behind full-decoding cryptosystems in [64] is to let the intentional error vectors
have any arbitrary weight. This way, an attacker would be forced to try full-decoding of the
public code, that is known to be a NP-complete task. Obviously, the legitimate receiver must be
able to decode any intentional error vector with reasonable complexity; so, the problem of full
decoding must be transformed from a one-way function to a trapdoor function. For this purpose,
the main idea is to use a transformation that maps a set of error vectors with weight ≤ t into a set
of arbitrary weight intentional error vectors.
If this transformation is represented by the n × n matrix M, the public code (as proposed
first in [64]) would be G′ = G ·M. The basic point for obtaining a trapdoor function is to make
Alice use only those error vectors that can be expressed as e′ = e ·M, where e is a weight-t error
vector. This way, when Bob uses the inverse of the secret matrixM to invert the transformation,
he re-maps each arbitrary weight error vector into a correctable error vector. Unauthorized users
would instead be forced to try full-decoding over arbitrary weight error vectors; so, the trapdoor
is obtained.
The set of intentional error vectors used in full-decoding cryptosystems is not the set (or
a subset) of the correctable error vectors, as in the proposed cryptosystem, but a transformed
version of it. In fact, the purpose of full-decoding cryptosystems is to increase the security level
with respect to theMcEliece cryptosystem by relying on a problem that is harder to solve. In order
to exploit the full-decoding problem, Alice must use for encryption only those error vectors that
can be anti-transformed into correctable error vectors. So, some information on the transformation
used to originate them must be disclosed. A solution is that the first p < n rows ofM are made
public [64]. However, it has been proved that, this way, the security reduces to that of the original
McEliece cryptosystem, and an attacker does not have to attempt full-decoding, but only normal
decoding.
Further variants aim at better hiding the secret transformation matrix in its disclosed version
[64]. In the last variant, a generator matrix of a maximum distance-t anticode is used to hide the
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secret transformation. This way, after inverting the secret transformation, the error vector remains
correctable for the legitimate receiver. To our knowledge, the latter version has never been proved
to be insecure nor to reduce to the same problem of the original McEliece cryptosystem. However,
the construction based on anticodes seems unpractical.
Differently from full-decoding cryptosystems, our proposal still relies on the same problem as
the original McEliece cryptosystem (that is, normal decoding); so, no transformation is performed
over the correctable random error vectors, but we need, at most, only a selection of them. For
this reason, the information leakage on the secret transformation matrix that is needed in the
proposed cryptosystem is considerably smaller with respect to what happens in full-decoding
cryptosystems.
5.5 Attacks against the proposed cryptosystem
A first concern about the proposed cryptosystem is to verify that it is actually able to provide
increased key security, with respect to previous variants of the McEliece cryptosystem, in such a
way as to allow the use of widespread families of codes (as RS and Generalized RS codes) without
incurring in the attacks that have prevented their use up to now.
From the comparison with the variants described in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, we infer that
previous attacks targeted to those cryptosystems do not succeed against the proposed one, due to
the differences in the family of codes used and in the information leakage on the secret transfor-
mation. Concerning the latter point, we observe that, even if the whole matrix R (and not only
the vector a) was public, an attacker would not gain much information. In fact, in this case, he
could compute x ·R = u ·G′ ·R. However, for the choices of the parameters we consider,R has
rank  n, so G′ · R is not invertible. Moreover, multiplication by G′ · R only provides a small
dimension syndrome of u, whose decoding is known to be a hard problem [15].
Themost powerful attack procedures against our proposed solution are those techniques that
attempt information set decoding (ISD) on the public code; so we estimate the security level of the
proposed cryptosystem against this kind of attacks. Actually, there is no guarantee that the public
code, defined through the generator matrix (5.6) or, equivalently, the parity-check matrix (5.9),
maintains the same minimum distance and error correction capability of the secret code. Since the
private code is already a very good code, and the transformation matrix is randomly chosen, the
public code will most probably be worse than the private one. So, in estimating the security level
as the work factor of ISD attacks, we make the pessimistic assumption that the public code is still
able to correct all intentional errors.
5.5.1 ISD attacks
In [17] the authors have proposed some smart speedup techniques to reduce the Stern algorithm
work factor (WF) over the binary field, this way obtaining a theoretical WF close to 260. Their
attack was implemented on a big cluster of computers that was able to break the McEliece cryp-
tosystem with original parameters (n = 1024, k = 524, t = 50). As a consequence, the authors
have proposed some new set of system parameters in order to increase the security level. The in-
formation set decoding attack is not polynomial in the code dimension, since it aims at decoding
a random linear code without exploiting any structural property (even if present) and this task is
notoriously non-polynomial. One of the biggest improvements presented in [17] is a smart way to
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find k independent columns in the public generator matrix at each iteration without performing
Gaussian reduction on all such columns. A further improvement consists in the pre-computation
of the sum of some rows during the reduction.
In [93], Peters points out that these speedups are efficient on very small fields. As it results
from the table available in [92], for q > 16 the maximum values of the speedup parameters are
c = 2, r = 1, where c represents the number of columns to be changed in the case an iteration fails
and r is the number of rows in a single pre-sum (1 means no speedup). So, for large fields, these
speedups are not relevant and the algorithm is quite similar to Stern’s one. The difference relies
on guessing not only p error positions but also p error values in the k independent columns, due to
the field cardinality. Finiasz and Sendrier have proposed a further improvement that could yield
a slight modification in the WF, resulting in a maximum increase of 26 or a maximum decrease
close to 23.
In Table 5.1 we report some values of the WF when using RS codes in the variant of the
McEliece cryptosystem we propose. They were computed through the PARI/GP script available
in [92], that allows the estimation of the security level, although it is not extremely accurate (it
can be about 4-8 times higher than the actual value). The reported WF values are the lowest ones
obtained for each set of parameters. We observe from Table 5.1 that, in order to reach a satisfactory
level of security (that is,WF ≥ 280) we need to adopt RS codes defined on F256 or more. Based on
Table 5.1, we can compare the proposed cryptosystem with the instances of the McEliece system
presented in [17].
Example 1
To reach WF > 280, the (1632, 1269) Goppa code is suggested, resulting in a public-key size of
460647 bits (obtained by storing the non-systematic part ofH, as in theNiederreiter cryptosystem).
With the new variant, we can consider the RS code with n = 255, k = 195, t = 30, having an
estimated WF ≈ 286.06 and an actual WF ≈ 284.18 (found through the C program available in [92]).
We can consider the Niederreiter version of the first implementation (see Section 5.3.2), and use
H′′, defined by (5.11), having elements over F256, as the public key.
This way, we need to store only the last k columns of H′′, so obtaining a public key size
of 93600 bits, that is about 80% less than in the revised McEliece cryptosystem [17]. If we instead
adopt the second implementation (see Section 5.3.3), we also need to store the 1×255 vector a, with
elements over F256. This would increase the public key size by 2040 bits, that is not a significant
change.
The security level of the two systems remains comparable when the constraint expressed by
a is imposed on the intentional error vectors of the modified cryptosystem. In fact, as it will be
shown in the next subsection, the introduction of each constraint results in a decreasedWF for the
ISD attack of 23 at most.
Example 2
As another example, we can consider the Goppa code suggested in [17] to achieve WF ≥ 2128,
which has n = 2960, k = 2288, yielding a key length of 1537536 bits.
An RS code with the same rate (0.77), defined over F512, is reported in Table 5.1 and has
n = 511, k = 395. By considering this code in the Niederreiter version of the first implementation
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(see Section 5.3.2), and storing the last k columns ofH′′, defined by (5.11), we obtain a public key
size of 412380 bits, that is about 73% less than in the revised McEliece cryptosystem.
Moreover, by using the new system, the security level grows up to 2158.67 (more precisely, it
is estimated as 2155.89 with the C program from [92]). This value remains very high even when we
consider the presence of the constraint expressed by a on the intentional error vectors.
Table 5.1: Work factor (log2) of ISD attacks on RS codes.
RS codes with n = 127 defined over F128
Rate 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.53
t 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
WF 49.2 50.1 51.0 51.7 52.3 52.8 53.3 53.7 54.0 54.2 54.3 54.4 54.4 54.4 54.2
RS codes with n = 255 defined over F256
Rate 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.59
t 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52
WF 79.0 81.6 83.9 86.1 87.9 89.6 91.1 92.4 93.5 94.4 95.2 95.8 96.2 96.5 96.7
RS codes with n = 511 defined over F512
Rate 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.77
t 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58
WF 81.3 90.1 98.1 105.6 112.4 118.8 124.7 130.2 135.3 140.0 144.3 148.4 152.1 155.5 158.7
5.5.2 Exploiting the knowledge on error vectors
It is important to assess whether the constraints that may be imposed on the intentional error
vectors in the proposed cryptosystem have any consequences on its security.
For this purpose, a conservative approach consists in considering, in the WF computations, a
reduced number of intentional errors, that is, t′ = t− z. This approach is conservative in the sense
that we assume that the attacker exactly knows both the position and the value of z errors, while
he actually knows only their values. We can estimate the WF of an ISD attack in this scenario by
using the same procedure as in Section 5.5.1. This has been done in Table 5.2. As we can observe
from the values obtained (and their comparison with those reported in Table 5.1, corresponding
to z = 0), we have a WF decrease close to 23 when z is increased by 1. So, the security level for the
considered parameters does not vary significantly, on condition that the value of z is kept small.
Table 5.2: Work factor (log2) of ISD attacks on RS codes with n = 255, defined over F256, when
z = 1 or z = 2 constraints are imposed on the error vectors.
Rate 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.59
t 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52
WF (z = 1) 75.9 78.6 81.1 83.3 85.3 87.0 88.6 90.0 91.2 92.2 93.0 93.7 94.2 94.6 94.8
WF (z = 2) 72.8 75.6 78.2 80.5 82.6 84.5 86.1 87.6 88.9 89.9 90.9 91.6 92.2 92.6 92.9
5.6 Conclusion
We have introduced a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem that, by replacing the secret permu-
tation matrix with a more general transformation matrix, is able to avoid that the public code is
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permutation-equivalent to the secret code. This allows to prevent attacks against classical families
of codes, as RS codes, and to reconsider them as possible good candidates in this framework.
We have proposed some practical implementations of the new cryptosystem, by considering
both its McEliece and Niederreiter variants, and we have addressed some important issues that
may influence their design.
We have also assessed the security level of the proposed cryptosystem by considering up-to-
date attack procedures, and we have compared it with the classical McEliece cryptosystem and
the Niederreiter variant. Our results show that the proposed solution, by exploiting RS codes, is
able to guarantee an increased security level and, at the same time, a considerable reduction in the
public key size.
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Chapter 6
Coding solutions for a secure storage of
biometric data
This chapter deals with the problem of securely storing biometric passwords, such as fingerprints
and irises. The proposed solutions [8, 107] involve the use of error-correcting codes whose length
can be very large, so that efficient decoding algorithms are required. We will discuss the use of
both classic algebraic codes and iteratively decodable codes.
6.1 Introduction
The use of biometric passwords, such as fingerprints, irises, etc., has been an important issue in
recent years, both because of the big advantages it may bring along and because of the clearly
non negligible privacy concerns and implementation issues [117]. In fact, as far as privacy is
concerned, the storage of raw biometric data is not an acceptable solution, but, on the other hand, a
secure storage cannot be easily implemented, as for traditional passwords, by simply introducing
an hash function. This is due to the fact that the binary strings derived from different acquisitions
of the same biometric feature can slightly change from each other, and the biometric feature can
slightly change itself. Therefore a certain threshold of tolerance is needed to be able to identify
legitimate from non legitimate users, but this prevents the standard use of collision resistant hash
functions [107].
This problem has prompted researchers to devise other solutions for the secure storage and
use of biometric passwords (see [116] for a selected survey of the literature). The idea behind most
of these methods is a combined use of error correcting codes and hash functions, whose model
is the fuzzy commitment scheme [61], which we revisit below. This has been later generalized to
other types of metrics, such as the set difference metric [62] and the edit distance metric [36].
In particular, the fuzzy vault [62] uses polynomial interpolation in order to allow authenti-
cation based on the matching of a sufficient number of features, while the fuzzy extractor [36] is
a further generalization which combines the previous constructions with particular objects called
random extractors. These make the previous schemes stronger with respect to information leak-
age, though they cannot prevent it [24, 37].
Briefly, privacy and implementation issues are still a concern and our aim is to give a further
contribution concerning these issues. In particular we will show that a syndrome based fuzzy
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hashing construction can be more convenient as far as information leakage is concerned. We will
also address the design of codes and other implementation issues.
The chapter is structured as follows: in Section 6.2 we briefly review the fuzzy commitment
scheme and its main issues. Section 6.3 is devoted to the syndrome based construction which we
denote by fuzzy hashing.
6.2 The fuzzy commitment scheme
The fuzzy commitment scheme, proposed in [61], works as follows. Suppose we want to securely
store a length n biometric vector x ∈ Fnq , where Fq is the Galois field of order q, and let e be the
maximum number of different symbols with respect to the reference vector x that we can tolerate
in any other acquisition of the same biometric feature.
According to the fuzzy commitment scheme, we choose a hash function Ha and an [n, k]-
linear block code C ⊂ Fnq , able to correct e errors, and then store (Ha(rx), l), where rx is a random
codeword associated to x and l = x− rx.
Given another biometric y, we compute the vector z = y−l and apply the decoding algorithm
of C . If decoding succeeds, this results in a codeword cz ∈ C , and we compute Ha(cz). If Ha(cz)
equalsHa(rx), i.e., the value previously stored, authentication succeeds, otherwise it fails.
In fact, if the hashes are the same, then cz = rx (apart from a negligible probability of a hash
collision), so d(cz , z) = d(rx, z) ≤ e, where d(·) denotes the Hamming distance. Since rx = x − l
and z = y − l, it results d(rx, z) = d(x, y) ≤ e.
Conversely, d(x, y) ≤ e implies d(x − l, y − l) = d(rx, z) ≤ e, so that decoding z results in
cz = rx and Ha(cz) = Ha(rx).
Below we revisit the main problems concerning the use of this scheme, namely implementa-
tion issues and security issues [107].
6.2.1 Choice of the code
As a first instance, in order to prevent bruce force attacks, we require for the size of the code
|C| ≥ 280. This is due to the fact that it is generally accepted that a total search space of 280 is
beyond the capabilities of modern computers. As a result it is desirable that codes constructed
over the binary field have dimension k = dim C ≥ 80, possibly a bit smaller if one works over
larger alphabets. In addition one wants to have a large relative minimum distance (because of
the big error tolerance required) that only low rate codes can afford. Indeed because e.g. of the
asymptotic Elias upper bound (see e.g. [19]) only very low rate binary codes can have relative
distance larger than e.g. 0.4. Of course the code should come with efficient decoding algorithms
even when the block length is about n = 104 or n = 105, depending on the type of biometric in
use.
In [61] it is proposed that Reed-Solomon and BCH codes might provide useful results (see
also [55]). For large code lengths, this might be a good option only if low-complexity decoding
algorithms are used. Otherwise other types of codes have to be introduced, for example product
codes or LDPC codes.
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6.2.2 Distribution of biometric templates
Privacy concerns may arise if the biometric templates are not uniformly distributed in the ambient
space, that is their entropy is not maximal. In that case, it may be feasible to infer from l some
information about rx and, therefore, endanger the system security. Depending on the size of C it
might be possible to do a search among all codewords with a particular pattern and consequently
break the system. A possible countermeasure would be to take a higher rate code, but at the
expense of lowering the minimum distance.
6.2.3 Practical Implementation Issues
There are other practical difficulties that make the problemmore complicated than how we stated
it, for example the fact that the scheme requires that the two passwords to be compared are
aligned, but one of the two passwords is not in the clear. In the literature [21, 22, 36, 44, 62, 65, 107,
118, 117, 128] we can find a deeper discussion of all these side problems together with proposals
to attack some of them.
6.3 Syndrome fuzzy hashing
Starting from the fuzzy commitment principle, an alternative scheme (here fuzzy hashing) can be
devised, in which syndromes are used in the place of codewords. Under a coding theory view-
point, the two schemes are equivalent. Despite this, the use of syndromes has several advantages
in the considered context. The idea of storing the syndrome of x, instead of a shift vector from a
codeword, already appeared in [36], where it is considered as an example of a sketch construction.
We will show that the use of fuzzy hashing is advantageous with respect to the classical fuzzy
commitment scheme, also by considering the characteristics of typical biometric data.
In the fuzzy hashing scheme, an [n, k]-linear block code C ⊂ Fnq , able to correct e errors,
is selected, and it is described through its r × n parity-check matrix H , with r = n − k. Given a
biometric vector x to be stored, the pair (Ha(x),Hx) is used to represent x, wereHa is a given hash
function. When another biometric y is acquired and is compared with x, the value Hx − Hy =
H(x− y) = Hv is computed, that coincides with the syndrome associated to the difference vector
v = x − y. Then, syndrome decoding is applied on Hv, according to the chosen code C . If y
is taken from the same individual as x, then v has Hamming weight equal to d(x, y) ≤ e and it
corresponds to a correctable error vector. So, syndrome decoding succeeds and correctly results in
v. Then, starting from v and y, x can be computed, as well as Ha(x). The latter coincides with the
stored value, so authentication succeeds. Otherwise, syndrome decoding fails or reports w 6= v.
In such case, x′ = w + y 6= x andHa(x′) 6= Ha(x) is obtained, so authentication fails.
In the fuzzy commitment, the vector l = x − rx is stored. As some bits of the biometric
x might be known with high probability, this reveals some information on the secret codeword
rx. The same may occur in fuzzy hashing, where the syndrome Hx is stored, but only under
the condition x = q + rq, where q is a correctable error vector and rq is any codeword. In this
case, syndrome decoding results in q; so, some bits of rq can still be guessed, starting from the
predictable bits of x. However, especially for very low rate codes, the probability that x is within
the decoding radius of a codeword rq is very low, so fuzzy hashing provides better security with
respect to the classical fuzzy commitment.
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6.3.1 Codes for fuzzy hashing
In order to design suitable codes to be included in the fuzzy hashing scheme, we must consider
the features of the biometric vectors we work with. If we refer to fingerprints or irises, a common
acquisition will consist of a vector of several thousands of bits. However, it would be unpractical
to apply fuzzy hashing directly on the plain acquisition, since a number of impairments could
jeopardize the identification process. In fact, small changes in the acquisition conditions (as am-
bient light or small movements of the subject) could result in significant differences between two
images of the same biometric feature. So, a common procedure is to extract a set of representa-
tive features from the biometric data through algorithms aimed at making them invariant to some
frequent acquisition impairments. An example of this kind of algorithms will be considered in
Section 6.3.3. So, the code must be designed to work with the vectors produced as output by the
feature extracting algorithm. Typically, such vectors have length of the order of 10k bits.
Another important aspect is the modeling of the errors affecting two vectors resulting from
different biometric acquisitions from the same individual. In [115], the errors are modeled through
a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with transition probability p. Wewill adopt the same approach
in this paper. As it will be shown in the next section, typical values of the percentage of different
bits between the vectors representing two acquisitions of the same biometric range between 10%
and 30%. So, we need codes with length about 10k bits that are able to correct such high fractions
of errors and, hence, have very low rate (R). Just to give an idea, a BCH code with (n = 2047,
k = 100), that is, rate R ≈ 0.05, is able to correct 379 errors, which means it has a relative error
correcting capability of about 19%. A BCH code with (n = 4095, k = 110), that is, rate R ≈ 0.03,
is able to correct 767 errors, that is almost the same percentage. A similar value is reached by the
BCH code having (n = 8191, k = 170), hence rate R ≈ 0.02, able to correct 1533 errors.
This evidences that, for classical algebraic codes, in order to maintain a given relative error
correcting capability, the code rate must be decreased as the code length increases. Furthermore,
due to the long code length, decoding may also yield complexity issues, although recent algo-
rithms can reduce the decoding complexity, as we have seen in the previous chapters. So we
have chosen to test the system with modern iteratively decoded error correcting codes, like Low-
Density Parity-Check (LDPC) codes [100]. Actually, the use of LDPC codes in this context has
already been proposed in [23, 107, 115], but the code design was not addressed in those works.
In summary, fuzzy hashing with LDPC codes brings the following advantages: i) it reduces the
amount of stored data, with respect to the fuzzy commitment, since r < n; ii) it reduces the pre-
dictability of the stored strings, as shown at the end of the previous section; iii) LDPC codes have
greater error correction capabilities than classical algebraic codes; moreover, their relative error
correcting capability, for a fixed rate, is almost constant as the code length increases; iv) LDPC
codes allow to reduce the size of the code representation, by exploiting the sparse nature of H .
6.3.2 Code Design
We are interested in almost regular codes, since they allow an easier implementation with respect
to irregular codes; so, we fix the column weight of the matrix H to be equal to an integer dv. The
row weight, for the code rate values here of interest, cannot be constant as well. However, it will
be minimally dispersed around its mean 〈dc〉 = dv/(1−R). If we suppose that (as it occurs for all
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the codes we consider):
k
n
= R <
1
dv + 1
, (6.1)
the matrix H can have rows with only the following two values of weight: dv and dv + 1. In this
case, r − k · dv rows have weight dv and the other k · dv rows have weight dv + 1.
We can describe the column and row weight distributions of the matrix H through the poly-
nomials λ(x) and ρ(x) representing, respectively, the variable node and check node degree distri-
butions of the associated Tanner graph [100]. Since we adopt the edge perspective, λi (ρi) denotes
the fraction of ones in the parity-check matrix H which are in columns (rows) of weight i. Based
on the hypotheses above, for the considered ensemble of codes it results:
λ(x) = xdv−1,
ρ(x) = [1−R(1 + dv)]xdv−1 +R(1 + dv)xdv . (6.2)
Starting from (6.2), we can estimate the asymptotic performance (that is, for n → ∞) of LDPC
codes in this ensemble by applying the density evolution method [100].
Gallager’s A algorithm [47] is an LDPC decoding algorithm for the BSC channel that permits
an easy characterization through density evolution [9]. So, we have estimated its convergence
threshold (that is the maximum channel error probability such that all the errors can be corrected
using an infinite length code) for the variable and check node degree polynomials given by (6.2).
Results are reported in Table 6.1, where the threshold values computed for dv = 3, 4, 5 are pro-
vided, for code rates ranging between 0.1 and 0.01.
Table 6.1: Threshold values for the considered LDPC codes ensembles under Gallager’s A decod-
ing.
R dv = 3 dv = 4 dv = 5
0.1 0.159 0.078 0.045
0.09 0.163 0.079 0.045
0.08 0.166 0.08 0.046
0.07 0.169 0.081 0.046
0.06 0.173 0.083 0.047
0.05 0.177 0.084 0.048
0.04 0.18 0.085 0.048
0.03 0.184 0.087 0.049
0.02 0.188 0.088 0.05
0.01 0.192 0.089 0.051
As we observe from the table, the choice of a small value of dv (like 3) should be preferred.
On the other hand, the asymptotic performance under Gallager’s A decoding is not very good.
For example, to reach a relative error correcting capability of 19%, for dv = 3, a code rate smaller
than 0.02 is required, that is similar to that needed by a BCH code with n = 8191.
Gallager’s A algorithm allows an easy density evolution analysis, that is useful to verify that
LDPC codes can asymptotically reach the error correcting performance we need and for which
values of code rate. On the other hand, when dealing with finite length codes, decoding algo-
rithms with better performance can be used. In fact, Gallager’s A algorithm is a majority-based
algorithm exploiting a fixed decision threshold b, that is not the most effective choice. For exam-
ple, adopting a variable b (as in Gallager’s B algorithm) gives a first performance improvement.
Furthermore, several improved versions of these algorithms have been proposed in the literature
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[76], that are able to outperform Gallager’s original algorithms. Finally, the classical Sum Product
Algorithm (SPA) [54] can also be applied on the BSC, even though, in absence of soft-information
from the channel, the initial likelihood associated to each bit can assume only two opposite values.
Despite this, the SPA is able to significantly improve the error correction performance with respect
to that predicted in Table 6.1, as we will show in the next section, by providing some examples of
practical codes.
Examples
In this subsection we provide examples of LDPC codes having parameters of interest in the fuzzy
hashing context. The codes have been designed through the Progressive Edge Growth (PEG) algo-
rithm [58], by imposing almost constant column and row weights for their parity-check matrices.
For given column and row weights, the PEG algorithm allows to design finite length LDPC codes
with very good performance under belief propagation decoding.
In detail, we first fix the column weight dv. Then, we impose the lower triangular form for
the parity-check matrices, in such a way as to facilitate encoding, especially for very long codes.
This introduces a last column having weight 1, and some columns having weight < dv. However,
their incidence with respect to the total number of columns is very small. Then, the PEG algorithm
is used to optimize the length of the local cycles within the Tanner graph associated to each code,
while keeping the row weight distribution as much concentrated as possible.
So, the characteristics of the codes we have designed are well overlaid with those fixed in the
previous subsection. The codes mentioned above have been used to perform Montecarlo simula-
tions over the BSC, based on SPA decoding.
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Figure 6.1: Performance of rate 0.1 LDPC codes with dv = 3 and dv = 5 over the BSC with SPA
decoding.
A first set of results is reported in Fig. 6.1, where LDPC codes having n = 9600 and k = 1000
(hence, rate ≈ 0.1) have been considered. We have designed two codes with different column
weights: dv = 3 and dv = 5. As we observe from the figure, the simulation confirms that the code
with dv = 3 has better performance, in the waterfall region, with respect to the code having dv = 5.
This was expected on the basis of the results of density evolution. However, we also observe that
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the code with dv = 5 has a better performance in the error floor region, so its Bit Error Rate (BER)
and Frame Error Rate (FER) curves tend to intersect with those of the first code. So, the choice of
dv = 3 is suitable if a failure rate on the order of 10
−4 or more is acceptable; otherwise, the choice
of dv = 5 should be preferred.
The performance improvement due to the SPA is evident: both codes are able to achieve a
rather low error rate for a percentage of bit errors around 20%, or even more.
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Figure 6.2: Performance of LDPC codes with dv = 3 and rate 0.05 and 0.02 over the BSC with SPA
decoding.
To further increase the error correcting capability of these codes, it is necessary to reduce their
rate. To provide some examples in this sense, we have considered k = 800 and designed two other
LDPC codes, having dv = 3 and rate 0.05 and 0.02 (that is, n = 16000 and n = 40000), respectively.
As we observe from their simulated performance, reported in Fig. 6.2, by using the SPA,
these codes are able to reach very low error rates for a percentage of bit errors around 30% and
even more. Also in this case, the performance improvement due to the SPA with respect to the
theoretical performance referred to Gallager’s A algorithm is evident.
These results confirm that LDPC codes are well suited for the application in the considered
context, in which a high correction capability is needed. Furthermore, we can observe that, in
this study, we have limited ourselves to consider almost regular codes, in order to keep their
implementation complexity low. The adoption of irregular LDPC codes can result in a further
performance improvement.
6.3.3 Entropy analysis
In this section, we discuss the use of fuzzy hashing for iris recognition and we study how the
adoption of syndromes affects some statistical properties of the biometric data. As a feature ex-
tractor, we use the algorithm described in [70] and available in [71], together with its associated
matching algorithm. In our simulations, we refer to the iris pattern database known as CASIA V.1,
provided by the Institute of Automation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences [27].
Since the bits in iris templates are mutually dependent [32], we should compute the entropy
of a source with memory, but this is computationally unfeasible for the sizes we are dealing with.
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So, according to [32, 30], we evaluate the discrimination entropy over both the sets of iris templates
and of their fuzzy hashes. For this purpose, we first compute the distribution of the normalized
Hamming distances between all the couples of patterns within the set (of images of the same iris
or of images of different irises). Then, we compute the mean µ and the standard deviation σ of
the normalized Hamming distance distribution. Finally, the discrimination entropy (also known
as “Degrees of Freedom” or DOF) is obtained as DOF = µ(1− µ)/σ2.
Applying fuzzy hashing to an iris recognition framework is not straightforward, due to the
high variability in the iris acquisition phase. In fact, we must try to avoid all the differences given
not only by the measure variability (i.e., scale and rotation), but also by the eye variability, that
can significantly change the amount of visible iris and its shape.
The standardway to take these issues into account is to compute amask describingwhich bits
in the iris template are free from such occlusions. The masks, in general, have a different number
of set bits for each iris reading, resulting into information patterns having different lengths, both in
the case they describe different irises and different readings of the same iris. This is not a problem
in the case of the standard matching algorithms, since we can take, as inputs for the matching
phase, the templates and masks of both the stored iris and the one we want to check. Then, we
can just compute the union of the two masks and obtain the number of different bits between the
two templates, limited to the region excluded from the union of the masks.
Instead, when we use syndromes, we cannot access the reference template in clear; so, we
must cope with different lengths of the information patterns. One way is to treat the matching
channel as an error-and-erasure channel [23], where erasures are given by the masks. However,
in [23] the authors use a different algorithm, while, in our case, the large number of bits erased
by the masks makes this approach unusable. In order to obtain a fixed length of the information
patterns, we compute, for each template bit position i, the probability m(i) that such bit is not
erased by a mask. Then, we compute a pseudomask selecting the bit positions corresponding to a
value ofm(i) lower than a threshold: m(i) ≤ mth. In our case, we fixmth = 2.4%.
We are aware that, with this approach, we may neglect some bits that were not erased by
their associated masks, but we have verified that this has a very limited effect for the considered
algorithm. In fact, using all the selected bits in each template, we obtain, between two different
readings of the same iris, an average Hamming distance of 28.24%, a standard deviation σ =
0.0435 and a discrimination entropy equal to 107 bits. Instead, using only the bits selected by the
pseudomask, we obtain an average Hamming distance of 26.2%, a standard deviation σ = 0.0486
and a discrimination entropy equal to 81 bit. The explanation for this moderate variation, in terms
of discrimination entropy performance, is that the feature extraction algorithm does not compute
the masks in the best possible way (for example the two eyelids are approximated with straight
lines and not with curves); so, when we consider all the bits in each template, we introduce some
errors that afflict the result, that is, we take some bits into account that we should actually erase.
We model the channel as BSC both in the case of intra-class and inter-class comparisons.
The use of a BSC model is further justified by the fact that, by exploiting the considered feature
extraction algorithm and pseudomask, we have an experimental transition probability p1→0 =
0.257, p0→1 = 0.268 for intra-class comparison and p1→0 = 0.480, p0→1 = 0.501 for the inter-class
case, thus confirming the (almost) symmetric nature of the channel.
In order to show that the use of fuzzy hashing is able to increase the discrimination entropy,
that is to provide a better protection against information leakage, we estimate the DOF on the set of
plain templates, before and after the application of fuzzy hashing. The latter is performed through
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Figure 6.3: Inter-class analysis of the Hamming distance for the considered set of iris templates
with and without fuzzy hashing.
the LDPC code having n = 9600, R = 0.1 and dv = 5, described in the previous section. We
compute the normalized Hamming distance between each pair of templates created from different
irises and then estimate its probability density function. The results are reported in Fig. 6.3.
The set of plain template vectors has µ = 0.4897, σ = 0.0281, hence DOF = 316.5. After per-
forming fuzzy hashing, the values become µ = 0.4932, σ = 0.0166, DOF = 907.1, thus confirming
the positive effect of fuzzy hashing.
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Chapter 7
Appendix I:
Gauss Sums of the Cubic Character
We show here an elementary approach to derive the values of the Gauss sums of a cubic character
over a finite field. We first deal with finite fields of characteristic 2 [102], then with fields with odd
characteristic [103], which is the more difficult and interesting case.
New links between Gauss sums over different field extensions will be shown in terms of
factorizations of the Gauss sums themselves, which then are revisited in terms of prime ideal
decompositions. Interestingly, one of these results gives a representation of primes p of the form
6k + 1 by a binary quadratic form in integers of a subfield of the cyclotomic field of the p-th roots
of unity.
Moreover a new relevant closed expression (equation (7.9)) is provided.
7.1 Characteristic 2
Let F2s be a Galois field over F2, with Trs(x) =
∑s−1
j=0 x
2j being the trace function over F2s , and
Trs/r(x) =
∑s/r−1
j=0 x
srj the relative trace function over F2s relatively to F2r , with r|s [68].
Further let χm be a character of order m defined over F2s and taking values in Q(ζm), where ζm
denotes a primitive m-th root of unity and Q(ζm) the corresponding cyclotomic field.
A Gauss sum of a character χm over F2s is defined as [16]
Gs(β, χm) =
∑
y∈F2s
χm(y)e
piiTrs(βy) = χ¯m(β)Gs(1, χm) ∀β ∈ F2s .
A cubic character χ3 is a mapping from F
∗
2s into the complex numbers defined as
χ3(α
h+3j) = ζh3 h = 0, 1, 2 j ∈ N ,
where ζ3 is a cubic root of unity, and α a primitive element in F
∗
2s , furthermore we set by definition
χ3(0) = 0 .
The values of the Gauss sums of a cubic character over F2s can be found by computing the
Gauss sum over F4 and applying Davenport-Hasse’s theorem on the lifting of characters ([16, 63,
68]) for s even (and by computing the Gauss sum over F2 and then trivially lifting for s odd).
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However it is possible to use a more elementary approach, and this is the subject of the present
work.
If s is odd then the cubic character is trivial because every element β in F2s is a cube as the
following chain of equalities shows
β · 1 = β · (β2s−1)2 = ββ2s+1−2 = β2s+1−1 = (β 2
s+1−1
3 )3 ,
since β2
s−1 = 1, and s+ 1 is even, so that 2s+1 − 1 is divisible by 3. In this case we have
Gs(1, χ3) =
∑
y∈F2s
χ3(y)e
piiTrs(y) =
∑
y∈F∗
2s
epiiTrs(y) = −1 ,
since the number of elementswith trace 1 is equal to the number of elements with trace 0, (Trs(x) ∈
F2; moreover Trs(x) = 1 and Trs(x) = 0 are two equations of degree 2
s−1), and epii·0 = 1 while
epii·1 = −1.
If s is even, the cubic character is nontrivial, and the computation of the Gauss sums requires
some more effort; before we show how they can be computed with an elementary approach, we
need some preparatory lemmas.
7.1.1 Preliminary facts
First of all we recall that, for any nontrivial character χm over Fq,
∑
x∈Fq χm(x) = 0. This is used to
prove a property of a sumof characters, already known to Kummer [126], which can be formulated
in the following form:
Lemma 7.1. Let χm be a nontrivial character and β any element of Fq; then
∑
x∈Fq
χm(x)χ¯m(x+ β) =
{
q − 1 if β = 0
−1 if β 6= 0 .
PROOF. If β = 0, the summand is χm(x)χ¯m(x) = 1, unless x = 0 in which case it is 0, then the
conclusion is immediate.
When β 6= 0, we can exclude again the term with x = 0, as χm(x) = 0, so that x is invertible, and
the summand can be written as
χm(x)χ¯m(x+ β) = χm(x)χ¯m(x)χ¯m(1 + βx
−1) = χ¯m(1 + βx−1) .
With the substitution y = 1 + βx−1, the summation becomes∑
y∈F
22m
y 6=1
χm(y) = −1 +
∑
y∈F22m
χm(y) = −1 ,
as χm(y) = 1 for y = 1.
2
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We are now interested in the sum
∑
x∈Fq χm(x)χm(x+ 1). Note that for the Gauss sums over
F2s we have
Gs(1, χm) =
∑
y∈F2s
Trs(y)=0
χm(y)−
∑
y∈F2s
Trs(y)=1
χm(y) . (7.1)
It follows that, if χm is a nontrivial character, then the Gauss sum over F2s satisfies the fol-
lowing:
Gs(1, χm) = 2
∑
y∈F2s
Trs(y)=0
χm(y).
In fact half of the field elements have trace 0 and the other half 1, so that∑
y∈F2s
Tr(y)=0
χm(y) = −
∑
y∈F2s
Tr(y)=1
χm(y)
as the sum over all field elements is zero, since χm is nontrivial.
Lemma 7.2. If χm is a nontrivial character over F2s , s even, then∑
x∈F2s
χm(x)χm(x+ 1) = Gs(1, χm) .
PROOF. The sum
∑
x∈F2s χm(x)χm(x+1) can be written as
∑
x∈F2s χm(x(x+1)), since the character
is amultiplicative function, now the function f(x) = x(x+1) is amapping from F2s onto the subset
of elements with trace 0, as Trs(x) = Trs(x
2) for any s, and each image comes exactly from two
elements, x and x + 1, that have the same trace, since Trs(1) = 0 for s even, which is our case.
Therefore, half of the elements with trace 0 are images of elements with trace 0, and the remaining
half are images of elements with trace 1. It follows that∑
x∈F2s
χm(x)χm(x+ 1) = 2
∑
y∈F2s
Trs(y)=0
χm(y) = Gs(1, χm) . (7.2)
2
Lemma 7.3. Let χm be a nontrivial character of order m = 2
r + 1. Then the Gauss sum Gs(1, χm), s
even, is a real number, i.e. Gs(1, χm) = ±2s/2.
PROOF. Using (7.2) we have
G¯s(1, χm) =
∑
x∈F2s
χ¯m(x)χ¯m(x+1) =
∑
x∈F2s
χm(x
2r )χm(x
2r+1) =
∑
x∈F2s
χm(x)χm(x+1) = Gs(1, χm) ,
as χ¯m(x) = χm(x)
2r = χm(x
2r) and x → x2r is a field automorphism, so it just permutes the
elements of the field. 2
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7.1.2 Main results
The absolute value of Gs(1, χm) can be evaluated using elementary standard techniques going
back to Gauss (see e.g. [16]), while its argument requires a more subtle analysis. Our main the-
orems in this section derive in an elementary way the exact value of the Gauss sum for a cubic
character χ3 over F2s , s even (the case of s odd is trivial, as shown above). Before we proceed, we
show in a standard way what is its absolute value.
Since Gs(β, χ3) = χ¯3(β)Gs(1, χ3) , on one hand, we have∑
β∈F2s
Gs(β, χ3)G¯s(β, χ3) =
∑
β∈F2s
χ¯3(β)χ3(β)Gs(1, χ3)G¯s(1, χ3)
=
∑
β∈F∗
2s
Gs(1, χ3)G¯s(1, χ3) = (2
s − 1)Gs(1, χ3)G¯s(1, χ3) .
(7.3)
On the other hand, by the definition of Gauss sum, we have∑
β∈F2s
Gs(β, χ3)G¯s(β, χ3) =
∑
β∈F2s
∑
α∈F2s
∑
γ∈F2s
χ¯3(α)e
piiTrs(βα)χ3(γ)e
−piiTrs(γβ)
,
and substituting α = γ + θ in the last sum, we have∑
β∈F2s
Gs(β, χ3)G¯s(β, χ3) =
∑
γ∈F2s
∑
θ∈F2s
χ¯3(γ + θ)χ3(γ)
∑
β∈F2s
epiiTr2s(βθ) = 2s(2s − 1) , (7.4)
as the sum on β is 2s if θ = 0 and is 0 otherwise, since the values of the trace are equally distributed,
as said above; consequently the sum over γ is 2s − 1 times 2s, as χ3(0) = 0. From the comparison
of (7.3) with (7.4) we get Gs(1, χ3)G¯s(1, χ3) = 2
s, then |Gs(1, χ3)| = 2s/2.
Few initial values are G2(1, χ3) = 2, G4(1, χ3) = −4, G6(1, χ3) = 8, G8(1, χ3) = −16, and
G10(1, χ3) = 32, so a reasonable guess is Gs(1, χ3) = −(−2)s/2. This guess is correct as proved by
the following theorems.
Theorem 7.1. If ` is odd, the value of the Gauss sum G2`(1, χ3) is 2
`.
PROOF. Let α a primitive cubic root of unity in F22` , then it is a root of x
2 + x + 1. In other
words, a root α of x2 + x + 1, which does not belong to F2` , as ` is odd, can be used to define a
quadratic extension of this field, i.e. F22` , and the elements of this extension can be represented in
the form x + αy, with x, y ∈ F2` . Furthermore, the two roots α and 1 + α of x2 + x + 1 are either
fixed or exchanged by any Frobenius automorphism; in particular the automorphism σ`(x) = x2
`
necessarily exchanges the two roots as it fixes precisely all the elements of F2` , while α does not
belong to this field, so that σ`(α) 6= α. Now, a Gauss sum G2`(1, χ3) can be written as
G2`(1, χ3) = 2
∑
z∈F
22`
Tr2`(z)=0
χ3(z) = 2
∑
x,y∈F
2`
Tr2`(x+αy)=0
χ3(x+ αy) = 2
∑
x,y∈F
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(x+ αy) , (7.5)
where we used the trace property
Tr2`(x+ αy) = Tr2`(x) + Tr2`(αy) = Tr`(x) + Tr`(x
2`) + Tr2`(αy) = Tr2`(αy),
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and the fact that
Tr2`(αy) = Tr`(αy) + Tr`(αy)
2` = Tr`(αy) + Tr`((αy)
2`)
= Tr`(αy) + Tr`(α
2`y) = Tr`(αy) + Tr`((α + 1)y) = Tr`(y) ,
since α2
`
= α+1 as previously shown. The last summation in (7.5) can be split into three sums by
separating the cases x = 0 and y = 0
2
∑
x,y∈F
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(x+ αy) = 2
∑
y∈F
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(αy) + 2
∑
x∈F
2`
χ3(x) + 2
∑
x,y∈F∗
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(x+ αy) .
Considering the three sums separately, we have:∑
x∈F
2`
χ3(x) = 2
` − 1 ,
as χ3(x) = 1 unless x = 0 since ` is odd;∑
y∈F
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(αy) = χ3(α)(2
`−1 − 1) ,
as the character is multiplicative, χ3(y) = 1 unless y = 0, and only the 0-trace elements (which are
2`−1 − 1) should be counted;∑
x,y∈F∗
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(x+ αy) =
∑
x,y∈F∗
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(y)χ3(xy
−1 + α) =
∑
z,y∈F∗
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(z + α) = (2
`−1 − 1)
∑
z∈F∗
2`
χ3(z + α) .
as y is invertible, χ3(y) = 1 since ` is odd, z has been substituted for xy
−1, and the sum we get
in the end, being independent of y, is simply multiplied by the number of values assumed by y.
Altogether we have
G2`(1, χ3) = 2
`+1− 2+χ3(α)(2`− 2)+ (2`− 2)
∑
z∈F∗
2`
χ3(z+α) = 2
`+1− 2+ (2`− 2)
∑
z∈F
2`
χ3(z+α) ,
and, for later use, we define A(α) =
∑
z∈F
2`
χ3(z + α). In order to evaluate A(α), we consider the
sum of A(β), for every β ∈ F22` , and observe that A(β) = 2` − 1 if β ∈ F2` , while, if β 6∈ F2` all
sums assume the same value A(α), which is shown as follows: set β = u+ αv with v 6= 0, then∑
z∈F
2`
χ3(z + u+ αv) =
∑
z∈F
2`
χ3(v)χ3((z + u)v
−1 + α) =
∑
z′∈F
2`
χ3(z
′ + α) .
Therefore, the sum
∑
β∈F
22`
A(β) =
∑
β∈F
22`
∑
z∈F
2`
χ3(z + β) =
∑
z∈F
2`
∑
β∈F
22`
χ3(z + β) = 0 yields
2`(2` − 1) + (22` − 2`)A(α) = 0
which implies A(α) = −1, and finally
G2`(1, χ3) = 2
`+1 − 2− (2` − 2) = 2` .
2
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Remark 7.4. The above theorem can also be proved using a theorem by Stickelberger ([68, Theorem 5.16])
Theorem 7.2. If ` is even, the Gauss sum G2`(1, χ3) is equal to (−2)`/2G`(1, χ3) .
PROOF. The relative trace of the elements of F22` over F2` , which is
Tr(2`/`)(x) = x+ x
2` ,
introduces the polynomial x + x2
`
which defines a mapping from F22` onto F2` with kernel the
subfield F2` ([68]). The equation x
2` + x = y has in fact exactly 2` roots in F22` for every y ∈ F2` .
By definition we have
G2`(1, χ3) = 2
∑
z∈F
22`
Tr2`(z)=0
χ3(z) = 2
∑
x,y∈F
2`
Tr2`(x+αy)=0
χ3(x+ αy) ,
where α is a root of an irreducible quadratic polynomial x2 + x + b over F2` , i.e. Tr`(b) = 1 ([68,
Corollary 3.79]) and Tr(2`/`)(α) = 1, which can be seen from the coefficient of x of the polynomial.
Now
Tr2`(x+ αy) = Tr2`(x) + Tr2`(αy) = Tr2`(αy) = Tr`(αy) + Tr`(α
2`y) ,
but α2
`
= 1 + α, so that Tr2`(x+ αy) = Tr`(y), and we have
G2`(1, χ3) = 2
∑
x,y∈F
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(x+ αy) = 2
∑
x∈F
2`
χ3(x) + 2
∑
y∈F∗
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(αy) + 2
∑
x,y∈F∗
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(x+ αy) ,
where the first summation has been split into the sum of three summations, by separating the
cases y = 0 and x = 0. We observe that, since the character over F2` is not trivial, the first sum is 0
and the second is χ3(α)G`(1, χ3), while the third sum can be written as follows
2
∑
x,y∈F∗
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(x+ αy) = 2
∑
x,y∈F∗
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(y)χ3(xy
−1 + α) = 2
∑
y∈F∗
2`
Tr`(y)=0
χ3(y)
∑
z∈F∗
2`
χ3(z + α) .
Putting all together, we obtain
G2`(1, χ3) = G`(1, χ3)
∑
z∈F
2`
χ3(z + α) = G`(1, χ3)A`(α) ,
which shows that |A`(α)| = 2`/2 and that A`(α) is real, as both G2`(1, χ3) and G`(1, χ3) are real.
Note that this holds for any α with Tr(2`/`)(α) = 1.
We will show now that A`(α) = (−2)`/2. Consider the sum of A`(γ) over all γ with relative trace
equal to 1, which is on one hand 2`A`(α), as the polynomial x
2` +x = 1 has exactly 2` roots in F22`
and on the other hand, explicitly we have∑
γ∈F∗
22`
Tr2`/`(γ)=1
A`(γ) =
∑
z∈F
2`
∑
γ∈F∗
22`
Tr2`/`(γ)=1
χ3(z + γ) =
∑
z∈F
2`
∑
γ′∈F∗
22`
Tr2`/`(γ′)=1
χ3(γ
′) = 2`
∑
γ′∈F∗
22`
Tr2`/`(γ′)=1
χ3(γ
′) ,
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where the summation order has been exchanged, and Tr2`/`(γ) = Tr2`/`(γ
′) as Tr2`/`(z) = 0 for
any z ∈ F2` . Comparing the two results, we have
A`(α) =
∑
γ′∈F∗
22`
Tr2`/`(γ′)=1
χ3(γ
′) = M0 +M1ζ3 +M2ζ23 ,
where M0 is the number of γ
′ with Tr2`/`(γ′) = 1 that are cubic residues, i.e. they have character
χ3(γ
′) equal to 1, M1 is the number of γ′ with Tr2`/`(γ′) = 1 that have character ζ3, and M2 is the
number of γ′ with Tr2`/`(γ′) = 1 that have character ζ23 , thenM0 +M1 +M2 = 2
`, and M1 = M2
since A`(α) is real. Therefore,we have A`(α) = M0 −M1, and so we consider two equations for
M0 andM1 {
M0 + 2M1 = 2
`
M0 −M1 = ±2`/2
solving forM1 we haveM1 =
1
3 (2
` ∓ 2`/2). SinceM1 must be an integer, we have{
M0 −M1 = 2`/2 if `/2 is even
M0 −M1 = −2`/2 if `/2 is odd.
2
Corollary 7.5. If ` is even, the value of the Gauss sum G2`(1, χ3) is −2`.
PROOF. It is a direct consequence of the two theorems above.
2
7.2 Odd characteristic
Let Fpr be a Galois field of order p
r, with Trr(x) =
∑r−1
j=0 x
pj being the trace function over Fpr , and
Trr/d(x) =
∑r/d−1
j=0 x
pdj the relative trace function over Fpr relatively to Fpd , with d|r [68].
Further let χm be a character of orderm defined over Fpr and taking values in the cyclotomic field
Q(ζm), where ζm denotes a primitive m-th complex root of unity.
The Gauss sum of χm over Fpr is defined, [16, 60], for any β ∈ Fpr as
Gr(β, χm) =
∑
y∈Fpr
χm(y)ζ
Trr(βy)
p = χ¯m(β)Gr(1, χm) .
We will focus our interest on cubic characters χ3 for odd primes p, while the case p = 2 is dealt
with in [102]. A cubic character χ3 can be either the principal character, i.e. χ3(β) = 1 for all
β ∈ F∗pr , or a non-principal character (if pr ≡ 1 mod 6)
χ3(α
h+3j) = ζh3 h = 0, 1, 2 , j ∈ N ,
where α is a generator of F∗pr . In addition, χ3(0) = 0 by definition.
By the above assumptions, the values of the Gauss sums of a cubic character over Fpr are in general
algebraic integers in the field Q(ζ3, ζp) = Q(ζ3p), p 6= 3 and Q(ζ3), if p = 3. Our aim is to give
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a thorough overview and derive more precise statements about these values with elementary
techniques. In particular, we have obtained an interesting new result in the vein of Gauss’ closed
expression for G1(1, χ2) in terms of a fourth root of unity and a root of an integral quadratic
polynomial. Specifically, our equation (7.9) expresses G1(1, χ3) in terms of a cubic root of unity
and a root of an integral cubic polynomial (see Equation (7.6)), whose coefficients are given explicit
functions of p. Gauss sums over extended fields are obtained from the expression of Gauss sums
over smaller fields, either using Davenport-Hasse’s theorem or with newmethods developed here
to link values over different field extensions.
7.2.1 Lemmas
For the considerations below, let
As(α) =
∑
y∈Fps
χm(y + α) and Br,s(α) =
∑
z1...,zr−1∈Fps
χm(1 +
r−1∑
i=1
ziα
i) ,
where αmay be in an extension of Fps , and χm defined in the same extension.
Lemma 7.6. Let χm be a nontrivial character of orderm over Fprs , p prime, whose restriction to Fps is also
nontrivial, and assume that there exists an irreducible polynomial Xr − β, for a suitable β ∈ Fps . Then
Grs(1, χm) = χ¯m(r)Gs(1, χm)Br,s(α),
where α is a root of Xr − β (thus with relative trace Trrs/s(α) = 0).
PROOF. Since Fprs is an extension of order r of Fps , its elements can be written in the form∑r−1
i=0 xiα
i with x0, . . . , xr−1 ∈ Fps . We thus have
Grs(1, χm) =
∑
z∈Fprs
χm(z)ζ
Trrs(z)
p =
∑
x0,...,xr−1∈Fps
χm(
r−1∑
i=0
xiα
i)ζ
Trrs(
∑r−1
i=0 xiα
i)
p
=
∑
x0,...,xr−1∈Fps
χm(
r−1∑
i=0
xiα
i)ζTrs(rx0)p =
∑
x0∈F
∗
ps
x1...,xr−1∈Fps
χm(
r−1∑
i=0
xiα
i)ζTrs(rx0)p ,
where we used that
Trrs(
r−1∑
i=0
xiα
i) = Trs(Trrs/s(
r−1∑
i=0
xiα
i)) =
r−1∑
i=0
Trs(xiTrrs/s(α
i)) = Trs(rx0) ,
as Trrs/s(xiα
i) = xiTrrs/s(α
i) because xp
s
i = xi, further Trrs/s(1) = r and Trrs/s(α
i) = 0 if i > 0
because α is a root of the polynomial Xr − β which has every coefficient (that is an elemen-
tary symmetric function of the roots) equal to zero with the exclusion of the constant coefficient,
then every symmetric function of the powers of the roots si =
∑r−1
j=0(α
pjs)i = Trrs/s(α
i) with
i = 1, . . . , r − 1 is zero as a consequence of the Newton formulas [25, vol. I, pg. 166], we thus
have Trrs(
∑r−1
i=0 xiα
i) = Trs(rx0); the sum
∑
x1...,xr−1∈Fps χm(
∑r−1
i=1 xiα
i) is zero, since with the
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change of variable xi = x
′
iλ, where λ is an element of F
∗
ps with χm(λ) 6= 1, the sum becomes
χm(λ)
∑
x1...,xr−1∈Fps χm(
∑r−1
i=1 xiα
i).
Now, as x0 6= 0, we may perform the change of variables xi = x0zi, i = 1, . . . , r − 1 and write
Grs(1, χm) =
∑
x0∈F ∗ps
ζTrs(rx0)p
∑
z1...,zr−1∈Fps
χm(x0 + x0
r−1∑
i=1
ziα
i)
=
∑
x0∈F ∗ps
ζTrs(rx0)p χm(x0)
∑
z1...,zr−1∈Fps
χm(1 +
r−1∑
i=1
ziα
i) .
The conclusion is immediate, noting that the first summation is simply χ¯m(r)Gs(1, χm). 2
The following Lemma is a corollary of the previous one, specialized to the case r = 2. However, we
present another proof, whose structure and running results are instrumental to proofs of further
theorems.
Lemma 7.7. Let χm be a nontrivial character of order m over Fp2s , p odd, whose restriction to Fps is also
nontrivial; then
G2s(1, χm) = χm(α)Gs(1, χm)As(
1
2α
) ,
where α is a root of an irreducible polynomial X2 − β for a suitable β ∈ Fps .
We note that from the definition of α and β it follows that Tr2s/s(α) = 0 and that χ2(β) = −1
for the nontrivial quadratic character over Fps .
PROOF. Since Fp2s is a quadratic extension of Fps , its elements can be written in the form x + αy
with x, y,∈ Fps . We thus have
G2s(1, χm) =
∑
z∈Fp2s
χm(z)ζ
Tr2s(z)
p =
∑
x,y∈Fps
χm(x+ αy)ζ
Tr2s(x+αy)
p =
∑
x,y∈Fps
χm(x+ αy)ζ
Trs(2x)
p ,
where we have used the equality Tr2s(x + αy) = 2Trs(x) = Trs(2x). Multiplying the last sum by
χ¯m(2)χm(2) = 1, we can write
G2s(1, χm) = χ¯m(2)
∑
x′,y∈Fps
χm(x
′ + 2αy)ζTrs(x
′)
p ,
and split the summation into three sums
χ¯m(2)
∑
y∈Fps
χm(2αy) , χ¯m(2)
∑
x′∈F∗
ps
χm(x
′)ζTrs(x
′)
p , χ¯m(2)
∑
x′,y∈F∗
ps
χm(x
′ + 2αy)ζTrs(x
′)
p .
The first summation is 0, the second summation is χ¯m(2)Gs(1, χm); the third summation can be
written as follows: the substitution y = zx′ yields
χ¯m(2)
∑
x′,z∈F∗
ps
χm(x
′ + 2αzx′)ζTrs(x
′)
p = χ¯m(2)
∑
x′∈F∗
ps
χm(x
′)ζTrs(x
′)
p
∑
z∈F∗
ps
χm(1 + 2αz) =
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χ¯m(2)Gs(1, χm)χm(2α)
∑
z∈F∗
ps
χm(z +
1
2α
) = χ¯m(2)Gs(1, χm)χm(2α)[As(
1
2α
)− χm( 1
2α
)] .
In conclusion, by combining the above summations, we haveG2s(1, χm) = χm(α)Gs(1, χm)As(
1
2α).
2
Corollary 7.8. Suppose p is odd and t = 2ks, with k ≥ 1, and let χm be a nontrivial character over Fpt ,
whose restriction to Fps is also nontrivial. Then
Gt(1, χm) = Gs(1, χm)
k∏
i=1
χm(αi)A2i−1s(
1
2αi
),
where αi is a root of an irreducible polynomial X
2 − βi over Fp2i−1s , i = 1, . . . , k.
Lemma 7.9. Let χm be a character over Fps , p ≡ −1 modm andm odd. Then Gs(1, χm) is real.
PROOF. We can write
Gs(1, χm) = G0 + ζmG1 + ζ
2
mG2 + · · · + ζm−1m Gm−1 ,
where ζm is a primitivem-th root of unity and
Gj =
∑
χm(x)=ζ
j
m
ζTrs(x)p , 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 ,
known as Gauss periods [50], are real numbers, since χm(x) = χm(−x), as −1 = (−1)m is an
m-th power. Thus, in each sum the exponentials occur in complex conjugated pairs. Furthermore,
Gj = Gm−j as proved by the following chain of equalities:
Gj =
∑
χm(x)=ζ
j
m
ζTrs(x)p =
∑
χm(x)=ζ
j
m
ζTrs(x
p)
p =
∑
χm(xp)=ζ
pj
m
ζTrs(x
p)
p =
∑
χm(y)=ζ
m−j
m
ζTrs(y)p = Gm−j .
In fact raising the trace argument to the power p leaves the trace invariant; ζpjm = ζ
−j
m as p is
congruent to −1modulom; lastly, the automorphism σ(x) = xp simply permutes the elements of
the field. Then, for any j, ζjmGj and ζ
m−j
m Gm−j sum to give a real number, hence Gs(1, χm) is also
real.
2
Corollary 7.10. Let χ3 be a cubic character, p ≡ 2 modulo 3 (p = 2 or p = 6k+5). ThenGs(1, χ3) is real.
Remark 7.11. For the case p = 2, see an alternative proof in the previous section.
Lemma 7.12. Let χm be a nontrivial character over Fp2s , with p and m odd. If (p
s − 1,m) = 1 (in
particular the restriction of χm to Fps is trivial), then G2s(1, χm) = p
s.
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PROOF. As in Lemma 7.7, let α be defined as a root of an irreducible polynomial X2 − β, with a
suitable β ∈ Fps . Then
G2s(1, χm) =
∑
x,y∈Fps
χm(x+ αy)ζ
Trs(2x)
p .
We split the summation into three: S1 = χ¯m(2)
∑
y∈Fps χm(2αy),
S2 = χ¯m(2)
∑
x′∈F∗ps
χm(x
′)ζTrs(x
′)
p , and S3 = χ¯m(2)
∑
x′,y∈F∗ps
χm(x
′ + 2αy)ζTrs(x
′)
p .
The first summation is S1 = χm(α)(p
s − 1), since the character is trivial over Fps , the second
summation is S2 = −χ¯m(2), and the third summation, after the substitution y = zx′, gives
S3 = χ¯m(2)
∑
x′∈F∗
ps
χm(x
′)ζTrs(x
′)
p
∑
z∈F∗
ps
χm(1 + 2αz) = −χ¯m(2)[χm(2α)
∑
z∈Fps
χm(
1
2α
+ z)− 1] .
In order to evaluateAs(
1
2α ) =
∑
z∈Fps χm(
1
2α+z), we consider the sum ofAs(β), for every β ∈ Fp2s ,
and observe that As(β) = p
s − 1 if β ∈ Fps , since all elements in this field are m-th powers, while,
if β 6∈ Fps all sums assume the same value As(α), which is shown as follows: set β = u+ αv with
v 6= 0, then∑
z∈Fps
χm(z + u+ αv) =
∑
z∈Fps
χm(v)χm((z + u)v
−1 + α) =
∑
z′∈Fps
χm(z
′ + α) = As(α) .
Therefore, the sum
∑
β∈Fp2s
A(β) =
∑
β∈Fp2s
∑
z∈Fps
χm(z + β) =
∑
z∈Fps
∑
β∈Fp2s
χm(z + β) = 0 yields
ps(ps − 1) + (p2s − ps)A(α) = 0
which implies A(α) = −1 = A( 12α ). Finally, by combining the above,
G2s(1, χm) = χm(α)(p
s − 1) + χm(α) = χm(α)ps = ps ,
because α, a root of X2 − β, is anm-th power, since every β ∈ Fps is anm-th power.
2
Remark 7.13. The above lemma can also be proved using a theorem by Stickelberger, [68, Theorem 5.16] or
[114].
7.2.2 Results
Trivial character. Let χ3 be trivial, then
Gr(1, χ3) =
∑
y∈Fpr
χ3(y)ζ
Trr(y)
p =
∑
y∈Fpr
ζTrr(y)p − 1 = pr−1
∑
a∈Fp
ζap − 1 = −1 ,
since the number of elements with the same trace a ∈ Fp (0 included) is equal to pr−1, i.e. the
number of roots in Fpr of the equation Trr(x) = a. This result settles in particular all the cases
of the fields F3r , or Fpr with p ≡ 5 mod 6 and odd r, where there is only the principal character,
because every field element is a cube.
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Nontrivial character: case p=6k+5. If p = 6k+5 and r is even, a nontrivial cubic character exists
and it will be shown thatGr(1, χ3) = −(−p)r/2, without recurring to Davenport-Hasse’s theorem.
Theorem 7.3. If p = 6k + 5 and s is odd, then G2s(1, χ3) = p
s.
PROOF. Since ps = −1 mod 3, the conclusion is a consequence of Lemma 7.12.
2
Theorem 7.4. If p = 6k + 5 and s is even, then G2s(1, χ3) = (−p)s/2Gs(1, χ3).
PROOF. Let α ∈ Fp2s be a cube and root of an irreducible polynomialX2−β over Fps (clearly such
an α exists, since if γ is a root ofX2 − β, with χ2(β) = −1, then γ3, a cube, is a root ofX2− β3 and
χ2(β
3) = χ2(β)
3 = −1). Then by Lemma 7.7
G2s(1, χ3) = Gs(1, χ3)As(
1
2α
) ,
where As(
1
2α ) =
∑
z∈Fps χ3(
1
2α + z) is an algebraic integer in the cyclotomic field Q(ζ3) which can
be written as A0 + ζ3A1 + ζ
2
3A2, where A0, A1, and A2 are the numbers of z for which χ3(
1
2α + z)
is equal to 1, ζ3 or ζ
2
3 , respectively, and A0 +A1 +A2 = p
s.
Now, by Lemma 7.9, both G2s(1, χ3) and Gs(1, χ3) are real, which implies that As(
1
2α ) is also
real, so that A1 = A2. We also know that A0 + A1 + A2 = A0 + 2A1 = p
s, so we consider two
equations for A0 and A1: {
A0 + 2A1 = p
s
A0 −A1 = ±ps/2
obtained from the fact that we know the absolute values of Gs(1, χ3) and G2s(1, χ3), [16, Theorem
1.1.4, pg. 10], [102].
Solving for A1 we have A1 =
1
3(p
s ∓ ps/2). As A1 must be an integer, we have
As(
1
2α
) = A0 −A1 =
{
ps/2 if s/2 is even
−ps/2 if s/2 is odd.
2
Corollary 7.14. If p = 6k + 5 and s is even, then G2s(1, χ3) = −ps.
Nontrivial character: case p=6k+1. If p = 6k+1, pr−1 is divisible by 3, so there exists a nontrivial
cubic character in Fpr for every r ≥ 1: we know that the Gauss sum over Fp of a nontrivial cubic
character is an algebraic integer in Q(ζ3p) of absolute value
√
p. Specifically we have
Theorem 7.5. If p = 6k + 1, then G1(1, χ3) is an element of Q(ζ3, η), a subfield of Q(ζ3p) with degree
6 over Q, where η is a root of a cubic polynomial with rational integer coefficients and cyclic Galois group
over Q.
PROOF. As in the proof of Lemma 7.9, for a cubic character we can write
G1(1, χ3) = G0 + ζ3G1 + ζ
2
3G2 ,
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where ζ3 is a primitive cube root of unity and, for 0 ≤ j ≤ 2,
Gj =
∑
χ3(x)=ζ
j
3
ζxp ,
which are real numbers since χ3(x) = χ3(−x), as −1 is a cubic power. Then, to evaluate the Gauss
sum G1(1, χ3) is tantamount to computing the Gauss periods G0, G1, and G2. The following
derivation can be found partly, in different form, in Gauss [50, art. 350-352].
Let a be any positive integer less than p and σa ∈ G(Q(ζp)/Q) be the element of the Galois
group of Q(ζp)whose action on ζp is defined as σa(ζp) = ζ
a
p , [121], then
σ(Gj) =
∑
χ3(x)=ζ
j
3
ζaxp =
∑
χ3(x′a−1)=ζ
j
3
ζx
′
p =
∑
χ3(x′)=ζ
j
3χ3(a)
ζx
′
p .
This implies that any of these automorphisms induces a permutation of G0, G1, and G2, and
therefore leaves their symmetric functions invariant, which thus belong to Q. In particular, the
three elementary symmetric functions
s1 = G0 +G1 +G2 , s2 = G0G1 +G1G2 +G2G1 , s3 = G0G1G2 ,
are rational integers; it follows thatG0,G1, andG2 are the roots of a cubic polynomial with rational
coefficients q(z) = z3−s1z2+s2z−s3, which has a cyclic Galois group of order 3 (since p−13 values
of a give the same permutation of its roots). Thus q(z) is irreducible overQ, and denoting one root
with η, the other roots can be expressed as polynomials with integer coefficients r1(η) and r2(η) of
degree 2 in η.
2
Gauss computed the coefficients of the cubic polynomial q(z) by a clever manipulation of the
periods, a task that generally has non-polynomial-time complexity in p. The following theorem
proves that these coefficients can be computed, with deterministic polynomial-time complexity,
exploiting pure arithmetic features of pwithout dealing with Gauss periods.
Theorem 7.6. Let q(z) be the monic polynomial whose roots are G0, G1 and G2. Then
q(z) = z3 + z2 − p− 1
3
z − (3 + u)p− 1
27
, (7.6)
where u is obtained from the representation 4p = u2 + 27v2 and taken with the sign making the constant
term an integer.
PROOF. Let q(z) be as above z3−s1z2+s2z−s3. It is immediately seen that s1 = −1, as
∑p−1
x=0 ζ
x
p = 0.
Using the structure constants of the integral algebra generated by G0, G1, and G2, we will show
that s2 = −p−13 , while s3 ultimately depends on the representation (u, v) of 4p by the quadratic
form u2 + 27v2.
Let σ be a generator of the cyclic Galois group of Q(η) (σ is also a generator of the Galois group
of q(z)), then G0 = η, G1 = σ(η), and G2 = σ
2(η) are Q-linearly independent [2] and generate
an algebra, [81, Lemma 2.2], whose constants of multiplication [35] are rational integers, [81, Re-
mark 2.3], so that G0G1, G1G2, and G2G0 are linear combinations of G0, G1, and G2 with integer
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coefficients. Furthermore, since G0, G1, and G2 are cyclically permuted by the action of σ, we can
write 
G0G1 = aG0 + bG1 + cG2
G1G2 = aG1 + bG2 + cG0
G2G0 = aG2 + bG0 + cG1
(7.7)
where a, b, c are integers whose sum is p−13 , since each Gj contains
p−1
3 powers of ζp and each
GiGj , i 6= j, expands into (p−1)
2
9 terms which are powers of ζp whose exponents, reduced modulo
p, are never 0. Then, summing the three equations, we get
s2 = (a+ b+ c)(G0 +G1 +G2) = −p− 1
3
.
The evaluation of s3 requires the explicit knowledge of c: by summing the three equations, multi-
plied by G2, G0, and G1 respectively, we obtain the relation
3G0G1G2 = (a+ b)s2 + c(G
2
0 +G
2
1 +G
2
2) = (
p− 1
3
− c)s2 + c(1− 2s2) ,
which yields s3 =
1
3 [cp − (p−1)
2
9 ]. Now, the value of c is specified as follows.
Since the Galois group of q(z), which is a polynomial with integer coefficients, is cyclic of order 3,
its discriminant∆ is the square of an integer [31, Proposition 7.4.2]. The direct computation yields
∆ = −p
2(p2 − 2p+ 1− 18cp − 18c+ 81c2)
27
,
then∆must be of the form v2p2, whence c is obtained from the equation
0 = p2 − 2p + 1− 18cp − 18c + 81c2 + 27u2 = −4p+ (9c− p− 1)2 + 27v2 . (7.8)
It is known [28, 50, 56, 60] that primes of the form 6k + 1 are essentially (up to signs) represented
in a unique way by the quadratic form x2 + 3y2 (note that this representation may be computed
in deterministic polynomial time using the Schoof algorithm [110] and the Gauss reduction algo-
rithm of quadratic forms [73]). Further, 4 = 1 + 3 is represented by the same form, then 4p has
essentially three different representations, namely
4p = (2x)2 + 3(2y)2 , 4p = (x− 3y)2 + 3(x+ y)2 , 4p = (x+ 3y)2 + 3(x− y)2 .
Since x is relatively prime with 3, necessarily exactly one of 2y, or x + y or x − y is divisible by 3
and allows us to write 4p = u2 + 27v2. By comparison with (7.8) we have 9c − p − 1 = u, and u
should be taken with the sign that makes the expression p + 1 + u divisible by 9, in order to have
an integer c, that is u should be taken with the sign that makes it congruent to 1 modulo 3: since
p+1+u = 0 mod 9 implies that the same expression is 0modulo 3 and p is congruent to 1modulo
3, then also umust be congruent 1modulo 3. 2
Corollary 7.15. The multiplicative constants of the algebra generated by the periods (equation (7.7)) are
obtained from the representation 4p = u2 + 27v2 as
a =
2p− u+ 9v − 4
18
, b =
2p − u− 9v − 4
18
, c =
p+ 1 + u
9
,
where the sign of u is specified in Theorem 7.6, and the sign of v is such that a and b are compliant with the
chosen definitions of G1 and G2.
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PROOF. The value c = p+1+u9 has been found in the proof of Theorem 7.6, where it was also
remarked that a + b + c = p−13 , thus for computing a and b, we only need a further independent
relation.
Adding member by member the three equations in (7.7) after their orderly multiplication by G0,
G1, G2, or by G1, G2, G0, respectively, we obtain
r1 = G
2
0G1 +G
2
1G2 +G
2
2G0 = a(G
2
0 +G
2
1 +G
2
2) + (b+ c)(G0G1 +G1G2 +G2G0) ,
r2 = G
2
1G0 +G
2
0G2 +G
2
2G1 = b(G
2
0 +G
2
1 +G
2
2) + (a+ c)(G0G1 +G1G2 +G2G0) .
If we know either r1, or r2, then we have a second linear equation for a and b. To compute r1 and
r2, we observe that they are exchanged by permuting, for example, G0 and G1, and are invariant
under a cyclic permutation of G0, G1, and G2. Then, their sum r1 + r2 and product r1r2 are
symmetric functions of the roots of q(z) and a theorem of Lagrange’s [25] assures that they can be
expressed by means of the elementary symmetric functions s1, s2, and s3 (the coefficients of q(z)).
Thus, using properties of the symmetric functions [25], we have
r1 + r2 = s1s2 − 3s3 , r1r2 = s32 − 6s1s2s3 − 9s23 − s3s31 ,
and substituting the explicit values of s1, s2, and s3 given in Theorem 7.6, we obtain
r1 + r2 =
3p − 1− p(u+ 3)
9
and r1r2 =
1 + pu+ p2u2 − 3p3
81
.
Solving a second degree equation, we find r1 =
1
2(
3p−1−p(u+3)
9 + pv) and r2 =
1
2(
3p−1−p(u+3)
9 − pv),
where the sign of v should be properly chosen to match the values of r1 and r2 obtained from the
definition of the Gauss periods. In conclusion, from the system
a+ b =
2p− 4− u
9
a2p+13 − bp−13 =
2p2 + 27pv − pu− 2u− 8
54
we obtain a = 2p−u+9v−418 and b =
2p−u−9v−4
18 .
2
It is possible to obtain a representation of the Gauss sum G1(1, χ3) in terms of a single root ηp of
q(z) by expressingG0,G1, andG2 in terms of ηp, becauseQ(ηp) is the splitting field of q(z), as seen
in Theorem 3 (cf. also [2]). For example, we may set G0 = ηp, thus the other roots, that is, Gauss
periods, are
G1 =
G20
v
+
4− u− 3v
6v
G0 +
2− u− 9v − 4p
18v
,
G2 = −G
2
0
v
− 3v − u+ 4
6v
G0 − 9v − u− 4p+ 2
18v
.
We note that changing the sign of v is equivalent to exchanging the values of G1 and G2. These
equations establish a correspondence betweenG0, and G1 and G2, thus the coefficients a, b, and c
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in equation (7.7) can be uniquely specified, for instance the equation G0G1 = aG0 + bG1 + cG2 is
satisfied choosing
a =
2p− u− 9v − 4
18
and b =
2p − u+ 9v − 4
18
,
whatever be the sign of v; c is specified in any case as shown in Theorem 7.6.
These observations yield the following representation:
Theorem 7.7. The Gauss sum G1(1, χ3) is uniquely characterized in terms of a root ηp of q(z), with u, v
obtained from the representation u2 + 27v2 of 4p, as
ηp+ ζ3(
η2p
v
+
4− u− 3v
6v
ηp+
2− u− 9v − 4p
18v
)+ ζ23 (−
η2p
v
− 3v − u+ 4
6v
ηp− 9v − u− 4p+ 2
18v
) . (7.9)
Remark 7.16. Since ζ23 = −1− ζ3, we can write
G1(1, χ3) = G0 −G2 + ζ3(G1 −G2) ,
thus the relation G1(1, χ3)G¯1(1, χ3) = p yields
p = (G0 −G2)2 − (G0 −G2)(G1 −G2) + (G1 −G2)2
which shows that the equation x2−xy+y2 = p has further solutions in the maximal order ofQ(ζp) besides
the solutions in rational integers, for example x = r1(η) − η and y = r2(η) − η.
Example Consider p = 7, then the Gauss sum has the form
G1(1, χ) = (ζ7 + ζ
6
7 ) + ζ3(ζ
2
7 + ζ
5
7 ) + ζ
2
3 (ζ
3
7 + ζ
4
7 ) ,
the coefficientsGj of the powers of ζ3 are real, and are roots of the cubic polynomial z
3+z2−2z−1,
which has a cyclic Galois group of order 3 over Q. Let η7 be a root of this polynomial. The other
roots are −2 + η27 and 1− η7 − η27 , thus if we choose the roots η7 = ζ7 + ζ67 , and the other two roots
equal to ζ27+ζ
5
7 and ζ
3
7+ζ
4
7 , respectively, we obtain the expression η7+ζ3(−2+η27)+ζ23 (1−η7−η27),
which coincides with the expression obtained specializing (7.9) with p = 7, u = 1, and v = 1.
Furthermore, it is direct to check that x = −2+η27−η7 and y = 1−η7−η27−η7 give a representation
of 7 through the quadratic form x2−xy+ y2 in integers ofQ(η7), which may be of interest besides
the 12 representations in rational integers (see e.g. [60, Proposition 8.3.1], [78]), namely x = 2 and
y = −1 and those obtained through associates and conjugates of 2− ζ3 in Q(ζ3).
A Gauss sum over Fpr is in general also not rational, as can be found using Davenport-Hasse’s
theorem, [16, 63], by lifting the case over Fp. If there exists an irreducible polynomialX
r − β over
Fp we can use Lemma 7.6 to obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 7.8. If p = 6k + 1, and if there exists an irreducible polynomial Xr − β over Fp, then Gr(1, χ3)
is again an element of the subfield Q(ζ3, η) of degree 6 of Q(ζ3p), and in particular it can be written in the
form
Gr(1, χ3) = χ¯3(r)G1(1, χ3)Br,1(α) ,
where α is a root of Xr − β. The factor Br,1(α) has the form B0 + B1ζ3 + B2ζ23 where B0, B1, and B2
are positive rational integers, that can be computed, up to a permutation, from the solutions of a quadratic
Diophantine equation.
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PROOF. By Lemma 7.6, we have
Gr(1, χ3) = χ¯3(r)G1(1, χ3)Br,1(α) ,
whereBr,1(α) is an element ofQ(ζ3)with absolute value
√
pr−1 (by taking absolute values of both
sides). This expression shows that Gr(1, χ3) belongs to Q(η, ζ3) as G1(1, χ3), since Br,1(α) belongs
to Q(ζ3). The factor Br,1(α) ∈ Q(ζ3) can be written as
Br,1(α) = B0 +B1ζ3 +B2ζ
2
3
where B0, B1, and B2 are positive integers whose sum is p
r−1. Since the square of the norm of
Br,1(α) is p
r−1, we have the Diophantine equation
pr−1 = B20 +B
2
1 +B
2
2 −B0B1 −B1B2 −B2B0 .
Using the relation B0 + B1 + B2 = p
r−1, we eliminate B2 and obtain a quadratic Diophantine
equation that can be solved for B0 and B1:
3B20 + 3B
2
1 + 3B0B1 − 3pr−1B0 − 3pr−1B1 + 3(p2r−1 − pr−1) = 0 .
With the substitution
B0 =
X + pr−1
3
, B1 =
Y + pr−1
3
,
we obtain the equation
X2 +XY + Y 2 − 3pr−1 = 0 ,
whose solutions can be obtained from the solution of
u2 + uv + v2 = p
as coming from
X − ζ3Y = (1− ζ3)(u− vζ3)r−1
by composition of quadratic forms. The ultimate assignment of the solutions to the Bi depends
on the choice of the primitive roots in the definition of the Gauss sums.
2
In the following we focus on the special case r = 2 to enlighten some properties and relations
of the Gauss sums seen from different perspectives.
Theorem 7.9. If p = 6k + 1, then G2(1, χ3) is again an element of the subfield Q(ζ3, η) of degree 6 of
Q(ζ3p), and in particular it can be written in the form
G2(1, χ3) = G1(1, χ3)A1(
1
2α
) ,
where α is a root of x2 − β and β ∈ Fp is a cube and quadratic non-residue.
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PROOF. As in Theorem 7.4, we can find such an α and then use Lemma 7.7 to deduce
G2(1, χ3) = G1(1, χ3)
∑
z∈Fp
χ3(
1
2α
+ z) = G1(1, χ3)A1(
1
2α
) ,
where A1(
1
2α ) is an element of Q(ζ3)with absolute value
√
p and χ3(α) = 1.
In conclusion G2(1, χ3) = G1(1, χ3)A1(
1
2α) shows that G2(1, χ3) belongs to Q(η, ζ3).
2
Remark 7.17. Theorem 7.9 states that the Gauss sumG2(1, χ3) is the product of G1(1, χ3) and A1(
1
2α ), a
result that is slightly different from that obtained using Davenport-Hasse’s theorem [60], which states that
G2(1, χ
′
3) = −G1(1, χ3)2, where χ′3 is defined by extending the nontrivial character over Fp to a character
over Fpm , using the extension rule
χ′3(x) = χ3(NFpm (x)),
where NFpm (x) = x · xp · · · xp
m−1
is the norm of x. In our case we have χ′3(x) = χ3(NFp2 (x)), and
whenever χ′3 is restricted to Fp, we specifically have
χ′3(x) = χ3(NFp2 (x)) = χ3(x
2) = χ¯3(x) ∀x ∈ Fp .
Therefore, since G2(1, χ¯
′
3) = χ
′
3(−1)G¯2(1, χ′3) = G¯2(1, χ′3), the equation given by Davenport-Hasse can
be read as
G2(1, χ
′
3) = −G¯1(1, χ′3)2 ,
where χ′3 is a cubic character defined in Fp2 , and G¯1(1, χ
′
3) is evaluated on the subset Fp.
In the following proposition we show how this relation may also be derived elementarily. First
we need a well-known lemma (see also [60, Proposition 8.3.3] or [1]), for which we present an
alternative proof:
Lemma 7.18. If p = 6k + 1, then G1(1, χ3)
3 = p
∑
x∈Fp χ3(x(x− 1)).
PROOF. The proof is straightforward from the computation of the cube
G1(1, χ3)
3 =
∑
x,y,z∈Fp
χ3(xyz)ζ
x+y+z
p =
∑
x,y,u∈Fp
χ3(xy(u− x− y))ζup ,
in which the substitution u = x + y + z has been performed. The summation over x can be split
into two summations S1 and S2, depending on whether u = y or u 6= y. The first summation turns
out to be 0, since
S1 =
∑
y∈Fp
∑
x∈Fp
χ3(xy (x))ζ
y
p =
∑
y∈Fp
χ3(y)ζ
y
p
∑
x∈Fp
χ3(x
2) =
∑
y∈Fp
χ3(y)ζ
y
p
∑
x∈Fp
χ23(x) = 0 .
The second summation, with the substitution x = x′(u− y), becomes
S2 =
∑
y,u∈Fp
y 6=u
ζup
∑
x∈Fp
χ3(xy(u− x− y)) =
∑
y,u∈Fp
y 6=u
χ3(y)ζ
u
p
∑
x′∈Fp
χ¯3(u− y)χ3(x′(1− x′)) .
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Defining A =
∑
x′∈Fp χ3(x
′(1− x′)), a constant that does not depend on u or y, we may write
S2 = A
∑
u∈Fp
ζup
∑
y 6=u
χ3(y)χ¯3(u− y) = A[
∑
y∈Fp
χ3(y)χ¯3(0− y) +
∑
u 6=0
ζup
∑
y∈Fp
χ3(y)χ¯3(u− y)] .
In conclusion, we have S2 = Ap, since the first summation over y is p − 1, the second summation
over y is −1 independently of u, [102, 126]; finally, the summation over u is −1, so that p − 1 +
(−1)(−1) = p.
2
Since G1(1, χ3)G¯1(1, χ3) = p, the above result gives
G1(1, χ3)
3 = G1(1, χ3)G¯1(1, χ3)A
which implies that G1(1, χ3)
2 = G¯1(1, χ3)A. On the other hand, Theorem 7.9 gives
G2(1, χ3) = G1(1, χ3)A1(
1
2α
) ,
thus we can prove the identityG2(1, χ3) = −G¯1(1, χ3)2, implied by Davenport-Hasse’s theorem, if
we can prove that A = −A¯1( 12α ). It is in fact immediately seen that both A and A1( 12α ) are primes
of the form a+ bζ3 and field norm p in Z(ζ3). Less direct is the exact relation between them, which
we establish in the following proposition making use of the function defined as
F (d, i) =
∑
y∈F∗p
χ3(y)=1
(
giy + d
p
)
,
where g is a primitive element in Fp.
Proposition 7.19.
A = −A¯1( 1
2α
) .
PROOF. We can write A in the following form
A =
∑
x∈Fp
χ3(x(x− 1)) =
∑
z∈Fp
χ3(z
2 − 1
4
) , (7.10)
where the last expressionwas obtained bymaking the substitution x = z+ 12 . Furthermore,A1(
1
2α )
can be written in a similar form, arguing as follows:
A¯1(
1
2α
) =
∑
x∈Fp
χ¯3(x+
1
2α
) =
∑
x∈Fp
χ3(x+
1
2α
)2 .
Furthermore, the identity χ3(y) = χ3(y)
p = χ3(y
p), which is true since p is congruent to 1modulo
3 and χ3 is a multiplicative character, implies
χ3(x+
1
2α
) = χ3(x+
1
2α
)p = χ3(x
p +
1
(2α)p
) = χ3(x− 1
(2α)
) ,
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as x and 2 belong to Fp, α is a root of x
2−β and the Frobenius automorphism exchanges the roots.
Then
A¯1(
1
2α
) =
∑
x∈Fp
χ3(x+
1
2α
)χ3(x+
1
2α
) =
∑
x∈Fp
χ3(x
2 − 1
4β
) . (7.11)
We notice now that, by definition, the value of any summation
∑
z∈Fp χ3(z
2 − d) can be written in
the form a0 + a1ζ3 + a2ζ
2
3 , where a0, a1 and a2 are the numbers of z ∈ Fp such that the value of
χ3(z
2 − d) is either 1, or ζ3, or ζ23 . Therefore, writing z2 − d = giy, with χ3(y) = 1, we have
ai =
∑
y∈F∗p
χ3(y)=1
[1 +
(
giy + d
p
)
] =
p− 1
3
+ F (d, i) i = 0, 1, 2 ,
since [1 +
(
giy + d
p
)
] is equal to 0, if giy + d is not a square; it is equal to 1 if giy + d = 0; and it
is equal to 2 if giy + d is a square.
Then, setting A = b0 + b1ζ3 + b2ζ
2
3 and A¯1(
1
2α) = c0 + c1ζ3 + c2ζ
2
3 , and using the expressions for A
and A¯1(
1
2α ) given in (7.10) and (7.11), we obtain
bi =
∑
y∈F∗p
χ3(y)=1
[1 +
(
giy + 14
p
)
] and ci =
∑
y∈F∗p
χ3(y)=1
[1 +
(
giy + 14β
p
)
] i = 0, 1, 2 .
The numbers ci can be written as follows
ci =
∑
y∈F∗p
χ3(y)=1
[1 +
(
giy + 14β
p
)
] =
∑
y∈F∗p
χ3(y)=1
[1−
(
β
p
)(
giy + 14β
p
)
] =
∑
y∈F∗p
χ3(y)=1
[1−
(
giβy + 14
p
)
]
because β is a quadratic non-residue; furthermore, since β is a cube, setting w = yβ, we deduce
that
ci =
∑
w∈F∗p
χ3(w)=1
[1−
(
giw + 14
p
)
] =
p− 1
3
− F (1
4
, i) ,
which only differs in sign from bi =
p−1
3 + F (
1
4 , i). The proposition follows from the fact that
A = b0 + b1ζ3 + b2ζ
2
3 = (b0 − b2) + (b1 − b2)ζ3
and
A¯1(
1
2α
) = (c0 − c2) + (c1 − c2)ζ3 = (b2 − b0) + (b2 − b1)ζ3 .
2
Remark 7.20. As has been said, Gauss sums are algebraic integers that belong to a subfield of a cyclotomic
field, and in the above theorems we found some factorizations of Gauss sums into elements that may belong
to different subfields. For example Theorem 4 shows that G2(1, χ3) ∈ Q(ζ3, η) can be expressed as a
product of G1(1, χ3) ∈ Q(ζ3, η) and A1( 12α ) ∈ Q(ζ3). The general picture of the fields involved in these
factorizations is shown in the following figure
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Every extension is Galois, in particular Q(η), Q(ζ3) and Q(ζ3, η) have Galois groups G(Q(η)/Q),
G(Q(ζ3)/Q), and G(Q(ζ3, η)/Q), which are cyclic groups of order 3, 2, and 6, respectively; more-
over, the third group G(Q(ζ3, η)/Q) = G(Q(ζ3)/Q) × G(Q(η)/Q) is a direct product of the other
two (see also [121]). In these fields, every rational prime p of the form 6k + 1 splits into prime
ideals as follows:
(p) = p3 in Q(η), i.e. the ideal (p) fully ramifies;
(p) = (pi1)(pi2) in Q(ζ3), i.e. the ideal (p) fully splits into principal ideals;
(p) = P31P
3
2 in Q(ζ3, η), i.e. the ideal (p) fully splits into ramified ideals;
(pi1) = P
3
1 and (pi2) = P
3
2, i.e. the principal ideals of Q(ζ3) fully ramify in Q(ζ3, η);
p = P1P2 in Q(ζ3, η).
These factorizations can be established by the properties given in [33, pg. 137-138], that is Dedekind’s
formulation in terms of ideals of a theorem of Kummer’s, or in [121, pg. 15].
Let τ2 denote the automorphism of order 2 in G(Q(ζ3)/Q), which leaves the elements of Q(η)
invariant when considered as elements of G(Q(ζ3, η)/Q), then τ2(P1) = P2.
Now, the Gauss sum G1(1, χ3) is an element of Q(ζ3, η) that divides p, as G1(1, χ3)G¯1(1, χ3) = p,
[16], so that (G1(1, χ3))(τ2(G1(1, χ3))) = (G1(1, χ3))(G¯1(1, χ3)) = (p).Therefore the principal ideal
(G1(1, χ3)) will be a product of powers of the two primes P1 and P2, i.e (G1(1, χ3)) = P
a
1P
b
2,
where a + b = 3 by the unique factorization in prime ideals, since the previous relation gives
(p) = Pa1P
b
2τ2(P
a
1P
b
2) = P
a
1P
b
2P
a
2P
b
1 = P
a+b
1 P
a+b
2 .
Thus, we may assume that (G1(1, χ3)) = P1P
2
2, as G1(1, χ3) belongs properly to Q(ζ3, η), whence
Theorem 7.9 and Proposition 7.19 show that (G2(1, χ3)) = P
4
1P
2
2 = (pi1)P1P
2
2.
In this framework, if the character χ′3 is used, the role of the two prime ideals is simply exchanged,
i.e. (G2(1, χ
′
3)) = P
4
2P
2
1 = (pi2)P2P
2
1, which is the expression defined by Davenport-Hasse’s
theorem written in terms of ideals.
In general, the Gauss sums Gs(1, χ3) for any s can be expressed in terms of ideals as follows:
(Gs(1, χ3)) = P
s
2P
2s
1 .
However, these formulations in terms of ideals (see also [34, 66, 114]) conceal the information
about which units are involved. In this sense, the elementary direct approach can be more in-
formative, although it may require different approaches for different situations. Considering for
example the Gauss summentioned above,G1(1, χ) for p = 7 (see also [48]), setting η7 = ζ7+ζ
6
7 , we
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can explicitly write the expression (which can also be obtained specializing (7.9) with p = 7, u =
1, v = 1)
G1(1, χ) = η7 + ζ3(−2 + η27) + ζ23 (1− η7 − η27) ,
whereas, choosing the idealsP1 = (ζ3− η7),P2 = (ζ23 − η7), we must find a unit in order to obtain
a complete factorization: G1(1, χ) = (4− η7 − 2η27)(ζ3 − η7)(ζ23 − η7)2, where 4− η7 − 2η27 is a unit.
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Chapter 8
Appendix II:
Additive decompositions by
multiplicative characters
In 1952, Perron showed that quadratic residues in a field of prime order satisfy certain additive
properties. This result has been generalized in different directions, and our contribution [104] is
to provide a further generalization concerning multiplicative quadratic and cubic characters over
any finite field. In particular, recalling that a character partitions the multiplicative group of the
field into cosets with respect to its kernel, we will derive the number of representations of an
element as a sum of two elements belonging to two given cosets. These numbers are then related
to the equations satisfied by the polynomial characteristic functions of the cosets.
Further, we show a connection, a quasi-duality, with the problem of determining how many
elements can be added to each element of a subset of a coset in such a way as to obtain elements
still belonging to a subset of a coset.
8.1 Introduction
Back in 1952, Perron [91] proved that every quadratic residue in Fp, with p an odd prime, can be
written as the sum of two quadratic residues in exactly bp+14 c − 1 ways, and as the sum of two
quadratic non-residues in exactly bp+14 c ways, a symmetric statement also holding for quadratic
non-residues.
Winterhof [126] generalized this result, proving that if xj is a nonzero element in a finite field
Fq, χ a nontrivial multiplicative character of order n and ω a primitive n-th root of unity, then
σ0+1 = σ1 = · · · = σn−1 = q−1n , where σi, i = 0, . . . , n− 1, stands for the number of field elements
x such that χ(x)χ¯(x+ xj) = ω
i.
A generalization in a different direction was provided by Monico and Elia [80, 81]: they
proved that the only partition of the field satisfying the additive properties found by Perron is
that of quadratic residues and non-residues, providing a sort of converse and a way to define
residues additively; moreover, they generalized Perron’s result for any multiplicative character
defined over a prime field.
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Lastly, in his dissertation [98] Raymond showed how to generalize the case of the quadratic
character to any finite field.
We provide here further generalizations considering quadratic and cubic characters over any
finite field. Section 8.2 provides notations and preliminaries for the rest of the chapter. In Section
8.3 we derive expressions for the number of (ordered) representations of an element as a sum of
two elements belonging to two given cosets of the character partition. Furthermore, these expres-
sions are shown to be related to the equations satisfied by the polynomial characteristic functions
of the cosets. In Section 8.4 we point out the mentioned quasi-duality relationship with the other
problem, and recall from chapter 3 how the two problems are involved in polynomial factoriza-
tion.
8.2 Preliminaries
Throughout the chapter we will deal with multiplicative characters, which are supposed to be
non-trivial.
Let Fpm , p an odd prime, be a finite field with polynomial basis {1, η, η2, . . . , ηm−1}where η is
a root of an irreducible polynomial of degreem over Fp, and let B0 be the set of squares (excluding
0) and B1 the complementary set in F∗pm . We recall that the quadratic character is a mapping from
F∗pm into the complex numbers defined as
χ2(α
hθ) = (−1)h , θ ∈ B0, h = 0, 1 ,
where α is a primitive element in F∗pm . Furthermore, we set χ2(0) = 0.
We can define an indicator function of the sets Bj using the quadratic character, namely, for
every γ 6= 0,
IBj (γ) =
1 + (−1)jχ2(γ)
2
=
{
1 if γ ∈ Bj
0 otherwise
j = 0, 1 .
Also, writing γ = γ0 + γ1η + · · · + γm−1ηm−1, a polynomial characteristic function that identifies
the set Bj can be defined as
fBj(X) =
∑
γ∈F∗pm
IBj (γ)X
γ ,
where Xγ is a short notation standing for the monomial xγ00 x
γ1
1 · · · xγm−1m−1 . Note that this notation
allows us to formally write
XγXδ = Xγ+δ mod IX ,
where IX = 〈(xp1 − 1), . . . , (xpm − 1)〉 is an ideal in Q[X].
It is immediate to see that, if Φp(x) is the p-th cyclotomic polynomial,
fB0(X) + fB1(X) + 1 =
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
Xγ + 1 =
m−1∏
i=0
Φp(xi) . (8.1)
In the following we will indicate the last product with the notation Φ(X).
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In the case of cubic characters, non-trivial characters exist only if p is 2 with even exponent
m, or p is an odd prime congruent to 1 modulo 6, or p is an odd prime congruent to 5 modulo 6
with even exponentm.
Let us write any nonzero element of the field as αk+3n, with k ∈ {0, 1, 2} and α a primitive
element: we define A0 = {α3i : i = 0, . . . , p
m−1
3 − 1}, that is the subgroup of the cubic powers in
F∗pm , and let A1 = αA0 and A2 = α2A0 be the two cosets that complete the coset partition of the
set of nonzero elements of Fpm .
Similarly to the case of the quadratic character, we define an indicator function of the setsAj
using a cubic character, that is a mapping of the type
χ3(α
hθ) = ωh , θ ∈ A0, h = 0, 1, 2 ,
with ω a primitive cubic root of unity in C (and χ3(0) = 0 by definition).
The indicator function, for every x 6= 0, is then
IAj (x) =
1 + ω2jχ3(x) + ω
jχ¯3(x)
3
=
{
1 if x ∈ Aj
0 otherwise
j = 0, 1, 2 ,
(where the bar denotes complex conjugation), and a characteristic function that identifies the set
Aj can be defined in the same way as above:
fAj(X) =
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
IAj (γ)X
γ j = 0, 1, 2 .
Again it is immediate to see that
fA0(X) + fA1(X) + fA2(X) + 1 =
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
Xγ + 1 = Φ(X) . (8.2)
Remark 8.1. It is worthwhile to note that the use of the indicator functions provides a sort of bridge between
our problems about the sums of residues and the classical problem of counting the number of solutions of
certain diagonal equations over finite fields [16, 68]. The special diagonal equations we refer to are equations
of the form a1x
k
1+a2x
k
2 + · · ·+anxkn = α, where a1, a2, . . . , an, α are fixed elements of a finite field Fq, the
exponents k is a positive integer, and the unknowns x1, . . . xn may assume any value in the same field. A
difference between the two problems is evident when the exponent k is a factor of q−1, for example counting
the number of solutions (x, y) of x3 + y3 = α with q − 1 divisible by 3, is not the same as counting the
number of representations of a given element α as a sum of cubic residues, that is counting the number of
solutions of the equation x + y = α where x and y are constrained to be cubic residues. The count of the
number of solutions of diagonal equations includes all x’s whose power xk has the same value, while the
sum of k-th residues does not consider this multiplicity, and also excludes the zero value. Therefore, the two
problems are clearly related, but a considerable effort is needed to obtain the solution of one of them from the
solution of the other.
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8.3 Results
To count the number of representations of a β 6= 0 in the field Fpm as the sum of an element in Bj
and an element in Bi (i not necessarily different from j), it suffices to compute
∑
z 6=0,β
1 + (−1)jχ2(z)
2
1 + (−1)iχ2(β − z)
2
(8.3)
Analogously, when we have a cubic character, to count the number of representations of a
β 6= 0 in the field Fpm as the sum of an element in Aj and an element in Ai (i not necessarily
different from j), it suffices to compute
∑
z 6=0,β
1 + ω2jχ3(z) + ω
jχ¯3(z)
3
1 + ω2iχ3(β − z) + ωiχ¯3(β − z)
3
. (8.4)
We summarize the conclusions in the next three theorems.
Theorem 8.1. The number of representations R
(2)
pm(β, i, j) of a β 6= 0 in the field Fpm , p an odd prime, as
the sum of an element in Bj and an element in Bi is
R
(2)
pm(β, i, j) =
1
4
(
pm − 2− χ2(β)(−1)i − χ2(β)(−1)j − (−1)i+jχ2(−1)
)
, (8.5)
and depends only on the quadratic residuacity of β.
PROOF. The proof is immediate from (8.3), since, for any nontrivial character χ,
∑
x∈Fpm χ(x) = 0
and
∑
x∈Fpm χ(x)χ¯(x+ γ) = −1 ([16, 88, 102, 126]).
2
Remark 8.2. From (8.5) the desired values can be easily read, depending on whether β is in B0 or B1 and
whether pm is congruent to 1 or 3modulo 4 (which determines χ2(−1) by the properties of the Jacobi symbol
and the quadratic reciprocity law); in particular, we can also read the values for which i 6= j, that are not
usually explicitly included in the literature; in this case equation (8.5) becomes
1
4
(pm − 2 + χ2(−1)) . (8.6)
Theorem 8.2. The number of representations R
(3)
pm(β, i, j) of a β 6= 0 in the field Fpm as the sum of an
element in Aj and an element in Ai is
R
(3)
pm(β, i, j) =
1
9
(pm − 2−K − K¯) (8.7)
with
K = χ3(β)(ω
2i + ω2j) + ω2i+j − ω2i+2jχ¯3(β)J(χ3, χ3),
J(χ3, χ3) being a Jacobi sum (
∑
c1+c2=1
χ3(c1)χ3(c2)), and depends only on the cubic residuacity of β.
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PROOF. Expanding equation (8.4), using
∑
x∈Fpm χ3(x) = 0 and
∑
x∈Fpm χ3(x)χ¯3(x + γ) = −1,
and given that χ3(−1) = 1, we get
1
9
[
pm − 2− χ3(β)(ω2i + ω2j)− χ¯3(β)(ωi + ωj)− (ω2i+j + ωi+2j) + ω2i+2jA(β) + ωi+jA¯(β)
]
where A(β) =
∑
x∈Fpm χ3(x)χ3(β − x); this summation can be manipulated as∑
x∈Fpm
χ3(x)χ3(β − x) = χ3(β2)
∑
x∈Fpm
χ3(β
−1x)χ3(1− β−1x) = χ¯(β)A(1) = χ¯(β)J(χ3, χ3),
whence the conclusion follows.
Remark 8.3. The last expression can be further simplified taking into account that J(χ3, χ3) can be com-
puted [68, Th. 5.21] with the Gauss sums of cubic characters (cf. also [103, 102]), as
J(χ3, χ3) =
G2m(1, χ3)
Gm(1, χ¯3)
.
In particular, if p = 2,∑
x∈F2m
χ3(x)χ3(x+ 1) = J(χ3, χ3) = Gm(1, χ3) = −(−2)m/2 .
Theorem 8.3. If p ≡ 1 mod 4, then R(2)pm(0, i, j) is p−12 for i = j or 0 if i 6= j; if p ≡ 3 mod 4, then
R
(2)
pm(0, i, j) is
p−1
2 for i 6= j or 0 if i = j. R
(3)
pm(0, i, j) is
p−1
3 for i = j or 0 if i 6= j.
PROOF. The proof is immediate, taking into account that an element α is in the same coset as −α
exactly when χ2(−1) = 1 (resp. χ3(−1) = 1).
2
Working with the characteristic functions, the counterpart of the above theoremswould be to
multiply fBi(X) and fBj(X) (or fAi(X) and fAj(X)) modulo IX, and then read the coefficients in
the output, which involves exactly the same computations as above. But there is more: the char-
acteristic functions fBi(X) and fAj (X) satisfy equations of second and third degree, respectively,
whose coefficients are intrinsically related to the number of representations of the field elements
as sums of elements with given quadratic or cubic residuacity.
Theorem 8.4. The characteristic functions fB0(X) and fB1(X) are roots of a quadratic equation
y2 − σ1y + σ2 = 0 mod IX (8.8)
in the residue ring of multivariate polynomials Z[X]/IX. The sum and the product of the roots (polynomi-
als) are {
σ1 = −1 + Φ(X) mod IX
σ2 = −14 [pmχ2(−1)− 1− Φ(X)(pm − 2 + χ2(−1))] mod IX
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PROOF. Throughout the proof all the multivariate polynomials should be intended modulo the
ideal IX. The coefficient σ1 is directly obtained from equation (8.1), that is
σ1 = fB0(X) + fB1(X) =
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
(IB0(γ) + IB1(γ))X
γ = −1 + Φ(X) .
The coefficient σ2 is computed using the symbols R
(2)
pm(β, i, j) as follows. Starting from
σ2 = fB0(X)fB1(X) =
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
∑
κ∈F∗
pm
IB0(γ)IB1(κ)X
γ+κ ,
and observing that exchanging the summation indices (variables) leaves the result invariant, we
may consider the symmetric summation
σ2 =
1
2
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
∑
κ∈F∗
pm
[IB0(γ)IB1(κ) + IB0(κ)IB1(γ)]X
γ+κ ,
and perform the index substitution κ = β−γ; the index β may be 0 but it cannot assume the value
γ; thus we may write
σ2 =
1
2
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
∑
β∈Fpm
β 6=γ
[IB0(γ)IB1(β − γ) + IB0(β − γ)IB1(γ)]Xβ .
Now, in the summation over β we separate the term with β = 0 and write
σ2 =
1
2
∑
γ∈F∗
pm

∑
β∈F∗
pm
β 6=γ
[IB0(γ)IB1(β − γ) + IB0(β − γ)IB1(γ)]Xβ + C
 .
where C = [IB0(γ)IB1(−γ) + IB0(−γ)IB1(γ)] = 1−χ2(−1)2 , thus exchanging the two summations
and, noting that
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
C = (pm − 1)C , we have
σ2 =
pm − 1
2
C +
1
2
∑
β∈F∗
pm
Xβ

∑
γ∈F∗
pm
γ 6=β
[IB0(γ)IB1(β − γ) + IB0(β − γ)IB1(γ)]
 .
Recalling the definition of R
(2)
pm(β, i, j), we may write the summation over γ as
σ2 =
pm − 1
2
C +
1
2
∑
β∈F∗
pm
Xβ
{
R
(2)
pm(β, 0, 1) +R
(2)
pm(β, 1, 0)
}
.
In conclusion, since R
(2)
pm(β, 0, 1) = R
(2)
pm(β, 1, 0) does not depend on β, we obtain
σ2 =
pm − 1
2
1− χ2(−1)
2
+R
(2)
pm(β, 0, 1)(Φ(X) − 1) ,
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and, using (8.6), we finally obtain
σ2 = −1
4
[pmχ2(−1)− 1− Φ(X)(pm − 2 + χ2(−1))] .
2
Theorem 8.5. The characteristic functions fA0(X), fA1(X), and fA2(X) are roots of a cubic equation
y3 − σ1y2 + σ2y − σ3 = 0 mod IX , (8.9)
where
σ1 = Φ(X)− 1 mod IX
σ2 =
1
3(p
m − 1)(Φ(X) − 1) mod IX
σ3 =
1
27
[
(Φ(X)− 1)3 + (3− 3Φ(X) + J(χ3, χ3) + J¯(χ3, χ3))(pm − Φ(X))
]
mod IX
PROOF. Throughout the proof all the multivariate polynomials should be intended modulo the
ideal IX. The coefficient σ1 is easily computed as
fA0(X) + fA1(X) + fA2(X) =
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
(IA0(γ) + IA1(γ) + IA2(γ))X
γ = −1 + Φ(X) ,
because IA0(γ) + IA1(γ) + IA2(γ) = 1 and equation (8.1) is used. The elementary symmetric
function σ2 is the sum
fA0(X)fA1(X) + fA1(X)fA2(X) + fA2(X)fA0(X) ,
then we need to compute the summation
σ2 =
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
∑
η∈F∗
pm
(IA0(γ)IA1(θ) + IA1(γ)IA2(θ) + IA2(γ)IA0(θ))X
γ+θ .
Using (8.7), we get
σ2 = −1
3
(pm − 1) + 1
3
(pm − 1)Φ(X) .
Lastly, the elementary symmetric function σ3 = fA0(X)fA1(X)fA2(X) is given by the summation
σ3 =
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
∑
θ∈F∗
pm
∑
κ∈F∗
pm
IA0(γ)IA1(θ)IA2(κ)X
γ+θ+κ .
Expanding the product of the indicator functions and performing the summations, most of the 27
sums are canceled, and it remains to compute the following:
1
27
∑
γ∈F∗q
∑
θ∈F∗
pm
∑
κ∈F∗
pm
(1− 3χ3(γ)χ¯3(θ) + χ3(γ)χ3(θ)χ3(κ) + χ¯3(γ)χ¯3(θ)χ¯3(κ))Xγ+θ+κ .
To complete the task we then need to compute only three summations.
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1. The summation ∑
γ∈F∗
pm
∑
θ∈F∗
pm
∑
κ∈F∗
pm
Xγ+θ+κ = (Φ(X)− 1)3 ;
is easily obtained, because the three summations on γ, θ, and κ can be performed indepen-
dently.
2. The summation
∑
γ∈F∗
pm
∑
θ∈F∗
pm
∑
κ∈F∗
pm
χ3(γ)χ¯3(θ)X
γ+θ+κ is computed by extending the sum range
to include 0; this is done using the function δ(κ) which is 1 if κ = 0, and is 0 otherwise, thus
the summation is
∑
γ∈Fpm
∑
θ∈Fpm
∑
κ∈Fpm
χ3(γ)χ¯3(θ)(1 − δ(κ))Xγ+θ+κ which splits into two sum-
mations∑
γ∈Fpm
∑
θ∈Fpm
∑
κ∈Fpm
χ3(γ)χ¯3(θ)X
γ+θ+κ −
∑
γ∈Fpm
∑
θ∈Fpm
∑
κ∈Fpm
χ3(γ)χ¯3(θ)δ(κ)X
γ+θ+κ .
In the triple summations, the sum over κ can be performed independently and gives Φ(X)
for the first, and simply 1 for the second. Thus we have
(Φ(X)− 1)
∑
γ∈Fpm
∑
θ∈Fpm
χ3(γ)χ¯3(θ)X
γ+θ .
The double summation can be easily evaluated with the substitution θ = β − γ∑
β∈Fpm
∑
γ∈Fpm
χ3(γ)χ¯3(β − γ)Xβ = pm − 1−
∑
β∈F∗
pm
Xβ = pm − Φ(X) ,
because the sum over γ assumes only two values, namely −1 if β 6= 0 and pm− 1 if β = 0. In
conclusion we obtain
(Φ(X)− 1)(pm − Φ(X)) .
3. The sums in the triple summation∑
γ∈F∗pm
∑
θ∈F∗pm
∑
κ∈F∗pm
χ3(γ)χ3(θ)χ3(κ)X
γ+θ+κ =
∑
β∈Fpm
∑
θ∈Fpm
∑
γ∈Fpm
χ3(γ)χ3(θ)χ3(β−(γ+θ))Xβ ,
have been extended throughout Fpm as χ3(0) = 0, together with the substitution κ = β −
(γ + θ). Now, the summation over γ has two values, namely 0 if β = θ, and χ¯3(β − θ)A(1) if
β 6= θ, where as above A(1) =∑x∈Fpm χ3(x)χ3(1− x) = J(χ3, χ3), therefore we obtain∑
β∈Fpm
∑
θ∈Fpm
θ 6=β
χ3(θ)χ¯3(β − θ)A(1)Xβ =
∑
β∈Fpm
∑
θ∈Fpm
χ3(θ)χ¯3(β − θ)A(1)Xβ = A(1)(pm − Φ(X))
since the restriction θ 6= β can be removed and the summation over θ is −1 if β 6= 0 or pm− 1
if β = 0.
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In conclusion, collecting the results we obtain
σ3 =
1
27
(
(Φ(X)− 1)3 − 3(Φ(X)− 1)(pm − Φ(X)) + [J(χ3, χ3) + J¯(χ3, χ3)](pm − Φ(X))
)
2
Remark 8.4. Note that J(χ3, χ3) + J¯(χ3, χ3) is always an integer, being twice the sum of real parts of
cubic roots of unity.
Remark 8.5. Even though its derivation involved handling products of three characters, the expression of
σ3 only involves the Jacobi sum A(1), i.e. fundamentally only the number of representations as the sum of
two elements of two given cosets.
8.4 Connections with other problems
In this section we point out a sort of duality relationship with the following problem.
Suppose that we have t elements of a finite field Fpm all belonging to one of the cosets deter-
mined by the character partition. We would like to know how many βs there are in the field such
that, adding β to all the t elements, we get t elements still belonging to a common coset. If the
character has order n, we let N
(n)
pm (t) be the number of βs; i.e. it is the number of solutions β of a
system of t equations in Fpm of the form
αjzn1 + β = α
kyn1
αjzn2 + β = α
kyn2
...
αjznt + β = α
kynt
(8.10)
where αjzn1 , α
jzn2 , · · · , αjznt are given and distinct, α being a primitive element, whereas the ele-
ments yis must be chosen in the field to satisfy the system, and the n values {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} for
k and j are all considered. However, we may assume j = 0, since dividing each equation by αj ,
and setting β′ = βα−j and k′ = k − j mod n, we see that the number of solutions of the system is
independent of j.
An explicit solutionwhen the character is quadratic or cubic can be obtained, again by means
of the indicator functions. For example, if we have a cubic character over F2m , given a zi we
can partition the elements β 6= z3i in F2m into subsets depending on the k ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that
χ(β + z3i ) = ω
k. Therefore, a solution of (8.10) for a fixed k and j = 0 is singled out by the product
t∏
i=1
IAk(β + z
3
i ) =
1
3t
[1 +
t∑
i=1
σ
(k)
i ] ,
where each σ
(k)
i is a homogeneous sum of monomials which are products of i characters of the
form χ(β + z3h) or χ¯(β + z
3
h). ThusN
(3)
2m (t) is
N
(3)
2m (t) =
∑
β∈F2m
β 6∈{z3i }
[
t∏
i=1
IA0(β + z
3
i ) +
t∏
i=1
IA1(β + z
3
i ) +
t∏
i=1
IA2(β + z
3
i )
]
. (8.11)
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The zi are excluded from the sum, since z
3
i + z
3
i = 0 does not belong to any coset.
In Chapter 3 or in [41], which deal with this problem to analyse the success rate of the Cantor-
Zassenhaus polynomial factorization algorithm, we computed exactly some of the above expres-
sions for small values of t, and gave bounds for more general cases. In particular, we found that
1 + max
z1 6=z2 6=z3
N
(3)
2m (3) =
{
1
9(2
m + 2m/2 − 2) for m/2 even
1
9(2
m + 2m/2+1 + 1) for m/2 odd
and
1 + max
z1 6=z2 6=z3
N
(2)
pm (3) =

1
4 (p
m − 1) for p = 4k + 1
1
4 (p
m + 1) for p = 4k + 3, m odd
1
4 (p
m − 1) for p = 4k + 3, m even
.
Recalling that R
(n)
pm (β, i, j), n = 2, 3, denotes the number of representations of a β 6= 0 in
a finite field Fpm as the sum of two element belonging to two cosets indexed by i and j in the
partition given by a character of order n, we find the remarkable identities:
max
i,j,β
R
(3)
2m(β, i, j) = 1 + max
z1 6=z2 6=z3
N
(3)
2m (3)
and
max
i,j,β
R
(2)
pm(β, i, j) = 1 + max
z1 6=z2 6=z3
N
(2)
pm (3) .
In the polynomial factorization context of Chapter 3 this quasi-duality had the following
interesting interpretation: the maximum t such that it is still possible to fail to split a polynomial
of degree t with two attempts is equal to the maximum number of attempts to split a polynomial
of degree 3.
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